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The labor movement’s groundswell in the 1990s accompanied a period of intense 
competition and conglomeration within the retail book sector. Unexpectedly, the 
intersection of these two trends produced two dozen union drives across the country 
between 1996 and 2004 at large retail bookstores, including Borders and Barnes & 
Noble. Historians have yet to fully examine these retail organizing contests or recount 
their contributions to the labor movement and its history, including booksellers’ 
pioneering use of the internet as an organizing tool. This thesis focuses on the aspirations, 
tactics, and contributions of booksellers in their struggles to unionize their workplaces, 
while also exploring the economic context surrounding bookselling and the labor 
movement at the end of the twentieth century. While the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) auspiciously announced a national campaign in 1997 to organize 
thousands of bookstore clerks, the only successfully unionized bookstore from this era 
that remains today is the Powell’s Books chain in Portland, Oregon with over 400 
workers represented by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)  
Local 5.  
Local 5’s successful union campaign at Powell’s Books occurring between 1998 
and 2000 is at the center of this study and stands out as a point of light against a dark 
backdrop of failed union attempts in the retail sector during the latter decades of the 
twentieth century. This inquiry utilizes Local 5’s internal document archive and the 
collection of oral histories gathered by labor historians Edward Beechert and Harvey 
Schwartz in 2001 and 2002. My analysis of these previously unexamined records 
demonstrates how Powell’s efforts to thwart the ILWU campaign proved a decisive 
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failure and contributed to the polarization of a super majority of the workforce behind 
Local 5. Equally, my analysis illustrates how the self-organization, initiative, and 
unrelenting creativity of booksellers transformed a narrow union election victory to 
overwhelming support for the union’s bargaining committee. Paramount to Local 5’s 
contract success was the union’s partnership with Portland’s social justice community, 
which induced a social movement around Powell’s Books at a time of increased political 
activity and unity among the nation’s labor, environment, and anti-globalization activists. 
The bonds of solidarity and mutual aid between Local 5 and its community allies were 
forged during the World Trade Organization (WTO) demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 
and Portland’s revival of May Day in 2000. Following eleven work stoppages and fifty-
three bargaining sessions, the union acquired a first contract that far exceeded any gains 
made by the UFCW at its unionized bookstores. The Powell’s agreement included 
improvements to existing health and retirement benefits plus an 18 percent wage increase 
for employees over three years. 
This analysis brings to light the formation of a distinct working-class culture and 
consciousness among Powell’s booksellers, communicated through workers’ essays, 
artwork, strikes, and solidarity actions with the social justice community. It provides a 
detailed account of Local 5’s creative street theater tactics and work stoppages that 
captured the imagination of activists and the attention of the broader community. The 
conflict forced the news media and community leaders to publicly choose sides in a labor 
dispute reminiscent of struggles not seen in Portland since the 1950s. Observers of all 
political walks worried that the Portland cultural and commercial intuition would collapse 
under the weight of the two-year labor contest. My research illustrates the tension among 
iii 
the city’s liberal and progressive populace created by the upstart union’s presence at 
prominent liberal civic leader Michael Powell’s iconic store and how the union organized 
prominent liberal leaders on the side of their cause. It concludes by recognizing that 
Local 5’s complete history remains a work in progress, but that its formation represents 




To the booksellers of ILWU Local 5  
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“The taproot of its [the labor movement] resilience has been the workers’ daily experience and the 
solidarities nurtured by that experience, which have at best encompassed a lush variety of beliefs, loyalties, 
and activists within a common commitment to democratic direction of the country’s economic and political 
life.”1  
– David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 
“Those are nothing but a bunch of anarchists,” a Portland, Oregon police officer 
dismissively characterized a rally of employees on strike at Powell’s Books. It was May 
Day 2000 and while the recently unionized workers picketed outside the hallowed 
independent bookstore, management locked the doors at the store’s iconic entrance as riot 
police surrounded the protesters. Contract negotiations had dragged on for nine months 
with no sign of ending, prompting a strike by the booksellers. As tensions rose outside 
the store of prominent liberal business figure Michael Powell, the echoing chant of “I-L-
W-U!” grew increasingly louder from a crowd marching up SW Tenth Avenue to join the 
rally. The police officer apparently hoped the warning about “anarchists” would dissuade 
the dockworkers, in town for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) 
convention, from joining the bookstore picket line.  
When the convention delegates arrived at West Burnside Street and Tenth 
Avenue, a police line blocked their progress. “Those are our people,” replied ILWU 
president, Brian McWilliams, a reference to the picketing bookstore workers who 
recently unionized and chartered ILWU Local 5. “We’re going across,” McWilliams 
stated as he stepped forward in front of three hundred longshoremen seeking to join the 
picket line. At that point, a riot gear clad officer swung a club at the fifty-year-old union 
president. The wooden stick narrowly missed McWilliams, most likely avoiding a serious 
                                                          
1 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 8. 
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melee. Immediately, the officer in charge pulled the foolhardy cop aside and allowed the 
ILWU contingent to join the picket line. With the police in retreat, Local 5 forced 
Powell’s Books to close for the day, for only the second time in its twenty-nine-year 
history.  
The two-day strike at Powell’s Books that began on May Day 2000 remains a 
milestone in Portland’s labor history and continues to hold folklore status among many in 
the city’s progressive and radical communities. Participants and those who observed the 
scene at Powell’s have been quick to share their accounts of the confrontation and 
remember the day when hundreds of burly longshoremen, alongside radicals freshly 
bruised by encounters with horse mounted officers, confronted the police on behalf of the 
comparatively and seemingly diminutive bookstore clerks. The union campaign existed 
as part and parcel of a reinvigorated labor movement as well as an emboldened global 
social justice movement that revitalized International Workers’ Day and street protest. 
Ultimately, for the bookstore employees and their union, ILWU Local 5, the May Day 
strike and street action precipitated a crucial momentum shift in contract negotiations that 
rebounded to the advantage of the union and its unique grouping of progressive allies. 
Booksellers, the Emergence of Corporate Retailing, and Employee Activism 
 May Day 2000 represents a significant historical event because it serves as an 
entry point into an investigation of several social and economic forces that converged in 
the Pacific Northwest at the turn of the twenty-first century. During the preceding two 
decades, the federal government had distanced itself from many of the policies of the 
welfare state and moved toward a free market, laissez-faire economic model. This 
included the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, 
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which unified Canada, the United States, and Mexico into a single economic trade zone, 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) a year later. During these years, public sector 
unions in Latin America, Asia, Europe, and elsewhere engaged in autonomous street and 
political actions to challenge austerity measures, the privatization of national resources, 
and free trade policies implemented by their governments often with the coordination of 
international financial agencies. While neoliberal trade agreements appeared to reflect the 
agenda of multinational corporations and promised enhanced consumer purchasing power 
through lower tariffs and the removal of national trade and investment restrictions, it 
spurred previously localized anti-corporate grassroots and progressive movements to act 
in solidarity. One example was the international movement to defend the Zapatista 
peasant uprising in Mexico that commenced on the first day of the NAFTA agreement. 
Later, the multitude of resistance movements representing environmental, labor, 
consumer, anarchist, and progressive causes captured headlines when they joined 
together to disrupt the WTO at its 1999 conference in Seattle, Washington. Similar to 
Portland’s May Day demonstration six months later, Powell’s Books workers marched in 
the streets with fellow unionists, environmentalists, and radicals at what became 
remembered as the Battle of Seattle. 
 Worker unrest within the national retail bookselling sector, including at Powell’s 
Books, paralleled a period of intense corporate expansion, acquisition, and competition in 
the field that arose in the 1990s, preceding the rise of internet retailing in the following 
decade. As Borders Books and Barnes & Noble struggled to capture a greater share of the 
market, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) made 
several efforts with minimal success at organizing bookstore employees between 1996 
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and 2004. After two previous organizing drives and an eight-month campaign that began 
in September 1998, Powell’s Books workers voted 161 to 155 in favor of union 
representation by the ILWU the following April.  
Booksellers at Borders, Barnes & Noble, and Powell’s organized unions to 
respond to the economic pressures common among all retail workers but also to address 
employee autonomy in an industry that had become increasingly centralized and 
incorporated. The organizing campaigns among booksellers in the mid-1990s and early-
2000s remain significant because employees initiated the union drives while unions of 
this period were finding little success organizing elsewhere in the retail sector, 
particularly within big-box stores.  
 The progressive and radical movements that embraced the “Spirit of Seattle” 
carried their grassroots, anti-globalization initiatives into the new century with optimism 
and greater resolve. West Coast urban centers such as Portland fostered both progressive 
middle-class and radical anti-capitalist causes between 2000 and 2003. In a signal of the 
optimism and common cause among Portland’s political left that occurred following the 
embittered 2000 presidential election, the Green Party’s Ralph Nader organized a 
“Democracy Rising: People Have the Power Tour.” The tour followed the defeat of 
Nader’s third-party presidential bid that nevertheless had attracted record crowds in 
Oregon and across the country. The post-election trek drew its largest crowd in Portland 
in August 2001 when 7,500 people and a hundred sponsoring organizations gathered to 
5 
hear Nader and other prominent progressives advocate for shopping local, supporting the 
labor movement, and building a new political movement to take back democracy.2  
Labor progressives nationwide, including Portland Jobs with Justice executive 
director Margaret Butler, subsequently acknowledged the nature of the stiff challenges 
facing the labor movement following the 9-11 attacks that came within weeks of Nader’s 
appearance in Oregon. Yet, Butler found new inspiration from the Powell’s workers who 
she described as creating a bridge “between a lot of young activists and the labor 
movement,” providing “hope for young workers who really need unions.”3 Indeed, 
following the Powell’s success, Local 5 took on new organizing campaigns in a city that 
experienced a growth of non-traditional labor organizing, including union drives among 
bike messengers, social service workers, and retail clerks by the Industrial Workers of the 
World (IWW), as well as immigrant day laborer organizing by the Voz Workers’ Rights 
Educational Project. On another front of the progressive movement, activists in Portland 
adopted new networking and internet communication strategies to protest the Iraq War. 
In the immediate years following it formation, Local 5 bookstore workers publicly 
opposed both the war and the conservative policies of President George W. Bush. 
The significance of the retail economic sector, including urban bookstores like 
Powell’s, figured substantially in turn of the twenty-first century labor discontent. By 
2015, retail employees would represent a growing 10 percent of the U.S. workforce and 
                                                          
2 “People Have the Power Tour: Portland, Ore.,” 90.7 KBOO FM, KBOO Community Radio Archive, 
Portland, Ore., MD-163, August 4, 2001; “Democracy Rising ‘People Have the Power Tour’ 2001-2003,” 
Democracy Rising, accessed January 17, 2017, http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/nader/naderrallies.html. 
3 “Margaret Butler on the Founding of ILWU Local 5.” YouTube video, 18:02, posted by “ilwulocalfive,” 
October 24, 2012, https://youtu.be/4jeWAXojrug. 
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account for fifteen million workers.4 While retail jobs have captured an increasingly 
larger proportion of the national employment market, employee income in this field has 
remained relatively stagnant and considerably lower than other categories of 
employment, creating what has been described as a precarious new population of 
working poor, or “precariat.”5  
Relevant Scholarship and Discourse 
 Scholarship on the retail sector, those who labor within it, and their organizing 
efforts remains thin among historians and academics, outside a few notable exceptions 
and a surge of interest in recent years within the social sciences. Nonetheless, a discourse 
on retail work exists among a few historians, sociologists, political economists, and labor 
organizers on several themes, which frame this inquiry into ILWU Local 5. The first 
subject that provides the foundation to study the organization of retail booksellers at the 
turn of the twenty-first century is found within the dialogue among historians concerning 
the aspirations, politics, and agency of the working and middle classes. Herbert Gutman 
blazed the trail for U.S. labor historians with a collection of essays titled Work, Culture, 
and Society in Industrializing America (1976), which examined working-class culture, 
identity, and community in the nineteenth century. Gutman’s positioning of laborers as 
subjects in their own historical and political development paralleled the writings of 
English historian E.P. Thompson. For these scholars, the “working class” existed as an 
ambiguous category with profound contradictions and variations, which compelled 
                                                          
4 Kendra Coulter, Revolutionizing Retail: Workers, Political Action, and Social Change (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1; Industries at a Glance. March 4, 2016. accessed March 7, 2016. 
http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag44-45.htm. 
5 Coulter, Revolutionizing Retail, 10. 
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Thompson to conclude in The Making of the English Working Class (1963) that rather 
than a static or uniform structure, class was a process of human relationships. While 
writing on an early surge in the labor movement in the 1890s, historian Alan 
Trachtenberg described the strike “as a working-class event in public life,” an 
“expression of working-class life” with significant cultural expressions.6 
A new examination of working-class culture, accordingly, accepts at its inception 
the understanding that its cultural character varies from decade to decade as well as 
among races, ethnicities, and gender. In Languages of Class: Studies in English Working 
Class History, 1832-1982 (1983) Gareth Stedman Jones elicited new questions regarding 
the formation of class. In contrast to Thompson, Jones challenged how social historians 
analyzed working-class culture and presumptions such scholars made concerning its 
revolutionary economic character.7 In “A New Agenda for American Labor History: A 
Gendered Analysis and the Question of Class” (1987), labor historian Alice Kessler-
Harris advanced the necessity of a critical examination of gender in “new” labor history. 
In this and subsequent writings, she pressed historians to integrate gender analysis within 
the study of work, class, and culture, a process which would decentralize the male 
workplace as the informative site of working-class identity, relationships, and actions.8  
Another emphasis on worker agency came through the work of David 
Montgomery, a former machinist and Communist Party organizer. Montgomery 
advanced a New Labor History perspective on shop floor struggles that noted two 
                                                          
6 Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1982), 89. 
7 Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
8 Alice Kessler-Harris, Gendering Labor History (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 149. 
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significant trends in early labor history. First, he noticed the presence of “a collectivist 
counterculture” during the late nineteenth century that extended beyond a singular 
factory. In The Fall of the House of Labor (1988), Montgomery astutely recognized that 
the daily experiences of workers alone failed to entirely explain working-class 
consciousness. Rather, militant unionists committed to “the project” of class 
consciousness helped place the experiences of their fellow workers in context and further 
“endeavored to weld their workmates and neighbors into a self-aware and purposeful 
working class.”9 Another study, Robert D. Johnston’s The Radical Middle Class (2003), 
sought to rehabilitate the role of a radical and activist middling class within a series of 
progressive political activities and movements in early twentieth-century Portland. While 
Johnston’s argument affirmed many of the conclusions of Montgomery, Gutman, and 
Kessler-Harris regarding the role of cross-class alliance, it emphasized the value of the 
middling class’ leadership within social struggles.10 
Discourse on the nature and evolution of corporate capitalism, both globally and 
within an urban context, represents another prominent theme within the scholarship on 
retail economic sector. Nelson Lichtenstein, the most prominent labor historian of the 
present day, has focused part of his scholarship on the realignment of power in the global 
economy from production firms to retailers, particularly Walmart. The retail sector, often 
given second-class importance by both financial magnets and unions for decades, 
emerged in the 1990s under the leadership of Walmart as a powerful interest and 
trendsetter in the global economy. Sam Walton’s ability to synthesize technological 
                                                          
9 Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America, 93; Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 2. 
10 Robert D. Johnston, The Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Questions of Capitalism in 
Progressive Era Portland, Oregon (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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advances with borrowed merchandising strategies, plus strict labor relations, awarded 
him comparisons to John D. Rockefeller and allowed him to create one the nation’s 
largest retailers with $43 million dollars in annual sales by the time of his death in 
1992.11 Walton’s creative use of the Universal Product Code (UPC) allowed him to create 
digital warehouses of consumer shopping information, empowering Walmart to reverse 
the dominant power relationship previously held by suppliers and manufacturers. 
Lichtenstein illustrated how Sam Walton and his attorney John Tate perfected a union 
avoidance strategy that became standard procedure for employers seeking to smother 
labor organizing campaigns. Similar rationalization characterized bookstores described in 
journalism scholar Jon Bekken’s critical “Feeding the Dinosaurs” (1997) and business 
historian Daniel M.G. Raff’s glorification of the same process in “Superstores and the 
Evolution of Firm Capabilities in American Bookselling” (2000).12 
Radical geographers have sought to illustrate how capitalism expands its markets 
by eliminating obstacles of time and space as it simultaneously creates distance between 
workers in order to thwart class solidarity. At the same time, the geographical approach 
has revealed the historical relationship between urban centers and unions, which have 
provided the latter with much of their political and economic power. Andrew Herod 
advocated for the creation of labor geography as a field of study in multiple articles, 
including “Workers, Space, and Labor Geography” (2003). Herod’s argument, 
constructed upon the work of predecessors including Marxist geographer David Harvey 
                                                          
11 Richard Vedder and Wendell Cox, The Wal-Mart Revolution: How Big-Box Stores Benefit Consumers, 
Workers, and the Economy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2006), 59. 
12 Jon Bekken, “Feeding the Dinosaurs: Economic Concentration in the Retail Book Industry,” Publishing 
Research Quarterly (Winter 1997-1998): 3-26; Daniel M.G Raff, “Superstores and the Evolution of Firm 
Capabilities in American Bookselling,” Strategic Management Journal 21 (2000): 1043-1059. 
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and contemporaries such as Rebecca A. Johns, argued that workers exist as spatially 
embedded agents who can act in solidarity with each other across distances, build cross-
class alliances, and contest capitalism’s geographical fixes that prioritize capital 
accumulation over the wellbeing of workers.13 Greg LeRoy, advocate for the labor 
movement's involvement in urban development and author of “Smart Growth for Cities: 
It’s a Union Thing” (2002), has recognized the historic relationship between capitalism 
and space. He concluded that urban sprawl has proved detrimental to existing unions in 
nine economic sectors and a contributing factor in the declining membership and 
influence of those unions. Thus, since unions exist historically as urban institutions, labor 
must assert its interests within city planning initiatives around the country.  
A third theme attempts to understand the nature and conditions for workers’ self-
organization on the job, and includes contributions from both unionists and sociologists. 
Working-class intellectuals, those whose lived experience in workplaces and unions serve 
as the foundation of their critical and historical inquiry, provide an important perspective 
in understanding collective action in the workplace. Whereas New Labor Historians 
sought to focus on the common laborer of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
intellectuals including Martin Glaberman, Stan Weir, and Staughton Lynd challenged the 
prevailing assessments of the labor movement’s rise to strength between the 1930s and 
1950s by examining the actions of rank-and-file union organizers. Both Glaberman and 
Weir studied with Trinidadian Marxist intellectual C.L.R. James and participated in 
Trotskyist political organizations. Glaberman’s Punching Out (2002) and Wartime Strikes 
                                                          
13 Andrew Herod, “Workers, Space, and Labor Geography,” International Labor and Working-Class 
History 64, Workers, Suburbs, and Labor Geography (Fall 2003): 117. 
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(1980) both detail labor’s dissatisfaction after the great wave of unionization in the 
1930s, as well as the precept that worker action begets class consciousness and not vice 
versa. Glaberman concentrated his study on workers’ culture of resistance, its often 
spontaneous transmission into action that contradicted conservative beliefs, and the role 
of working-class leaders, or a militant minority, who could initiate action and compel 
fellow workers to join them.14  
Congruent with these elements of Glaberman’s work is the recent publication 
Revolutionizing Retail (2014) by Kendra Coulter that structurally examines the recent 
organizing in the retail sector. Coulter asserted that a worker’s emotions, a determinant 
for either submission or collective action, represented a “contested space” for managers, 
unions, and customers.15 In Coulter’s advocacy of why retail matters and her 
investigation into recent worker and union initiatives to organize, she has applied an 
anthropological methodology accredited to fellow social scientist Linda Briskin known as 
“mapping,” which traces the actions workers take to organize their fellow coworkers.16 
Weir’s Singlejack Solidarity (2004) explained that “a workplace isn’t a collection 
of individuals so much as a collection of informal groups,” and emphasized the role of 
these informal workgroups as the sparks and determinant forces for collective activity in 
the workplace.17 Lynd, although primarily an academic, has always remained close to 
rank-and-file activism and combined these relationships with historical study and oral 
                                                          
14 Martin Glaberman, Wartime Strikes: The struggle against the no-strike pledge in the UAW during  
World War II (Detroit, Michigan: Bewick Editions, 1980), 125, 132-33. 
15 Coulter, Revolutionizing Retail 2014), 117. 
16 Coulter, Revolutionizing Retail 6; Coulter defines her mapping approach as, “both spatial and conceptual. 
It involves documenting and analyzing how workers’ organizing takes shape in different places, often 
simultaneously. Connections, similarities, and differences are to be identified, and both the material and 
discursive dimensions of organizing are considered.” 
17 Stan Weir, Singlejack Solidarity (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 250. 
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history to author Solidarity Unionism (1992). Lynd terms the participatory qualities of the 
labor activism that spurred the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) as “solidarity 
unionism” and juxtaposed it with the centralized and sectional “business unionism” of the 
contemporary labor movement. 
English sociologist David Wright, whose research examines the connections 
between consumption and work within cultural arenas, published a study examining the 
relationship between bookstore workers and the objects they sell that he titled 
“Commodifying Respectability: Distinctions at Work in the Bookshop” (2005). Wright’s 
arguments have implications for further research into the subsector, particularly for how 
some bookstore workers’ pre-existing emotional attachment to books as culturally 
imperative objects of self-development could influence their decisions to challenge 
working conditions through collective activity. Wright concluded that a clerk’s 
attachment to books serves as a “resource” for workers to shield themselves from the 
alienation inherent within the service workplace.”18 
Another theme, primarily addressed by economists and sociologists, is the 
evolution of the labor process within modern capitalism and its contributions to the 
mental and emotional alienation workers experience. This theme owes much to Harry 
Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974), which has influenced generations of 
social scientists because of how it revitalized Marx’s argument regarding the 
“progressive alienation of the process of production from the worker” under capitalist 
                                                          
18 David Wright, “Commodifying Respectability: Distinctions at Work in the Bookshop,” Journal of 
Consumer Culture 5 (3): 311. 
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management.19 Braverman, a former metal worker and a Marxist political economist, 
argued that shifts in social relationships corresponded to changes made to the modes of 
production. He detailed how employers became increasingly successful at incorporating 
the middle class and capturing, dividing, managing, and automating a laborer’s skill. 
Braverman’s insight on retail and service work is particularly pertinent. For instance, he 
observed in the 1970s how the utilization of Universal Product Codes (UPC) were 
beginning to empower businesses with tremendous amounts of new information that 
made consumer purchasing patterns predictable, contributing to the rise of “logistics” as a 
field of business management. Conversely, the UPC innovation allowed employers to 
decrease labor hours. Braverman believed that the UPC led to the commodification of all 
goods and services, and forewarned before other scholars that a “revolution is now being 
prepared which will make of retail workers, by and large, something closer to factory 
operatives than anyone had ever imagined possible.”20 
A corollary theme to the alienation of labor is the historically antagonistic and 
evolving relationship between management and employees. David R. Roediger, 
prominent historian of race and culture in the United States, made significant 
contributions to labor history in his study of time and management. While Roediger 
demonstrated the important struggle over the duration of the work day in Our Own Time 
(1989), in The Production of Difference (2012) he traced the origins and historic role of 
management theory. Sociologists have noted how retail management has increased its 
                                                          
19 Emphasis by Braverman. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in 
the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 58. 
20 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 371. 
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efforts to control the emotions of retail service workers, which has significantly affected 
workers’ internal psyche and their capacity to collectively resist.  
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s concept of “emotional labor,” first developed in her 
study of flight attendants in The Managed Heart (1983), has become a required 
framework from which to study management and employees within the service sector.21 
Hochschild, like Braverman before her, rehabilitated Marx’s theory of alienation and 
applied it to the growing number of predominantly women service workers in the modern 
Western economy. Hochschild, greatly influenced by the writings of C. Wright Mills, 
observed how service economy employers incorporated the employee’s personality and 
emotional expression into workplace behavior, a process Hochschild termed “the 
transmutation” of emotion from the private sphere into the waged economy. While this 
process provided the employer with greater control and competitive advantage in the 
service economy, the commodification of emotion through the coercive corporate 
management of feelings led to a worker’s estrangement: the division and tension between 
a person’s “real” self and their employee, or “on stage,” self.22  
At the time of her writing, Hochschild concluded that emotional labor 
predominantly pertained to a set of feminine middle-class jobs. Since then, the recent 
surge in scholarship on the retail sector, such as the collections of articles in Working in 
the Service Society (1996) by Cameron Lynne Macdonald and Carmen Sirianni, and 
Retail Work (2011) by Irena Grugulis and Öbdül Bozkurt, have revealed emotional 
                                                          
21 Hochschild defined emotional labor as “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial 
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Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press, 1983), 7. 
22 Hochschild, The Managed Heart, 19.  
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labor’s ubiquitous presence throughout the retail sector. Macdonald and Sirianni 
emphasized how the historically low rate of unionization among front-line service 
workers engaged in face-to-face work, termed the “emotional proletariat,” should not be 
misconstrued as either a sign of employee contentment or passivity. Rather, changes to 
technology and labor processes have altered how workers display dissatisfaction with 
management, but that resistance continues through everyday methods and tactics, which 
are often misunderstood or entirely ignored by the institutional labor movement.23  
Grugulis and Bozkurt’s collection of articles from social scientists reiterated 
Braverman and Hochschild’s conclusions regarding the deskilling of labor through 
management's application of technology. As a result, retail managers hire for “soft 
skills,” qualities related to petit-bourgeois sociability and aesthetic, conferring skill upon 
the presentation of “middle classness.”24 Cameron Lynne Macdonald and Carmen 
Sirianni’s collection of articles, titled Working in the Service Society (1996), carried on 
the research of Braverman and Hochschild, as well as complements Roediger’s historical 
inquiry with contemporary analysis. 
The historiography of the service economy remains considerably thin, despite 
several recent contributions. Nonetheless, Dorothy Sue Cobble’s Dishing It Out: 
Waitresses and Their Unions in the Twentieth Century (1991) acts as model for how to 
synthesize institutional labor history with the approaches of Gutman and Kessler-Harris, 
by applying historical inquiry to service work. In this work, Cobble illustrated the 
interrelationship of gender, work, and skill classification by documenting the emotional 
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labor of waitresses. “Workplace struggle,” explained Cobble, determined “the 
achievement of skill status,” and that waitresses elevated their emotional labor to the 
status level of a craft through unionization. Cobble’s research into what she terms as 
“occupational unionism” also included a critical analysis of the functional use of 
solidarity within the broader labor movement and the triangular relationship that exists 
between management, workers, and customers.25 
The Historical Imperative and the Sources for this Study 
The absence of previous scholarship on the Powell’s Books union campaign, as 
well as the recent upsurge and interest into workers’ organization within the retail sector 
of the economy, has created an imperative for historical inquiry. The lack of scholarship 
is emblematic of the field of labor history because of the historically low level of service 
sector organizing in the United States. Previous attention to the Powell’s union remains 
limited to a published interview with a Local 5 member for the ILWU and an equally 
brief account that focused on the campaign’s strategy for Labor Notes, an independent 
publisher reporting on the labor movement since 1979. Yet, a historical inquiry into the 
Powell’s union campaign is more appropriate now than ever before because of the 
continued centralization and growth of the retail sector and the recent surge in non-
traditional organizing by mainstream unions as demonstrated by the Our Walmart and 
Fight for $15 movements. As a case study, this thesis seeks a historical understanding of 
the under-investigated field of retail labor organizing within the subsector of bookselling, 
under the premise that although most union authorization and contract campaigns share 
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many similarities, there exists creative initiatives and individuals awaiting to be 
resurfaced through the ephemera found in union archives and the oral histories of union 
members. 
This work examines the aspirations, tactics, and context for the Powell’s Books 
workers’ union drive between 1998 and 2001. It considers two quotes reflecting on the 
union’s experience by Powell’s worker and organizer Mary Winzig. “Powell’s was 
unique,” Peter Olney, former Organizing Director for the ILWU, remembered Winzig 
saying, “but every organizing drive is unique, but every organizing drive is the same.”26 
This thesis investigates what made the Powell’s campaign unique among other union 
drives and why it was successful within an economic sector so predominantly 
unorganized. Was the success an outgrowth of the broader social movement unfolding at 
that time or the result of a momentarily resurgent labor movement? “You don’t expect a 
group of middle-class white kids to organize a union, but that’s what we did,” Winzig 
observed.27 Does the Powell’s union challenge or reinforce preconceived notions of the 
labor movement? This work addresses these questions and, more broadly, seeks to 
replicate the narrative response of bookstore workers to the increased centralization and 
rationalization of their labor during a tumultuous three-year cross-section of history 
within the retail sector. 
 The primary sources used to examine the history of the ILWU Local 5 and the 
Powell’s Books’ union campaign divide into three categories: oral histories, archival 
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documents, and press coverage. The ILWU Local 5 Oral History Project serves as a 
valuable source to evaluate the union’s early years because of its selection of participants 
and the context during which the interviews occurred. ILWU historians Edward Beechert 
and Harvey Schwartz conducted the project by individually interviewing fourteen 
participants in the local’s recognition campaign and first contract. The collection of 
narrators included nine Powell’s workers, one former worker, and four members of the 
ILWU’s international staff, which included the President and Organizing Director. While 
Beechert and Schwartz’s selection process for Powell’s employees appears relational and 
not systematic, those interviewed represented active members of the union who served on 
its organizing committee, bargaining committee, or as a steward during either the union 
drive or at the time of the interviews. The exchanges occurred between April 2001 and 
September 2002 during the middle of the union’s first contract cycle and captured the 
workers’ memories, assessments, and aspirations at that time. Only Schwartz’s interview 
with Mary Winzig has received academic citation or publication, found only in his 
Solidarity Stories: An Oral History of the ILWU (2009). Thus, this thesis brings the 
narratives of union bookstore workers into the historical dialogue for the first time.  
Although the Beechert and Schwartz’s institutional oral history project limited its 
focus on a specific series of events within a four-year period, it is a rich resource because 
of the trust, community, and institutional knowledge the interviewers and participants 
shared. Beechert, who interviewed nine workers and one staff member in Portland, 
maintained a consistent line of inquiry for each worker that included three categories: 1) 
the worker’s job and initial response to the union, 2) the worker’s participation in the 
union and what tactics were successful or failed, and 3) how is the union functioning 
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currently and what issues are of greatest concern. While pursuing these questions, 
Beechert also sought out the workers’ opinions of management and bookstore owner 
Michael Powell. Schwartz interviewed three staff members in San Francisco about the 
international union’s internal politics, organizing strategy, and direct participation in the 
Powell’s campaign, as well as what factors positioned the ILWU as the union of choice 
for the bookstore’s workforce. Together, the interviews allow the narrators to document 
and assess the effectiveness of both the union’s and the company’s tactics during the 
organizing drive. 
 The ILWU Local 5 archive serves as the thesis’ second group of primary sources 
and proved vital to establishing both the institutional account of the local’s history and 
the dialogue among workers regarding the union. The local maintains a paper archive of 
communications and activities during the union’s first five years, which covers the 
recognition campaign, contract campaign, and post-contract union building phase. In 
addition to providing a timeline of events, a record of union activists, and 
correspondences with community organizations, the Local 5 archive preserved the 
political culture of the union through its collection of writings and images created by 
supporters, opponents, and undecided workers. The cache of documents includes a small 
collection of the anti-union materials circulated by individual and semi-organized groups 
of Powell’s workers opposed to Local 5, as well communications from management to 
workers regarding the union’s involvement in the store. These documents articulate the 
content and context of the dialogue workers engaged in about unionization. Additional 
cultural artifacts of the union movement include a collection of button and sticker 
slogans, songs and poems, as well as letters and cartoons. Local 5’s three membership 
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surveys captured a portion of the workplace’s demographic and priorities during the 
contract negotiations. Although not scientifically sampled, these internal surveys 
represent a useful resource to measure the membership engagement with the union and 
the contract negotiations. Similar to the oral history collection, these documents have not 
been used previous to this thesis.  
The local press’ reporting and editorial debate regarding the Powell’s union 
campaign serves as the third group of primary sources. Few other union recognition 
campaigns in Portland during the 1990s received as much attention from local press and 
the public as the Powell’s workers’ campaign. The public opinion battle over the union’s 
efforts had profound implications on the contest and generally was revealed in the press’ 
news coverage, editorials, and letters-to-the-editors. The business, independent, and 
special interest press all paid close attention to the campaign, which challenged Michael 
Powell’s credibility as a high profile liberal business leader. The Oregonian, Willamette 
Week, Portland Business Journal, Northwest Labor Press and The Portland Alliance 
covered the workers effort to organize at one of the nation’s leading independent 
bookstores; the struggle also made the pages of the LA Times and The Nation. Local 
television and radio stations, particularly KBOO FM Portland, maintained an interest in 
the events, particularly as large, traffic-stopping, demonstrations appeared in front of the 
store in the spring of 2000. 
  The thesis follows a chronological timeline that traces the first three years of the 
Powell’s Books union, which began in 1998 when workers formed an organizing 
campaign, ends in 2001 with the ILWU Local 5’s first year under contract, and is 
punctuated by the 2000 May Day rally. The work contains five chapters and a 
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Conclusion. Chapter One addresses the history of the labor movement with attention to 
the retail economic sector, the efforts to resuscitate the labor movement in the 1990s, and 
Portland’s labor history. Chapter Two details the evolution of the American bookstore 
since 1950 and presents a history of bookselling in Portland with focus on Powell’s 
Books. Furthermore, the chapter traces booksellers’ resistance to changing job conditions 
and their cultural position within society. A survey of early efforts to organize the 
workforce at Powell’s precedes an investigation of the 1998-1999 ILWU’s organizing 
and recognition campaign found in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Four explores the contract campaign, which reached a stalemate in the 
spring of 2000, and Chapter Five examines the series of events that occurred during May 
and June 2000 that precipitated a three-year agreement signed in September 2000. 
Additionally, the last chapter addresses the continued tension between management and 
the union during the first year of the contract and Local 5’s efforts to expand its model of 
unionization into other workplaces. Finally, the Conclusion assesses the significance of 
the Powell’s union campaign and attempts to deduce conclusions regarding its unlikely 
success, its choice of tactics, and unexpected alliances. From there, the Conclusion 
suggests further areas of historical inquiry that might broaden the understanding of 




 Landscape of Labor 
 After years of accommodation or submission, organized labor across multiple 
continents responded to the neoliberal challenge with an unexpected strike wave that 
began in the mid-1990s and carried through to the end of the century. Kim Moody, author 
of Workers in a Lean World (1997), counted twenty-two mass political strikes by workers 
in twenty countries between January 1994 and February 1997; including French strikes 
opposed to the Plan Juppé austerity plan, Canadian “Days of Action” against free trade 
policies, a South Korean general strike in response to the elimination of labor laws, and 
international solidarity actions for locked out British dockworkers.28 Moody observed in 
these strikes a tendency for established unions to break with national political parties, as 
well to broaden their scope societally and globally in a strategy he termed “social 
movement unionism.”29 Labor protest also translated into enthusiasm for new organizing 
in North America. The Canadian labor movement found hope for its future when in 1997 
retail workers successfully unionized at a Walmart in Windsor and, in the same year, the 
Canadian Auto Workers organized the first union at a Starbucks.30  
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Organized Labor in the United States Awakens in the 1990s 
Modern labor history in the United States has been framed by the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) (1935), which ushered in the era of legally protected, production-
halting strikes during which unions organized 21 million workers by 1979.31 But, during 
the forty-five years following the passage of the NLRA the federal government and union 
leadership bargained away many of the extralegal freedoms of workers, such as the right 
to strike during the length of contract. These two growing tendencies collided with a 
detrimental effect for organized labor in the 1980s. Labor historians point to President 
Ronald Reagan’s replacement of striking air traffic controllers in 1981 as a sign of a new 
era during which private corporations, emboldened in part by the president’s actions, 
aggressively pushed back upon unions. Even where organized labor responded with 
militancy, such as during the 1985 Hormel strike, unions proved incapable of slowing the 
tide of setbacks and defeats, which included not simply dollars-and-cents measures but 
also the reduction of union power in determining workplace conditions.  
The labor movement demonstrated signs of a renaissance in the 1990s as rank-
and-file voices on the margins and a new cohort of progressive union leaders began to 
break with the forty-year course steadied for it by organized labor’s established 
leadership. A growing number of disaffected unions within the AFL-CIO questioned the 
leadership of President Lane Kirkland and his passivity towards job killing trade deals 
and his failure to initiate organizing in new economic sectors. Those concerned about the 
future of the labor movement and the fate of American workers in the twenty-first 
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century pointed to ominous signs in numerous indicators. As the number of U.S. union 
members declined sharply from its 1954 historic high of 28.3 percent of employed 
workers to 13.1 percent in 1994, observers also noted the growing apathy among union 
members.32 That same year, unions lost 54 percent of union representation elections 
administered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).33 Conservative economists 
considered these facts, coupled with the declining number of work stoppages, as evidence 
that the relevancy of unions to American workers was a thing of the past. Indeed, 
between 1979 –Kirkland’s first year as president– and 1993, both the number of work 
stoppages and the number of workers involved in such actions declined by over 80 
percent.34  
Progressive unionists argued that the AFL-CIO’s conservative and narrow 
organizing strategy, along with an increasingly detrimental relationship with the 
Democratic Party, caused the dramatic deterioration of its bargaining power and public 
support. Indeed, as rank-and-file workers experienced the harshest effects of growing 
attacks on the labor movement, union members in multiple sectors during the 1990s 
increasingly scrutinized their union officials. Member activists scrutinized their 
leadership’s collective bargaining and organizing records, six figure salaries, and 
commitment to internal democracy. Under the leadership of Ron Carey from the 
Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
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were at the forefront of the labor movement in the 1990s as a union successfully captured 
by rank-and-file reformers and committed to organizing. Conversely, under the twenty 
plus years of Edward Hanley’s leadership, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees International Union (HERE) lost its significant influence within the rapidly 
growing hospitality sector. Although a Department of Justice investigation in 1995 found 
convincing evidence of corruption and led to Hanley’s forced retirement, rank-and-file 
reformers in Chicago’s Local 1 reported that the Hanley family maintained influence over 
the local’s new leadership in the years that followed.35  
In the AFL-CIO’s first contested election and amid great expectations, a coalition 
of dissident unions leaders rode the tide of reformism that flowed from the margins of the 
labor movement. In 1995, the “New Voice” leadership slate of John Sweeney of the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Richard Trumpka of the United Mine 
Workers of America (UMW), and Linda Chavez-Thompson of the American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) defeated Kirkland and his 
followers. The new administration made their ambitions clear from the beginning, stating 
their goal to “renew the labor movement” by activating union members, exciting 
unorganized workers to join unions, and opening doors to new allies.36 Sweeney 
described the election as “a moment of hope and promise for the future” and his 
administration carried this optimism into institutional reforms.37 
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The New Voice slate represented a cultural shift in the U.S. labor movement 
whose leaders began restructuring the AFL-CIO from the top down in an effort to make 
the greatest amount of change in the least amount of time. Although the new leadership 
recognized local unions and Central Labor Councils as best positioned to implement its 
new organizing initiative across the country, top officials anticipated regional opposition 
to financial reforms and diversity directives from above. Thus, the Sweeney 
administration sought to create a new standard for investing in organizing by devoting 30 
percent of its budget to new campaigns with the hope of setting an example for locals. In 
order to work around opposition from the locals, the leadership increased the size and the 
responsibility of the Federation’s staff. While the power shift towards the international 
and its staff prompted critique from some unionists and the secession of several affiliate 
unions beginning in 2000, observers including author and United Auto Workers (UAW) 
activist Mike Parker noted that the previous norm of “denouncing internal critics as 
destroyers of unity and agents of the enemy” had waned with the new leadership.38 
Sweeney demonstrated this cultural shift by writing the afterword to an anthology of 
essays entitled A New Labor Movement for the New Century (1998), describing it as a 
“valuable contribution” to the labor movement’s “new spirit of open debate and 
aggressive action.”39 Tellingly, four of the authors and union activists received staff 
positions in Sweeney’s administration. 
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Between 1995 and 1997, New Voice funneled increasingly more resources to new 
diversity initiatives, organizing efforts, and political tactics than ever before in the AFL-
CIO’s history. In an attempt to reflect the changing demographic and identity of the 
working class, under Sweeney’s leadership the AFL-CIO reversed its opposition towards 
immigration to support citizenship for undocumented workers and welcomed the 
affiliation of Pride at Work, a LGBT labor organization. Under the banner of “Organizing 
for Change, Changing to Organize,” the new leadership invested over $30 million dollars 
to new organizing initiatives, including the Union Summer program that trained college 
students to organize unions in between their academic sessions. The New Voice slate 
hoped to utilize Central Labor Councils in cities across the country to conduct its Union 
Cities program, which sought to increase labor standards through local legislation.40 
Furthermore, under Sweeney’s leadership, the AFL-CIO entered digital space by 
launching its first website in 1996. However, while union activists began utilizing the 
internet to create horizontal communication structures through such tool as online 
discussion forums, the AFL-CIO’s website presented a top down flow of information.41 
Along the West Coast during the 1990s, the International Longshore and 
Warehouse Union (ILWU) helped lead labor’s resurgence by committing greater 
resources and energy to organizing. The union, established following the 1934 Maritime 
Strike when several West Coast locals split from the East Coast based International 
Longshore Association (ILA), did not experience the same depth of struggle over the 
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cultural shift brought on by the changes within the AFL-CIO leadership that the rest of 
the labor movement experienced. Arguably, ILWU’s history of militant organizing and 
position on civil rights kept the union outward facing for periods of time when many 
other unions gazed inward. In fact, the ILWU had begun to turn its attention to new 
organizing in 1991, revamping a long neglected organizing program under the leadership 
of new president Dave Arian. At the union’s next convention three years later, delegates 
passed a resolution forwarded by Arian that committed 30 percent of the international’s 
budget to organizing.42 Yet, disagreement regarding the effectiveness of the campaign led 
to a challenge of leadership. In the July elections, Arian lost to Vice-President Brian 
McWilliams, who explained his victory as a return to the union’s principles in his first 
report as president: “The membership perceived that we were making a transition from a 
rank-and-file union to a top-down one; a change that was unacceptable.”43 Beyond the 
commitment to organize more, the question for the ILWU remained where to organize 
and how to compel locals to financially support new campaigns?  
During the Arian leadership, the international created a Regional Organizing 
Committee for the Columbia River region and made modest gains in adding new 
bargaining units into Local 8. However, these gains proved temporary as servicing these 
new workers in regions as far away as Idaho proved too difficult for the current union’s 
structure. McWilliams, who began working on the waterfront in 1967, also ambitiously 
sought to extend organizing into the growing West Coast warehouse sector, but imagined 
new targets, as well. “There were no organized hotels in San Diego and there was only 
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one organized hotel in Portland,” he later recalled. Inspired by the hundreds of hotel 
workers in Hawaii already organized into the ILWU, McWilliams differentiated his 
approach from his predecessors by targeting the service industry and prioritizing the 
creation of new non-longshore locals. McWilliams voiced his belief that unionized 
longshore workers possessed a great degree of privilege among the working class, and 
that supporting workers’ efforts to organize was the optimum way to “leverage that 
power” the ILWU had amassed.44 
During the 1990s, several unions attempted to revitalize the work stoppage as a 
winning tactic in labor conflicts, using both prolonged economic strikes and one-day 
publicity walkouts. In Decatur, Illinois in 1993 following years of stalled contract 
negotiations over union concessions and an effort by workers to slow production, 
management at A.S. Stanley (a grain processing plant purchased by a multinational 
corporation Tate & Lyle in 1988) locked out its employees. While workers at Decatur’s 
Caterpillar and Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. plants joined the grain workers on strike in 
the summer of 1994 and led several high profile marches and rallies, A.E. Stanley’s use 
of replacement workers, court injunctions, and collaboration with police forced the 
striking workers to accept unprecedented contract concessions.45 On July 13, 1995, 2,500 
workers at the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press struck after management instituted 
new work rules following stalled contract negotiations. Though the strike resulted in a 
loss of over $100 million for the papers, owned by media conglomerates Gannett and 
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Knight-Ridder, management responded by investing in replacement workers and security, 
waiting nineteen months for the unions to surrender.46 Despite repeated appeals in July 
and December 1996 for a labor march in Detroit from activists, including the Action 
Coalition of Strikers and Supporters, it took the AFL-CIO’s newly elected Sweeney 
administration until February (the same month the union was forced to concede) to call 
for a national day of action.47 
Labor’s defeats in Decatur and Detroit only emphasized the previously stated 
recommendations of progressive and radical unionists that the AFL-CIO unions needed 
to dramatically change how they organized and responded to challenges from large 
corporations. Observers, including Martin Glaberman and Kim Moody, noticed signs of 
promise in the dozen of localized strikes led by the UAW demanding an increase in 
hiring.48 The Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles acted as further inspiration as 
SEIU innovatively organized a predominantly immigrant workforce, scattered throughout 
numerous downtown job sites and employed by several different contractors. Janitors 
working in Century City high-rises struck in 1990 and won recognition of their union, 
overcoming violent confrontations with the police. A decade of continued organizing led 
to a victorious three-week strike in 2000, expanding the union’s reach even wider 
throughout the city.49 The successes of the Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles 
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propelled it to a national level as SEIU locals in other cities copied its organizing model. 
In the nineties, Portland’s Local 49 organized a downtown rally that featured a speech by, 
then SEIU president, John Sweeney as well as street rallies for displaced union janitors.50  
On the national scale, the sixteen-day United Parcel Services (UPS) strike in the 
summer of 1997 by Teamsters translated the renewed spirit of the labor movement into 
action on the public stage. The strike crippled UPS’s operations, responsible for 
delivering 80 percent of the nation’s packages including those of retailers, such as 
Powell’s Books, and amounted to a loss of $600 million dollars for UPS. Despite modest 
consumer and small business dissatisfaction, the union’s demand for ten thousand new 
full-time positions won the sympathy of the public who had alternative shipping options 
to choose from during the strike.51 Although President Bill Clinton had ordered American 
Airlines pilots to end their strike earlier in the year and intervened in the Major League 
Baseball players’ 1994 season-halting work stoppage, Clinton denied UPS’s appeals to 
use his authority to end the strike. In Oregon, the walkout involved 2,700 UPS Teamsters 
from the Joint Council of Teamsters 37 based in Portland, whose president reported the 
union members were “100% solid on the picket lines.”52 Even workers interviewed by the 
Oregonian who expressed disagreement at the union’s decision to strike refused to cross 
picket lines.53 Portland-area Teamsters received extensive support from local unions 
including the Machinist Union District Lodge 24, which refused to cross UPS picket 
lines. Through a long-practiced tradition of solidarity, ILWU Local 8 provided work to 
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striking Teamsters in need. Additionally, Oregon Public Employees Union (OPEU) 
members at Oregon State University resisted pressure from the administration to 
complete deliveries typically done by UPS workers.54  
In an article titled “UPS Strike Makes New Labor History,” written as the work 
stoppage unfolded, labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein predicted the Teamsters’ victory 
would put an end to idea that a strike was “synonymous with labor's defeat and 
demoralization.” These several examples of renewed militancy within organized labor 
did not guarantee future success, nor were the defeats entirely fruitless. Ultimately, both 
the victories and the defeats in the strikes of the 1990s highlighted for labor the need to 
work around the nation’s restrictive labor laws, organize among the growing service 
sector, and build strong community-labor coalitions. 
New Political Efforts  
The revitalization of the labor movement in the 1990s included several unions 
ambitiously organizing the formation of a new national political party. Following decades 
of preparation and organization by a loose coalition known as Labor Party Advocates, 
over 1,300 delegates representing unions from around the country converged in 
Cleveland, Ohio to found the Labor Party of America in June 1996. The ILWU along 
with the United Electrical Workers (UW) and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers 
Union (OCAW) were among the initial endorsing unions of the new political party. The 
longshoremen advocated at the convention for the ability to run local candidates, but 
uncertainty and disagreement among delegates regarding whether to formally break with 
the Democratic Party led to the Labor Party’s decision not to run or endorse candidates. 
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Leading co-founder, Tony Mazzocchi, believed that “the silliest thing in the world would 
be to get involved in local elections.” Citing the political right’s success in shaping the 
nation’s political discussion, he questioned the logic of running candidates outside of the 
two dominant parties on the local level because “[the] way this nation is set up, what the 
hell can you do in a local office except frustrate all your constituents?”55  
Despite considerable enthusiasm among unions and their membership for the 
Labor Party, Sweeney and the AFL-CIO withheld a full endorsement. Nevertheless, calls 
for a labor party persisted even among Democratic Party politicians with union 
backgrounds. Former firefighter and Oregon state legislator Randy Leonard told the 
state’s 1999 AFL-CIO convention that powerful interests within the Democratic Party 
“disdain those of us who represent working-class Oregonians” and suggested the time 
may be ripe for a labor party.56 Ultimately, the Labor Party’s relevance slowly declined 
over the next decade as the Working Families Party and later the Green Party gathered 
increasingly more adherents from those seeking a progressive third force.  
Social Unionism and Alternatives to Collective Bargaining 
Beginning in the 1970s, workers’ rights activists experimented with new tactics 
and forms of organization to compensate for the nation’s most influential unions inability 
to respond to frequent factory closures or organize amongst marginalized workers in 
immigrant and minority communities. By the 1990s, these efforts, often termed “social 
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unionism” because of their emphasis on strong community support, achieved noteworthy 
victories through worker centers and living wage initiatives. Jobs with Justice, founded in 
1987 with assistance from Communications Workers of America (CWA) President Larry 
Cohen, became the most prominent new national organization that sought to link 
struggles of health care, immigration, and global justice to workers’ bargaining 
rights.57Although initially the AFL-CIO under Kirkland’s leadership reacted 
ambivalently to the new community-labor alliance, relations improved under Sweeney’s 
leadership. By 1996, the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Director Richard Bessinger described 
the coalition’s thirty local chapters, built upon the principles of direct action and a shared 
leadership with local unions and social justice organizations, as “the conscience of the 
labor movement.”58 Through civil disobedience and its use of Workers’ Rights Boards (a 
community initiative that could respond quickly and apply public pressure upon illegal 
union busting activity), Jobs with Justice locals, including the Portland chapter, 
challenged the power of the National Labor Relations Board for responding slowly to 
employer Unfair Labor Practices (ULP).59 
Union activists organized Portland’s first Jobs with Justice action in 1988, but it 
would it take another three years before CWA organizers successfully chartered a branch. 
As part of its founding objectives, the organization aimed to establish alliances between 
communities of color and the city’s labor movement.60 By September 1991, the coalition 
under the direction of CWA organizer Margaret Butler began to make an impact on local 
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labor fights, winning commendation from union officials. “Jobs with Justice is more than 
a good idea,” wrote Teamsters Local 206 Secretary-Treasurer Tom Leedham in a letter to 
the editor in the Northwest Labor Press, “it’s an idea that works.”61 Leedham went on to 
detail how a recent Jobs with Justice action aided his union’s contract negotiations with a 
local hotel and urged other union to support the coalition.  
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, economic justice and workers’ rights advocates 
across the country opened worker centers and advanced living wage ordinances as way to 
implement the benefits of collective action and collective bargaining for workers often 
unorganized by mainstream unions. Worker centers, community-based organizations 
assisting low-wage workers with a wide spectrum of services, first began opening in the 
1970s and increasingly filled the organizing void among marginalized and immigrant 
workers. Labor relations specialist Janice Fine argued in her study of worker centers that 
their influence and significance grew as the power of unions declined as they increasingly 
refused to organize employees in small, typically retail or food-service workplaces. The 
number of centers nationally increased rapidly from ten in 1989 to twenty-nine by 2000. 
These facilities were often funded by faith and service organizations and based among 
the growing number of suburban and urban Latino and Southeast Asian immigrants.62  
A few unions, particularly HERE, embraced a collaborative relationship with 
worker centers. During the 1990s, the Portland local union formed the Hotel Workers’ 
Organizing Committee, later restructuring into the Workers’ Organizing Committee 
(WOC). WOC operated out of a storefront on East Burnside Street and SE Eight Avenue, 
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providing services and organizational support to low wage workers. The organization 
became independent of the union in the late 1990s, and served as the precursor for the 
Voz Workers’ Rights Education Project. Additionally, independent unions such as 
Oregon’s Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste, founded in 1985, and Florida’s 
Coalition of Immokalee Workers, founded in 1993, combined the community building, 
member services, and media tactics often characteristic of worker centers with the direct 
action and collective bargaining strategies commonly associated with unions. 
Economic justice activists in the 1990s circumvented collective bargaining 
agreements and lagging adjustments to the minimum wage by pressuring local 
municipalities to pay their employees and subcontracted workers a “living wage” that 
could support a family of three to four. These campaigns helped popularize the term 
“living wage” among activists, but the efforts received pushback from local chambers of 
commerce and nationally from the Employment Policies Institute because the laws 
targeted private sector employers who used public funds. As organizers showed 
considerable ambition through these campaigns described “as one of the most significant 
signs of grassroots awakening around economic justice,” their demands reflected a 
pragmatism based upon local conditions resulting in a variance of demands between 
$6.50 to $12.00 per hour, with the typical campaign demanding $8.75 per hour.63  
Activists grounded in faith and community organizations, and aided with national 
support from Jobs with justice and the Association of Community Organization for 
Reform Now (ACORN), passed fifty-nine living wage ordinances across the country by 
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2000 with dozens more in the process of organizing.64 While these campaigns generally 
began outside the institutional labor movement or as a fringe efforts of locals, such as the 
1994 Baltimore, Maryland campaign, the AFL-CIO’s new national leadership and its 
local Central Labor Councils increased their involvement in living wage projects. The 
labor federation voted to nationally endorse the living wage initiative in 1997 and 
collaborated in the 1998 Los Angeles airport campaign. Ultimately, however, 
enforcement of living wage ordinances without community or union oversight proved a 
barrier to effective implementation, as occurred in Portland where the city passed an 
ordinance in 1996 only for the city to ignore the law for two years before activists 
organized for a revised measure.65 At that point, a coalition of thirty-five labor, religious, 
and community groups (including the AFL-CIO’s Northwest Oregon Labor Council) 
successfully pressured the City Council to expand its living wage ordinance and give 
Portland’s Jobs with Justice chapter a role in monitoring its enforcement.66 
The changing nature of the workforce meant that if organized labor hoped to 
continue its revitalization on past the 1990s, unions needed to shift attention away from 
the familiar manufacturing workforce that built the CIO, but had been on decline since 
the 1970s, to the increasing numbers of retail and service employees at big box retailers, 
such as Walmart. Unions that tried to organize isolated Walmart stores or distributions 
centers in the 1970s and 1980s proved terribly outmatched by pioneer union avoidance 
consultant John E. Tate, who coached Walton and store management on strategies and 
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tactics to defeat union drives, including captive-audience speeches meant to dissuade 
employees from supporting a union through a “mix of bluster and contrition,” as one 
activist described it.67 In 1989, the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) 
inaugurated an external public campaign against Walmart that has unofficially never 
ended, which has proved more of a defensive effort to try to limit the expansion of its 
superstores than a committed effort to organize the workforce. Tate’s success inspired 
other employers to hire him or replicate his practices, which emphasized employee 
loyalty to management and a philosophical realignment of unions as unnecessary third 
party agents characterized as “nothing but blood sucking parasites living off the 
productive labor of people who work for a living.”68 Ultimately, Nelson Lichtenstein 
attributed the success of Walmart and similar big box retailers in the 1990s and after to 
their ability to outsource risk and instability upon employees and suppliers.69 
A Survey of Portland’s Labor History: 1900-2000 
An understanding of the city’s labor history must begin with the state’s formation 
as a white homeland within the United States intentionally constructed through 
institutional racism. The state’s 1859 constitution aligned itself with other free states of 
the Union, but distinguished itself as the only state to constitutionally exclude African 
Americans from working, buying property, or living within its borders. Such 
discrimination, which passed by popular vote, compelled historian Egbert S. Oliver to 
conclude in his study of the debate surrounding exclusion that African Americans who 
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resided or made homes in Oregon, “were essentially illegal aliens,” in the state.70 Chinese 
and Japanese immigrants, as well as Native Americans, faced similar exclusions and 
discriminations throughout the late nineteenth century. Simultaneously, as these 
communities confronted institutional racism, they became the target of white working-
class resentment and hatred that intensified during periods of economic crisis. These 
social conditions, coupled with the trends of capitalist economic development, resulted in 
Portland historically having the most diverse population within one of the least racially 
diverse states in the Union. As a result, many Portland labor unions did not confront the 
issue of integration or internal racism until the dramatic demographic changes the city 
experienced during World War II.  
Generally, Portland’s twentieth-century labor history is segmented into three 
sequential, chronological, and developmental stages: labor’s rise prior to 1935, its peak of 
influence on through the 1960s, and its slow decline in the years that followed before its 
revitalization in the 1990s. While the proportion of unionized workers in Portland 
measured 21.7 percent in 1986, its share for the combined Portland-Vancouver region in 
1999 measured only 15.1 percent.71 Historically, organized labor’s power has rested 
primarily on its ability to organize workers into unions and to leverage its collective 
economic power to win concessions and control production, most commonly through the 
use of the strike. Community support, defined broadly in this thesis as the solidarity of 
both the labor community and those of the “middling class,” proved a critical component 
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to organized labor’s ability to form unions, take economic action, and acquire political 
influence in the twentieth century.72 Reciprocally, the Portland business community’s 
capacity to resist unionization and maintain its unilateral control of the labor process 
depended upon employers’ ability to identify a community of interest, act together, and 
compel city officials to dispatch the police on its side during labor conflicts.  
One of Portland’s first recorded union organizing campaigns to bring the 
community into the street to support a labor cause was the contentious 1906 trolley car 
strike. In December of that year, the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric 
Railway Employes of America launched a strike against the Portland Railway, Light & 
Power Co. seeking union recognition for six hundred employees as well as economic 
gains. The workers demanded a ten-hour day with a raise in wages, plus the reinstatement 
of a terminated union member, and an end to the employer’s practice of photographing 
employees for identification purposes. “The company,” the Vice-President of the 
streetcar operator defiantly proclaimed, “will not recognize any union among our men,” 
and thwarted a threatened strike in July by dissuading workers from participating when 
the union provided forty-eight hours’ notice of its intended action.73 In response, the 
union sprung a secretly planned work stoppage against the company on the afternoon of 
December 15, shutting down the streetcar service in less than three hours. “Such 
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demonstrations as those that attended the strike had never been on the streets of 
Portland,” reported the Oregonian the next day.74  
The general sentiment of Portlanders witnessing the beginning of this unexpected 
strike and disruption to their transit was of overwhelming support. “SUCCESS OF TIE-
UP IS DUE TO CROWD,” announced the Oregonian, “People on the streets take sides 
with strikers at outset of trouble.”75 As the night progressed, the crowd on the street grew 
into the thousands, aiding union leaders with the task of compelling workers to leave 
their street cars and join the walkout. The police, also caught by surprise by the strike and 
the public’s enthusiasm, proved incapable of dispersing the crowd. When it became clear 
the union had prevailed on the first night of its strike, supporters proudly announced 
“We’ll walk!”, referring to the extra effort needed to complete their commute home after 
helping shut down street car service for the night. Despite expressions of continued 
community support over the next several days, however, the police and streetcar 
management collaborated in the restoration and protection of service, effectively 
defeating the strike within a week.  
In 1907 the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) launched its first industrial 
action along the West Coast in Portland, leading over two thousand sawmill workers in 
an impromptu strike that lasted forty days. The action began in March when several 
sawmill workers walked off the job demanding a nine-hour day and $2.50 minimum daily 
wage. IWW organizers stepped in to assist the workers and spread the work stoppage 
across town, shutting down nearly every mill in Portland for ten days. While the local 
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press and the public responded positively to the IWW’s non-violent strike, lumber mill 
owners and the AFL craft unions discovered a mutual interest in defeating the burgeoning 
industrial union’s first big push on the West Coast. In retrospect, IWW historians Fred 
Thompson and Melvyn Dubofsky both agreed that this strike sent “shock waves” through 
Washington and California and laid the foundation for radical organization among 
Western loggers in the years to come.76 
In the summer of 1913, forty women at the Oregon Packing Co. struck for higher 
wages, shorter hours, and safety improvements at the Southeast Portland fruit cannery 
located on SE Belmont Street.77 As was also the case with the sawmill workers in 1907 
and typical of that era, the workers made demands and walked-out without previous 
recognition of a union. The Portland women’s cannery strike occurred on the heels of 
similar, but larger, IWW led strikes among working-class women on the East Coast in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912 and Paterson, New Jersey in 1913. In Portland, IWW 
organizers Tom Burns, Rudulph Schwab, and Dr. Marie Equi joined Mary Schwab of the 
Socialist Labor Party in aiding the workers’ organizing efforts. Equi arose as the 
spokesperson for the striking women, many of whom she knew from her medical 
practice. The police violence against Equi and the women picketers, plus restraints placed 
upon public speeches, spurred the AFL to petition for the mayor’s recall. Ultimately, the 
strike ended in a modest wage increase for the workers and an organizational failure for 
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the IWW. Disagreements over tactics and negotiations during the strike among outsider 
supporters also drove a wedge between the IWW and many of the city’s Progressives, 
who had rallied to the cause of the women laborers.78 
Comparatively, women working within the waitressing occupation and the 
garment industry found greater success with AFL unionization efforts during the early 
and midcentury. While Portland’s Waiters and Waitress Union Local 189 first organized 
in 1901, unionization among women increased following World War I in cities such as 
Portland, where waitresses fought to create locals exclusively for women. Led by Agnes 
Quinn and Gertrude Sweet for multiple decades, Waitress’ Local 305 in Portland 
operated from 1921 to 1976, reaching a peak membership of two thousand members in 
1948.79 In another instance, women in the garment industry acquired a $1 increase in 
weekly wages and a reduction of hours from sixty to forty-eight between 1903 and 1915 
through the efforts of the United Garment Workers of America Local 228.80 Furthermore, 
women, including Elizabeth Gee, found leadership positions within the union in the 
1910s and 1920s, while the predominantly women workforce maintained a reputation of 
aiding striking workers, including refraining from riding streetcars during the 1906 strike. 
This commitment to cross-union solidarity continued through the Great Depression 
through various textile and garment unions, including participating in picket duty for 
striking longshoremen in 1934.81 
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 Organized in 1868, the Longshoremen's Protective Union stood as Portland’s first 
waterfront labor organization. In June 1916, five waterfront union locals totaling a 
thousand workers struck for nearly two months alongside dockworkers in other port cities 
on the West Coast. In response, Portland’s business community rallied for an open shop 
ballot initiative amendment to the state’s constitution. The Waterfront Employers’ 
Association defeated the strike by dividing the longshore union from the maritime and 
the ground transport unions, as well as effectively bringing in replacement workers under 
armed guard. In 1919 and again in 1922, dockworkers with the International 
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) Local 6 lost strikes for higher wages, safety 
improvements, and control over hiring, leading to the ILA ceding all its bargaining power 
on Portland’s waterfront until a resurgence in 1934. Disputes between ILA and IWW 
longshoremen over access to work in the preceding years to the 1922 strike had 
compromised unity on the picket line, aiding to the ILA’s devastating defeat.82 
The ILA’s 1934 strike was part and parcel of a working-class social movement 
occurring around the country that emerged from rank-and-file protest over corporate 
capitalism and accompanied the rapid growth of industrial unions in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Historian Carl Abbott asserted that in this era Portland “was two cities side by side,” one 
that consisted of “militant union members, skid-road workers and the periodically 
unemployed” alongside a middle class that saw the city as “solid, sober, politically and 
socially conventional.”83 The ILA, joined by other maritime unions including the 
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Communist Party’s Marine Workers Industrial Union, commenced a strike in May at 
every port city on the West Coast, which at its peak involved 35,000 maritime workers.84 
The ILA longshoremen sought the recognition of their union, as well as control over 
hiring, wage increases, and safety improvement.  
Wobblies, IWW members or adherents to the syndicalist union’s mission of 
industrial unionism, led the strike in Portland from within the ranks of the ILA.85 These 
militant longshoremen helped win the strike by organizing both deep within the ranks of 
maritime workers and wide within the community. Portland’s unemployed, labor unions, 
farmers, small business communities, students, sex workers, and cab drivers provided 
sustaining morale and material support to the longshoremen throughout the strike, while 
the business elite organized into the Citizens Emergency League to assist in financing 
and coordinating strikebreaking.86 Over the course of the eighty-three-day walkout, the 
clash between the longshoremen and employers evolved into a larger conflict between 
opposing social classes. The tension erupted on the morning of July 11, when one 
hundred policemen opened fire using shotguns and pistols upon unarmed picketers in 
Portland’s Pier Park. The strike ended soon after on July 31 when the employers 
conceded to the union’s demands, averting both the possible deployment of the National 
Guard and a general strike.87 
                                                          
84 Buchanan, Dock Strike. 
85 Pilcher, The Portland Longshoremen, 42-43. 
86 William Bigelow and Norman Diamond, “Agitate, Educate, Organize: Portland, 1934,” Oregon 
Historical Quarterly 89, no. 1 (1988): 16-27; Michael Munk, “Portland’s ‘Silk Stocking Mob’: The 
Citizens Emergency League in the 1934 Maritime Strike,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 91, no. 3 (2000) 
152-160. 
87 Buchanan, Dock Strike, 95-96. 
46 
 Successes such as the ILA’s 1934 strike and the passage of the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 spurred industrial union organizing campaigns by both the CIO 
and its main rival, the AFL, throughout the remainder of the decade. The 1935 AFL 
timber workers’ strike involved tens of thousands of workers across several western 
states lasting three months. In the years that followed, the high demand for labor and 
uninterrupted production brought on by World War II generally benefitted unions by 
providing steady work, supportive labor laws, and a position of influence within the 
government. The demand for labor by Portland’s wartime manufacturing operations, 
particularly the Kaiser shipyards, exceeded the city’s pre-war supply. Out of state 
workers, including thousands of African Americans, migrated to Portland for these 
wartime production jobs, resulting in a 32 percent population increase between 1940 and 
1944.88 Portlanders welcomed the new arrivals for their contributions to the war effort, 
but saw them as temporary residents who would leave town once the war boom was over. 
Whereas the federal government constructed temporary war time housing regardless of 
race and banned discrimination in wartime employment in 1941, employers instead 
relegated African American workers to unskilled laborer jobs. At the same time, labor 
organizations, including the Boilermakers Union, collaborated in such discrimination by 
relegating black workers to second class status within the union or forming segregated 
unions. In response to such treatment, skilled African American workers formed the 
Shipyard Negro Organization for Victory and threatened to strike for the right “to work 
our trades on equal status with whites.”89 The fight to integrate the city’s unions 
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(including the ILWU), challenging exclusions based on race and gender, became a 
prominent issue throughout the next several decades and intersected with the broader 
civil rights and women’s movements. 
Portland’s political and public support for organized labor began to turn in the 
1950s as evidence of corruption and violence within the Teamsters’ union threatened to 
tarnish the reputation of the broader labor movement. From 1956 to 1960, Teamsters’ 
officers in Seattle and Portland came under scrutiny for corruption by the Oregonian and 
a congressional investigation. Journalists Wallace Turner and William Lambert reported 
that union officers, including President Dave Beck and Vice President Frank Brewster, 
directed organizers to leverage the union’s power in the distribution sector of the formal 
economy to control and profit from Portland’s vice sector. Turner and Lambert’s prize-
winning report precipitated a 1956 Oregon grand jury indictment of the county’s district 
attorney, the city’s chief of police, and local organized crime figures. A year later, the 
U.S. Senate initiated the McClellan Committee to investigate union racketeering, 
attracting coverage by the national television networks. The news depicted Portland’s 
corrupt union officials, gangsters, and politicians associated together on a national stage. 
Simultaneously, a selection of Hollywood films, including On the Waterfront (1954) and 
Slaughter on Tenth Avenue (1957), featured union members and officers confronting 
violent corruption from the mob. In a study of how movies have historically depicted 
organized labor, media critic William J. Puette concluded that Hollywood in the 1950s 
equated unions and organized crime as one and the same, a stereotype perpetuated on 
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through the 1980s.90 Ultimately, the corruption of Portland’s Teamsters and the ensuing 
public investigations damaged the labor movement’s public reputation locally and 
facilitated a negative turn in the public opinion of unions nationally.  
 Despite significant community support for unions during Portland’s 1959-1965 
newspaper strike, the cause ended as a major defeat for the local labor movement and set 
a corporate precedent for instituting mechanization over union protest within the 
newspaper business.91 Printers had organized early on in Portland’s history, establishing 
unions in the 1850s and 1860s as some of the first organized labor associations in the city 
and maintained decent relationships with the newspaper families. In 1950, however, Sam 
Newhouse’s newspaper conglomerate, Advance Publications, purchased the morning 
Oregonian and sought to acquire the afternoon Oregon Journal, which lingered in 
probate following the death of the last family heir. The newspapers bargained with their 
unions jointly, with the Oregonian management now taking charge. As the Newhouse 
executives, who sought to automate printing and reduce labor costs, remained steadfast, 
Stereotypers Local 49 gained no ground in attempting to negotiate over the 
implementation of new labor-saving technology. 
In November 1959, the Stereotypers directed a strike of a dozen unions 
comprising 850 members against Oregon’s two most prominent daily newspapers. 
Workers picketed outside both the Journal’s headquarters on SW Front Avenue and the 
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Oregonian’s offices, surrounding the building that covered an entire block on SW 
Broadway. As Republican governor Mark Hatfield and future governor and television 
news commentator Tom McCall encouraged the Newhouse corporation to bargain with 
its employees, tens of thousands of Portlanders canceled their subscriptions to show 
support for the unions. Journalists from the Newspapers Guild, including Wallace Turner, 
refused to cross the picket lines. Turner and dozens of other strikers choose to assist the 
formation of the Portland Reporter, a daily newspaper published between 1960 and 1964 
by the striking union workers with a peak circulation of 78,000.92 In anticipation of a 
strike, which the unions conjectured was intentionally provoked, the Newhouse 
corporation invested in strike insurance and hired replacement workers from out of town. 
Management housed the strikebreakers at the Hungerford Hotel across from the 
Oregonian building on SW Columbia Street. When Mayor Terry Schrunk banned the use 
of mass picketing, the unions lost their most effective tactic to halting production.93 The 
January 1960 bombing of ten newspaper delivery trucks by men hired by Levi 
McDonald, an Oregonian employee and part of the negotiating team for the Stereotypers 
local, raised public concerns over the direction of the strike. The court indicted 
McDonald and the bombers, but found no evidence of union direction. On the contrary, 
journalist Gene Klare, a striking journalist from the Portland Reporter and later editor of 
the Northwest Labor Press, would argue that Newhouse management conspired with 
McDonald to bomb the trucks in order to sway public opinion, city officials, and the 
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police against the unions.94 Whatever the case, both the strike and the Portland Reporter 
had collapsed by 1965, and Newhouse consolidated control of both major daily papers. 
The defeat meant permanent replacement for many of the workers who walked off the job 
because the NLRB had ruled the strike illegal in 1963, releasing the Oregonian from any 
obligation to rehire the production workers. 
Portland’s labor movement experienced the same general decline of political 
influence, as well as decreasing private sector membership and bargaining strength, that 
affected the labor movement nationally in the 1970s and 1980s. During the preceding 
decade, the New Left and student movement, which formed around Portland State 
University and Reed College, provided a jolt of radical rank-and-file organizing within 
the local labor movement as radical organizers took jobs in factories seeking to organize 
the classic segments of the working class. Through established unions or new 
organizations, including the Workers Revolutionary Movement (WoRM) and 
Revolutionary Union (RU), radicals participated in strikes at ESCO Steel, Fry Roofing, 
Precision Castparts, and elsewhere.95  
The membership gains made by Oregon’s unions in the 1970s and across the 
country came in the organization of public sector workers, including teachers, social 
service workers, office workers, and even police officers. The AFL ended its unionization 
efforts among police officers following the 1919 Boston police strike. Nevertheless, the 
Portland Police Association (PPA) formed in 1942 with a charter from American 
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Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and became an 
affiliate of the AFL’s Central Labor Council. Since the city refused to recognize the PPA 
as the exclusive bargaining agent and AFSCME required the officers to adopt a no strike 
pledge to their constitution, the PPA, like most other city employees, could not acquire a 
collective bargaining agreement and could only petition city council for improved wages, 
hours, and benefits.  
The conditions for unionization changed dramatically in 1968 when Portland’s 
city council opened the door to collective bargaining with its employees. That same year, 
the PPA members elected David Callison, the son of a union sawmill worker, as its 
president and he quickly began to mobilize his fellow officers. Callison successfully 
leveraged the power of Portland’s labor community against the city to acquire the 
nation’s first collective bargaining agreement for police officers. Organized labor’s 
support, including the Central Labor Council endorsement of the PPA’s demands, proved 
crucial to the officers’ cause. Both the Teamsters and the ILWU respected the picket lines 
set up by the police at the city’s docks, shutting down port traffic for three days and 
compelling the city council to sign a contract with the PPA. Nevertheless, the PPA’s 
participation alongside organized labor proved short lived once it guaranteed a contract, 
as both AFSCME and the PPA split bitterly in 1970.96
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Chapter 2 
Historical Developments in the Retail Book Sector 
By the end of the twentieth century, booksellers had become a major component 
of the retail sector. In the years after World War II, consumer habits involving books 
changed dramatically, altering the triangular retail relationship between bookstore 
employers, customers, and employees. Journalism scholar, Jon Bekken, has asserted that 
these changes mattered because bookselling represented a “vital cultural sector,” 
distinguishably different from other retail business who used similar strategies to increase 
their profitability. Bookstores, suggested Bekken, possessed “a central role in the 
dissemination of ideas.”97 The authors of Books: The Culture and Commerce of 
Publishing (1982) concurred, and further recognized that this tension between commerce 
and culture, as well as criticism of over-commercialization, has existed within 
bookselling since the emergence of capitalism.98 Nonetheless, “While publishers may 
believe their problems are unique,” stated the authors of Books, “they are in fact endemic 
in modern industrial societies, which are plagued with a basic contradiction: while the 
logic of mass production homogenizes tastes, the relative affluence of the society and the 
complex division of labor gives rise to specialization and differentiated tastes.”99  
The Retail Triangle: Employers, Customers, and Bookstore Clerks 
Department stores and independent bookstores, both often located in urban 
centers, controlled bookselling in the United States prior to the 1960s. Department stores, 
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which grew to retail prominence during the intense urbanization occurring during the first 
half of the twentieth century, accounted for an estimated 40 to 60 percent of all book 
sales in 1951.100 However, this dominance faded rapidly in the decade as overall 
declining sales, brought on by the population’s residential and consumer movement out 
of the urban core and into suburban neighborhoods, led to the elimination or downsizing 
of these stores’ book departments. In their place, independent, non-chain bookstore 
acquired the dominant share of market, amounting to 72 percent of all bookstore sales in 
1958.101 Modest sized national or regional chains, most notably Doubleday and 
Brentano’s, coexisted unobtrusively with local independents throughout the 1960s. 
During the 1970s, the subsequent generation of chain stores, most notably 
Waldenbooks and B. Dalton’s, represented what Laura Miller described as “new chains,” 
characterized by aggressive expansion and a rationalization of the distribution process 
through the aid of new technology and supermarket inspired merchandising strategies. 
Between 1972 and 1977, book chains expanded at a rate of 101 percent. These 
corporations often focused on new, enclosed malls featuring ample parking as well as 
weekend and evening hours to serve a newly affluent and increasingly educated suburban 
population.102 By 1980, Waldenbooks operated 704 locations in all fifty states while B. 
Dalton’s maintained 526 outlets.103 Furthermore, book sales by chains with twenty-five 
or more outlets rose by 194 percent between 1972 and 1977.104 In the 1980s, the success 
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of the new chains either drove independent stores out of business, or compelled them to 
differentiate themselves from the chains by offering knowledgeable and specialized 
services, cafes, and space for community events and book groups.  
The arrival of the superstore bookstore chains Borders and Barnes & Noble in the 
1990s both followed and precipitated the big-box store trend in the broader retail sector, 
as well as disrupted the stasis created in the previous decade between independents and 
chain bookstores. With new infusions of investment capital, superstores rapidly created a 
near monopoly on bookselling in the 1990s by acquiring small chain competitors, sharply 
discounting prices, and offering specialty services. Borders and Barnes & Noble 
combined the best services and ambiances found in independent bookstores with the 
discount pricing and merchandising strategies of the chain stores in a single, warehouse 
sized superstore. As these superstores borrowed strategies from the independents, so did 
the independents begin to look more like chain stores by the late 1990s. “With 
independents’ heightened emphasis on expansion, marketing, and technology,” wrote 
Publishers Weekly in 1998 about a trend among stores including Powell’s Books, “they 
are, ironically, starting to resemble the chains they revile.”105 As regionally notable 
independents including Books & Co., Oxford Books, and Taylors Bookstores all closed 
in the late 1990s after over twenty years of business, the American Booksellers 
Association (ABA) responded that the independents that survived this period of “market 
absorption” proved “stronger” and more “innovative.”106 
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Borders, first opened in Ann Arbor, Michigan by brothers Thomas and Louis 
Borders in 1973, capitalized early on UPC bar-coding and created the pioneering Book 
Inventory System to centralize and expedite ordering.107 Kmart, which already purchased 
Waldenbooks, acquired Borders in 1992 and aggressively expanded the brand from 
nineteen to seventy-five stores in three years. Leonard Riggio acquired Barnes & Noble 
in 1971, expanded the brand, and fifteen years later acquired B. Dalton’s 798 stores. 
While Borders rose to prominence primarily through the competitive advantages its 
inventory system provided, a significant factor in Barnes & Noble’s success proved to be 
its merchandising strategy. Riggio boldly introduced shopping carts in his stores. While 
simultaneously taking the “stuffiness out of a bookstore” to accommodate customers, not 
scholars, Riggio tapped the consumer’s vain desire to take on scholarly appearances, 
noting that customers buy volumes of books as “shelf fillers, in order to project images of 
themselves through their collections.”108 Riggio’s quest for a greater share of the national 
market led him to challenge and overtake the Borders Group in the superstore sector, 
with Barnes & Noble operating 431 units compared to Borders’ 157 by 1996.109 By the 
end of the decade, however, financial and publishing experts criticized the book market 
for its saturation. Although, Borders Group and Barnes & Noble tallied almost $4.5 
billion in sales in 1996 and accounted for 43.3 percent of bookstore sales a year later, the 
arrival of internet bookselling and Amazon.com in 1995 would soon make the superstore 
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chains appear more like “lumbering dinosaurs” than the industry titans they seemed only 
a few years earlier.110 
The power relationship between publishers and booksellers has for most of 
history been tilted in favor of the publisher; however, chain stores began to alter this 
balance of power. Similarly, while the authors of Books observed in the 1980s that chain 
stores and publishers experienced a “reciprocal dependency,” nearly thirty years later 
Laura J. Miller argued that the chain stores altered the balance of power in the industry to 
the point that publishers became dependent upon them.111 The ABA’s record of civil 
lawsuits against the chains, the superstores, and Amazon.com in the interest of 
independent bookstores, who often survived on the margins of the industry, illustrated the 
shifting power between publishers and retailers. First, in the 1980s the ABA filed suits 
against several major publishers, who at the time were also under investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission, arguing that publishers gave chains special accommodations 
not received by ABA members. Following this, the ABA shifted much of its criticism 
from the publishers to the chains, announcing in 1998 that they have “now decided to 
strike at what we think is the heart of the problem, the power of the chains.”112 The 
independent bookstores claimed that the superstore chains and their subsidiaries 
pressured the publishers into giving them significant discounts unavailable to 
independents, creating an unfair competitive advantage. The 2015 ABA request for a 
Department of Justice investigation into Amazon for anti-trust violations has revealed 
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how independent booksellers’ fear of the publishers in the 1980s and retailers in the 
1990s have combined as Amazon has become the world’s largest publisher and retailer of 
new books.113 It can be argued that these business trends democratized bookselling in the 
United States since it was no longer a geniocracy limited to urban West Coast and 
Northeast metropolitan areas, but increasingly occurred in the suburban environment and 
spread to rural and southern areas of the country where bookstores were historically 
sparse. 
 Consumer habits accompanied structural shifts in bookselling. Book shopping 
increasingly evolved from an act of indulgence or intellectual curiosity to a common 
leisure activity in the late twentieth century. During the era of bookselling before the new 
chains, booksellers organized their display by publisher to expedite inventory 
management. Thus, the consumer relied as heavily on the clerk’s expert knowledge of 
authors and book titles as they did on shelving organization. When in the 1970s new 
chains broke free from this antiquated business model by utilizing new technology and 
merchandising strategies, they did so to attract a modern consumer, desiring of 
unpretentious self-service when shopping. In her observations of how the new chain 
stores changed bookselling in the 1970s, Laura Miller noted that by moving to the 
suburbs “it lessened the elite aura” of shopping for books and brought the bookstore 
“down to the level of the supermarket across the parking lot or the teen jeans outlet next 
door.”114 As chain stores increasingly absorbed a greater share of the broader market 
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through a limited popular collection, customers also benefitted from how independents 
turned to specialized retailing with religious, children, technical, or women’s books. The 
Borders and Barnes & Noble superstores of the 1990s appealed to the customer base of 
both the small chains and the independent stores because the superstores combined 
discount pricing located in suburban centers with specialty services, cafes, and 
community events. Reflecting on a half century of developments in bookselling, Miller 
concluded that retailers had established the activity of “shopping for books” as “one of 
the quintessential expressions of consumption as a leisure activity.”115 
 The identity and responsibilities of book clerks that existed in the 1950s and the 
earlier heyday of department store bookselling reverberated throughout the remainder of 
the twentieth century. The original chains, Doubleday and Brentano’s, and the traditional 
independents continued the legacy of a department store retailing model in which the 
bookseller’s expertise of titles and shelving organizations provided them a tangible skill 
set. Store owners expected employees to possess an extensive knowledge of books, 
authors, and subjects. Prior to the 1970s, bookstores shelved their display stock by 
publisher to ease inventory counting and reordering. As a result, the book clerk also 
needed to maintain an intricate understanding of publishers and titles in order to locate 
books for customers. Waldenbooks and B. Dalton’s significantly rationalized the work 
process, effectively altering the responsibilities and expectations that employers had for 
book clerks as such changes reduced labor hours and the reliance on the employee’s 
experience. Unlike other book chains, Borders formalized its expectations of employees 
in an applicant screening process to demonstrate they had a sufficient knowledge of 
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books, authors, and subjects before being hired. Indeed, in the first years of the company, 
select employees in each section held the title of “buyer” and choose the titles to shelf, a 
responsibility that derived from job roles in the early era of department stores. 
Additionally, buyers also assisted with floor sales and cashier duties. Borders considered 
them valuable because of their years of experience, product knowledge, and familiarity 
with what the local consumer wanted.116 
Bookstore Clerks Join the Union Movement 
  The labor movement’s groundswell in the 1990s accompanied a period of intense 
competition and conglomeration within the retail book sector that also paralleled a wave 
of union campaigns among the nation’s largest booksellers. Yet, while unionization for 
bookstore workers was hardly a new concept, as the United Auto Workers had 
represented employees at Strand in New York City since 1976 and the ILWU had 
organized Stacey’s Bookstore in San Francisco in the 1950s, these campaigns represented 
isolated and insular events, as anomalous as the names of the unions suggest. However, 
seemingly out of nowhere employees at large retail bookstores, including Borders and 
Barnes & Noble, initiated over two dozen union drives across the country between 1996 
and 2003. These campaigns were predominantly initiated by store workers and not union 
organizers, and although the campaigns focused narrowly on union recognition and 
collective bargaining at the individual store level, workers used the newly available 
internet to share information, coordinate actions, and ultimately create informal national 
bookstore unions. 
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 Borders served as the epicenter of book clerk organizing and the primary target 
for unionization in the mid to late 1990s, and then again in the early 2000s. The Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW) and the workers at Borders store #21 in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania embarked upon the first concerted effort to organize and seek union 
recognition at one of the national chains in the country. Though the workers lost the 
election by a 25 to 20 vote in March 1996, the company’s subsequent termination of 
twenty-two-year-old union activist Miriam Fried in June sparked an unexpected 
international campaign against Borders. Utilizing the internet to share information about 
Fried’s firing, the IWW launched a website to announce the formation of a “cyber picket” 
of Borders and to coordinate pickets at store locations across the country in eighteen 
cities, including the company’s downtown Portland store in August 1996.117 The boycott 
campaign garnered national attention after filmmaker Michael Moore refused to cross a 
picket line at the Philadelphia store in September, and alternatively welcomed Fried and 
the protest into the store for his book signing event. Borders, once considered a 
progressive liberal employer by the public, suddenly began receiving demands from 
progressive cultural figures and organizations, such as Noam Chomsky, Billy Bragg, the 
National Writers Union, and the Women’s International League of Peace and Justice. 
“Borders manipulates its hippie image,” wrote the stalwart progressive magazine The 
Nation, adding it “uses new­age obfuscations to derail union efforts.”118 
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 Although the IWW continued its relevance for several more years in the struggle 
to unionize Borders through periodic organizing drives, pickets, and the boycott website, 
the United Food and Commercial Workers’ (UFCW) wider national presence and greater 
resources propelled the union to the forefront of the Border’s campaign. While the 
UFCW received charges from the IWW of raiding their union drive at the Chicago 
location, Borders’ tested the union’s commitment and ability to organize employees in 
the retail superstore sector.119 In the summer of 1996, Borders employees in Chicago and 
at the company’s flagship store in Ann Arbor began organizing with the UFCW, with the 
Chicago store becoming the first recognized union at any of Borders 157 locations in the 
country. In the immediate years that followed, the unionized Chicago workers were 
joined by Borders employees in Des Moines, Iowa (1996); Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 
(1997); and New York City’s World Trade Center (1997) who voted for the union. Yet, 
the UFCW would win as many times as it had lost or withdrew petitions for elections, 
including at Ann Arbor, Michigan (1996); Stamford, Connecticut (1997); Seattle, 
Washington (1997); Evanston, Illinois (1997); and twice at a warehouse facility in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (1996 and 1998).120  
Believing that there was widespread agitation among employees throughout 
Borders, the UFCW auspiciously announced a national campaign in October 1997 to 
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organize the company’s ten thousand employees. Union president Douglas H. Dority 
pledged the “support, the resources and the unwavering commitment” of the UFCW to 
the “educated, loyal and committed” Borders employees “seeking a fair reward and 
opportunity for future growth.”121 The strategy focused on first acquiring a neutrality 
pledge from management to not interfere with organizing while simultaneously 
mobilizing customers to take a visible stance of support for the workers, but this call to 
action for consumers fell short of joining the boycott called by the IWW. Such optimism 
and sentiments of “unwavering commitment” proved ephemeral as the UFCW called off 
the national media campaign targeting the bookstore’s liberal reputation in December. “I 
thought Borders would care more about their publicity,” explained UFCW organizer 
Vanessa Sylvester. Organizer Liza Canada also admitted the union was out of touch with 
the issues which workers faced in the targeted Michigan stores.122  
Following this defeat, the UFCW encountered difficulty negotiating contracts for 
its four union stores or organizing new shops but workers continued to press the 
company. The union at Bryn Mawr decertified in June 1998 without acquiring a contract, 
while the agreements for the Chicago, Des Moines, and World Trade Center stores 
secured only minor economic benefits. Nonetheless, an upsurge in organizing at Borders 
occurred again in 2002, when employees at the Ann Arbor and Minneapolis stores 
elected the UFCW. By this time, the UFCW no longer represented the workers at the four 
previous unionized bookstores. In comparison to the previous efforts, the UFCW acted 
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considerably more aggressive in its efforts to secure a contract for the new unionized 
stores, building strong community coalitions in both cities and engaging in a fifty-four-
day strike at the Ann Arbor store that began in November 2003. Workers in Minneapolis 
received support from the Union of Radical Workers and Writers (URWW), a small 
“social movement network” organized to “confront, impede, and revise neoliberal 
policies and practices in the everyday lives of workers of the word.”123 The URWW grew 
out of the struggle to unionize Borders and went on to host the first conference for 
activist bookstore workers titled “Resist Retail Nihilism: A Bookstore Workers 
Organizing Forum” in January 2004.  
The Borders Group initially proved slow to respond nationally to the IWW’s early 
union drive, but as union activity became more frequent around the country in the 
summer of 1996 the company adapted a classic union avoidance strategy to its liberal 
corporate image. By September 1996 company executives had embarked upon a 
campaign that included the creation of a “Union Awareness Training for Borders 
Managers” manual by Vice President of Human Resources Anne Kubeck. In 1998, the 
manual was leaked to the public and published online by Borders union activists, the 
IWW, and Mother Jones magazine. Kubeck appeared to have modeled the manual on the 
works of other union avoidance strategists, such as John Tate and Alfred T. DeMaria, by 
giving instructions for how management should alert corporate executives about any 
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suspicious behavior from employees.124 Additionally, the guide instructed managers 
about how “Raising awareness about the specific unions in question can also be 
enlightening” to employees. “Anytime we are afraid to speak about unions,” the manual 
warns, “we give our employees the impression that there must be something of value to 
them in a union and therefore encourage their activity to continue.”125 Management 
coupled this nuanced strategy by responding to select cases of union activity with a sharp 
rebuke of the educated workforce it had sought out, while simultaneously attempting to 
reinforce the futility of challenging retail economics. “We have highly educated 
employees who consider themselves ‘professional,’’’ stated an April 1997 company 
newsletter, “but who are in reality working at an early level retail job.” The newsletter 
went on to say that, “If you desire an enjoyable job while you figure out what to do with 
your life, this is a good place to be,” but warned employees against trying to make a 
career from what could “never be a well-paying job.”126 
 Despite the resistance and the defeats to unionization met by Borders employees, 
union efforts and messages found resonance with book clerks at Barnes & Noble, who 
initiated organizing campaigns in 1997 and 1998 with familiar aspirations, tactics, and 
principles. Responding to why he contacted the UFCW to help organize a union at the 
Arlington, Texas Barnes & Noble, college student James Schram stated that he believed 
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that he and his fellow coworkers were paid less than the average retail worker and that 
their “job is more demanding intellectually and sometimes physically.”127  
Wesley Gibbs, a thirty-year-old Indiana University graduate with an English 
degree working at the Louisville, Kentucky Barnes & Noble store #2705, began 
organizing in August 1997 after learning about the Borders union campaigns. When 
questioned by management about his actions, Gibbs stated that he “felt that it was my 
obligation as a United States citizen to improve working conditions which ultimately 
affects workers around the world.”128 Gibbs reported that the Borders union websites 
inspired him to launch http://booksellersunion.org/ to encourage the unionization of 
Barnes & Noble’s employees. The site republished financial information about the 
company and top executives from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s website, as 
well as included forums and discussion boards, creating a horizontal communication 
network between employees from Barnes & Noble and Borders. In less than four months, 
Gibbs received forty messages from current employees at thirty different store locations 
and tallied 6,300 views.129 Summarizing just how technologically far ahead non-
unionized retail book clerks were compared to the UFCW, the largest union representing 
retail workers in the country, Local 227 organizer Bruce Finley acknowledged that the 
internet was an “untapped resource” for the labor movement, one that “kind of takes the 
isolation away” from workers in organizing campaigns. Additionally, as Courier-Journal 
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reporter Joe Ward summarized, “Workers far apart can use it to share ideas and to give 
each other emotional support. They also can benefit from the same research on the 
company, much of which can now be done on the Internet.”130 Although Barnes & 
Noble’s employees in Kansas City, Missouri and Charlottesville, Virginia, joined the 
Arlington and Louisville workers by trying to unionize with the UFCW in the late 1990s, 
none of the campaigns succeeded in achieving recognition or collective bargaining 
agreements.  
 The arrival of Amazon.com in 1995 further disrupted the retail triangle that 
historically existed under capitalism between the employer, the employee, and the 
consumer. By creating a global digital marketplace for books, Amazon.com founder Jeff 
Bezos eliminated the face-to-face interaction from the transaction and shifted the 
expected skill set of the employee from literary knowledge to technical support. Union 
activists around the globe anticipated the importance of organizing Amazon’s operation 
during its early phases and launched an international effort to organize its customer 
service and distributions centers in November 2000. In the United States, WashTech (an 
initiative of Communication Workers of America) targeted the four hundred Seattle 
based customer service associates, while a partnership between the UFCW and the 
Prewitt Organizing Fund (POF) sought to organize five thousand workers at seven 
distribution centers around the country. POF served as an incubator for organizers and 
campaigns as a non-profit and independent labor group that partnered with established 
unions. Yet, the UFCW broke with POF over disagreements, including POF’s support for 
                                                          
130 Joe Ward, “Internet Helps Drive to Organize Bookstore Labor,” The Courier-Journal, January 20, 1998, 
Business Section, 1.  
67 
Ralph Nader’s presidential campaign, just as organizers prepared to publicly launch the 
campaign, a series of events that doomed the union drive in the distribution centers.131  
Amazon responded to WashTech’s customer service campaign aggressively, 
calling a paid “all hands meeting” with less than a twenty-four hour’ notice. Union 
activists considered it a captive audience meeting because of the short notice and the 
previous precedent that all hands meetings were voluntary and not paid. Management 
later expelled workers from the breakroom when they attempted to discuss the union 
effort with groups of coworkers. Additionally, Amazon created and directed its associates 
to an “informative and educational” FAQ web page the firm created about unions, 
illustrating that companies could also utilize the internet to counter organize the 
workforce.132 Though these domestic organizing efforts failed to gain recognition or 
collective bargaining agreements, the setbacks and small successes illustrated two 
conclusions. First, despite all the rhetoric regarding the “new economy” and its liberal 
values, which made unions irrelevant, WashTech co-founder Marcus Courtney noticed 
only a superficial difference between how management within the traditional and new 
economies responded to workers’ collective activity. “Management is completely willing 
to accept someone with a nose ring,” remarked Courtney of Amazon, “but all of a sudden 
that employee with a nose ring wants a real say over how things are going, they think it's 
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1910 all over again.”133 Next, despite the labor movement’s five years of resurgence, 
WashTech organizers Gretchen Wilson and Mike Blain challenged the narrow vision of 
membership most unions held, arguing that continual evaluation of a campaign’s success 
based on the acquisition of a contract “is a shortsighted and outmoded yardstick.”134 At 
the start of the twenty-first century the WashTech organizers were not alone with their 
criticisms, as progressives and radical unionists increasingly experimented with tactics 
outside the contract model. Wilson and Blain argued that the reliance on contracts 
benefited employers, prevented unions from gaining new members, and was 
“symptomatic of a shrinking and nostalgic U.S. labor movement.”135 
History of Book Selling in Portland and Powell’s Books 
 Portland, founded in the Oregon Territory on the Willamette River in 1845, 
maintained multiple bookstores within a decade of existence, thanks to entrepreneurial 
retailers and printers. Early Portland settler and regional merchant Stephen Coffin began 
advertising his “small assortment” of books and stationery for sale in 1850, a year later 
opening a general store on Washington and Front Streets that featured school books.136 
Another successful early Portland bookseller was Stephen J. McCormick, a printer and 
publisher who sold his titles at his Franklin Book Store on Front Street.137 Opened in 
1852, it quite possibly was Portland’s first store devoted to books. McCormick’s press, 
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which published the work of Joaquin Miller, Abigail Scott Duniway, and popular 
almanacs, garnered him notoriety as well as positioned him as a political leader, 
precipitating his selection as a delegate to the state’s constitutional convention and 
election as Portland’s tenth mayor. Long before Powell’s City of Books, A.R. Shipley 
opened City Book Store on Morrison Street in 1855. Located within the new post office 
building, the store boasted that its stock arrived fresh off a steamer from New York, 
offering both a specialized and general collection of “standard histories, poets, travels, 
biographies, scientific, and agricultural works” at affordable prices.138 
 Prior to Powell, the name Gill was synonymous to bookselling within Portland 
and the Pacific Northwest. “There is no better example of steady growth in the 
bookselling field than J.K Gill company,” reported Publishers Weekly in 1920, as its 
owner employed agents in several states and prepared to break ground on a new eight-
story, eight thousand square foot downtown retail space.139 Joseph K. Gill began retailing 
books, along with stationery and office furniture, in Portland in the 1870s and became the 
city’s foremost name in bookselling by the turn of the century. Gill diversified his 
financial interests in the 1880s, becoming a publisher for popular regional works, 
including the Chinook Jargon dictionary and investing in the Columbia River Paper Co. 
The J.K. Gill Company began operating out of its headquarters on SW Fifth and SW 
Alder Avenues in 1922 and at its height operated thirty-six stores in the West. Locally, 
the company out competed the downtown department stores, such as Meier and Frank, in 
the 1950s and weathered the rise of suburban shopping centers through the 1960s. 
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Nevertheless, the Gill family decided to sell their business in 1970 to an out of state firm, 
which sold it again a decade later before its final owners liquidated the company in 1998.  
 In the 1970s, the number of both single store and chain-operated bookstores in 
Portland increased rapidly. Yet, the number of used book retailers, such as Cameron’s 
Book Store and Green Dolphin Bookshop, remained few. The category of “Second 
Hand” bookselling began to enter the city’s business directory in 1921, with Hyland’s 
Old Book Store located at 204-206 Fourth Street. Advertising the “largest miscellaneous 
stock of books in Oregon,” the Hyland brothers offered special interest books on such 
subjects as mechanics and foreign tongues as well as rare titles to downtown shoppers 
into the 1950s. Although the national chains of B. Dalton’s and Waldenbooks arrived to 
Portland in 1973 and 1982 respectively, the number of independents grew at a faster rate, 
often specializing in specific fields like feminist, radical, religious, science, or erotic 
literature. Nevertheless, many of these stores, such as Book Haven and Sandy’s Book 
Nook, followed a national trend of shutting down after only a year or two of operation.140 
Amidst this proliferation of competition and a decline in downtown retail 
shopping, Walter Powell opened Powell’s Books in 1971 with one hundred boxes of 
books that he collected at rummage sales and purchased for cash from college students. 
Walter, a retired contractor and president of the local Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 
described getting “bit by the book business” while spending a month in Chicago helping 
his son Michael Powell operate his recently opened used and specialty book shop. By 
Walter’s second year in business, his store boasted 37,000 used paperback and hardcover 
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titles ranging all topics. Although he prided himself as the resident expert of religious 
books and worked as a teacher prior to becoming a house painter, as a newcomer to 
bookselling Walter relied on the expert staff he hired for other subjects, including 
Stefanie Siegel and Bernard M. Kehoe.141 Yet, Walter made the decisions on how to 
retail books, often breaking conventional wisdom. When Walter expanded his business in 
the late 1970s to include new books, he aimed to compete with J.K. Gill’s by “by adding 
two of everything and three of nothing,” recalled his son Michael.142 But, Walter’s most 
successful retail innovation was stocking new and used, paperback and hardcover, next to 
each other on the same shelves, organized by topic. “I had no sympathy,” recalled son 
Michael at that time still in Chicago, “It seemed crazy.”143 No other store had tried and 
succeeded in organizing books this way, but father Walter’s instinct proved “absolutely, 
brilliantly correct” in hindsight to Michael and the practice became a hallmark of 
Powell’s success.144 
Walter selected a small, well-worn storefront at 302 SW Twelfth Avenue, one 
block off the main thoroughfare of West Burnside Street, for the location of his store. The 
wood floors creaked under the weight of the stacks and shelves of books Walter squeezed 
into the 1909 space, even having shelves in the bathroom. The area contained an eclectic 
mix of Portland’s working-class and LGBTQ communities, giving the store an instant 
bohemian quality. The Oregonian’s Paul Pintarich fondly recalled being a graduate 
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student frequenting Powell’s first location. He described the clientele in those early days 
as being as “used and battered” as the stacks of books Walter piled in every corner of his 
store. The “denizens of the inner city endlessly seeking esoteric tomes” regularly found 
Walter behind the counter, ready to direct them to the right book.145 Henry Weinhard’s 
brewery on West Burnside Street emitted a consistent smell of cooked malts and hops 
within an industrial district packed with auto body shops and warehouses, drawing little 
consumer traffic. Low cost and temporary stay housing buildings resided on the south 
side of West Burnside Street, including the two floors above the storefront and the Joyce 
Hotel on SW Eleventh Avenue. A triangle area formed by SW Stark Street and West 
Burnside Street, between SW Ninth and Thirteenth Avenues, became home to a variety 
of business owned and frequented by Portland’s increasingly public gay community. Gay 
bars within the triangle, including The Family Zoo and The Majestic Hotel and Bath 
House, served as centers for socializing and political organization.146 Powell’s Books and 
the Majestic, which also reopened in 1971, operated on opposite sides of the street until 
1976 when Walter moved his storefront to a bigger ten thousand square foot space one 
block up, at 1207 West Burnside Street.   
 Michael Powell joined Powell’s Books in 1979, relocating with his wife Alice and 
new daughter Emily from Chicago at the request of his father who had asked for his help 
managing and expanding his store. Powell, the great-grandson of an 1890s Oregon 
homesteader, graduated from Portland’s Grant High School in 1958 and received a 
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degree in political science from the University of Washington. He spent his summers 
working as a commercial fisherman, before entering graduate school at the University of 
Chicago in 1962, hoping to eventually become a professor. While in Chicago in the late 
1960s, he began scouring thrift stores and the Maxwell Street flea market for rare books. 
At first on bike, and later with car, he began buying and transporting books that he could 
resell on consignment at the university co-op store where he worked. "I enjoyed the 
treasure hunt of it," recalled Powell fondly of these early days of book scouting.147 He 
experimented with selling books by catalogue to universities and had hoped to move to 
Santa Fe, New Mexico to open a store. His friends and professors, including author Saul 
Bellows and sociologist Morris Janowitz, urged him to turn his passion for rare books 
into a business venture. When an opportunity arose to share a one thousand square foot 
store space in Hyde Park, Bellows lent him $3,000 to acquire an inventory and, along 
with other benefactors, helped pay for the initial rent. Despite having no business 
background, Powell opened shop in 1970 and proved a quick success and a model for 
father Walter. “I always thought I would come back,” Michael Powell recounted in an 
interview year later about why he left the successful business he started in Chicago, “I 
always thought of myself as an Oregonian, always kept my Oregon driver’s license.”148  
Michael’s return to Portland and the end of Walter’s lease on the store’s space 
positioned Powell’s Books for a massive expansion in the 1980s. These factors coincided 
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with what Michael Powell called “an explosion of reading” in the 1980s, a trend showing 
increased consumer activity for books.149 While the Pacific Northwest responded to the 
geological explosion of Mount St. Helen’s in May 1980, Powell’s Books moved into the 
former American Motors Corporation dealership at 1005 West Burnside Street, 
immediately sparking speculation of Powell’s being the “largest bookstore in the 
world.”150 Michael Powell’s first of many expansions to the company his father started 
involved increasing the new location’s retail space from 24,000 to 30,000 square feet in 
1983. In the first four years of the father-son duo, Powell’s sales increased 38 percent 
with a staff of twenty-four.151  
As chain competitors B. Dalton’s and Waldenbooks expanded aggressively into 
malls and suburbs in the mid-1980s, Powell’s kept pace by opening either a specialized 
or general book store once a year. “I was both interested in segmenting books like 
technical and travel and cooking,” reflected Michael Powell decades later about 
expanding his audience of readers, “I was also interested in demographics, like urban 
centers, suburbs and airports.”152 In 1984, Powell’s opened a store in the neighboring 
suburb of Beaverton, proving that its new-used retail model could work with the typical 
chain store oriented suburban consumers. The following year, he partnered with the city 
of Portland to open a three thousand square foot Travel Store in Pioneer Courthouse 
Square as well as with business owner and former art gallery proprietor Anne Hughes, 
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who opened a coffee shop in the main store.153 Powell’s opened its ten-thousand-square-
foot Technical Bookstore near its downtown store and a separate Books for Cooks store, 
in the trendy Hawthorne District in 1986.154 A year later, Powell’s opened its Rare Books 
Room in the main store to showcase two thousand of its highest priced and hard-to-find 
volumes.155 By the end of the decade, Powell’s maintained seven locations, including one 
within the concourse of Portland’s airport. As a destination for locals and tourists alike, 
Powell’s had become more than a bookstore but a destination. “It sounds like it was 
planned,” Michael Powell said about the decisions and speed of Powell’s expansion in 
the 1980s, “but it wasn’t. It was just opportunity and impulse.”156 
Powell’s success has historically rested on its entrepreneurial approach to used 
book dealing, particularly its aggressive acquisition strategy. Both father and son shared 
the emphasis on book buying. Walter explained his approach in 1979, “Our advertising is 
all slanted toward buying books. Once we have them, we can sell them,” he once 
explained.157 Shortly after joining the company, son Michael echoed his father’s 
sentiments, emphasizing their focus was “on buying books, not selling.” He observed, “If 
we can get a really good quality book, we know we can sell it with no trouble at all.”158 
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By 1998, the company was purchasing 3,500 books over the counter each day.159 
Additionally, in an era of bookselling where the perception that bookstores either had to 
specialize or generalize to meet the customer's needs, Powell’s did both on a scale that 
precipitated the superstores of later decades. Nevertheless, the personalities and business 
approaches of father and son revealed significant differences, each contributing to the 
success and character of the store. Although Walter continued to work behind the counter 
up until his death in 1985, he had sold the store to Michael in 1982. “It was like Old and 
New world capitalism,” said Stefanie Siegel to the Oregonian in 1999, who began 
working at Powell’s in 1971. While Walter gave Powell’s an innovative retailing strategy 
and the charming ‘Pop’ of a local small business, Alice Powell, attributed the 
“magnitude” of the store to her husband Michael, who some employees found distant and 
preoccupied with making deals.160  
Michael Powell proved an adept entrepreneur in both used book buying and 
selling. In order to satisfy the demand for used books of his Portland customers, Powell’s 
needed a supply line beyond its reach in the metropolitan region. When independent 
bookstores go out of business, their remaining stock is often sold at discount to other 
local independents, effectively keeping that revenue stream local. Powell capitalized on 
the closure of independent bookstores nationally by acquiring their remaining stock at 
bargain prices, as was the case with a Cleveland, Ohio bookseller in 1983. Powell 
purchased 700,000 books for $300,000 dollars, spurring the need for the 1983 store 
expansion.161 Again, in 1990s he purchased the remaining fifty thousand volumes from a 
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Bloomington, Indiana dealer going out of business.162 Additionally, collectors sought out 
Powell’s Books to liquidate their personal libraries, including one seller in Maryland 
from whom Michael Powell bought twenty thousand books in 1999.163  
Michael Powell simultaneously positioned his bookstore as an industry leader 
globally through unparalleled partnerships with nation-states, such as Vietnam, and 
domestically through application of innovative merchandising practices. Powell sought 
out transpacific opportunities to deal books in bulk during the mid-1980s, finding new 
markets and a growing demand for English language paperbacks, technical books, and 
magazines in the Philippines, Korea, China, and Japan.164 Powell’s became the first 
commercial trade partner to Vietnam since the 1975 embargo, brokering a deal with the 
country’s Ministry of Culture in 1992 for English language textbooks, paperback fiction, 
and technical manuals.165 Meanwhile, Powell’s stores provided local customers with a 
hyper-organized book arrangement in which the main store was divided into color coded 
rooms, further divided into labeled sections with identifiable subsections in every aisle. 
Powell continued his father’s innovative and popular practice of shelving new and used 
books alongside one another. Powell’s introduced shopping baskets and full-color maps 
at store entrances, facilitating a consumer experience that merged the excitement of a 
treasure hunt with the satiation of buying in bulk. Employees stationed at information 
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desks in each room provided expert, no-hassle customer service in case shoppers required 
extra assistance with the store’s self-guided design.  
The bookstore’s success in the 1980s garnered Powell city-wide praise and he 
became a leading voice from the business community within civic affairs. In 1987, 
Powell donated to the county library’s new Black Resource Center in North Portland a 
collection of three hundred books written by black authors dating back to the early 
nineteenth century. The Fisk University Press Reprint series, valued at $5,000, became 
the backbone of the collection. Later that year, Powell partnered with the Black Resource 
Center by donating 250 books to a holiday “Books for Kids” giveaway.166 “He has a 
social conscience that most of us should have,” stated Portland’s populist mayor Bud 
Clark that year.167 When funding for school libraries was equalized statewide in 1994, 
cutting the budgets of Portland’s school districts, Powell’s initiated the “It’s for Kids” 
charitable campaign. The effort raised tens of thousands of dollars for area school 
libraries each year, distributed to schools through gift cards to Powell’s.168 The bookstore 
owner also has been involved in a long list of philanthropic, arts, cultural, and civic 
organizations, including Portland’s World Affairs Council, Chamber Music Northwest, 
the Northwest Triangle Association, and many more since the 1980s.169 
Powell publicly contributed to liberal causes that aligned to his political outlook 
as a supporter of the Democratic Party and his position as a business figure. Powell’s 
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Books benefited from the shop local movement, a liberal consumer response to the 
conglomeration of national retail chains that drew money out of the local economy. In a 
display of solidarity with his competitors, Michael Powell, often posted a large “BREAK 
THE CHAIN” sign in his downtown store’s windows with a list of Portland’s 
independent bookstores.170 When the controversial Ballot Measure 9 initiative sought to 
amend the state’s constitution to discriminate against the LGBTQ community in 1992, 
Powell’s Books joined other business and cultural leaders by contributing $10,450 to the 
coalition opposing the measure. “Nine could be the most devastating thing to happen to 
our economy in our time,” Michael Powell told an oppositional rally of ten thousand 
attendees at Portland’s Pioneer Square, forewarning that it could lead to a national 
boycott of Oregon businesses. During censorship and book banning episodes, bookselling 
became a defiant political act. "We have a social responsibility to the community and our 
industry to fight censorship," declared Powell’s website in October 1999.171 When 
Congress attempted to regulate internet content in the late nineties through the Child 
Online Privacy Act, Powell’s joined sixteen other plaintiffs represented by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to challenge the law. “Powell's is proud to join forces with 
these other organizations to translate our values into actions,” stated a letter to customers 
in April 1999. Such examples of Michael Powell’s engagement and leadership in the 
community won him an appointment by Democratic Governor John Kitzhaber to serve as 
a Port of Portland Commissioner for two terms in the 1990s. The influential position in 
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the region's economy, trade, and labor relations brought Powell in direct contact with 
several unions representing workers at Portland’s docks and airport. For his service, 
Powell won the praise of the Portland Business Journal editorial board who commented 
that he “studies the shipyard and asks tough questions of the folks who run the port. [...] 
That's why we need to keep him on the commission.”172 
For Powell’s, the 1990s began with optimism and a continuation of growth and 
ended with the unexpected unionization of its workforce. Nevertheless, the proliferation 
of chain superstores and the arrival of internet bookselling made for a challenging decade 
for independent bookstores nationwide, resulting in the closure of many stores and 
further consolidation of the sector. Powell’s responded to its growing competition by 
expanding four locations by 5,000 to 10,000 square feet, including the main store that 
now contained 43,000 square feet.173 Additionally, a new general bookstore next to its 
cookbooks store was added on SE Hawthorne Boulevard in the mid-1990s. The company 
also experimented with a variety of specialized stores during this growth period, 
including a Powell’s Books for Health located in a Portland hospital, a Powell’s Books 
for Kids in Beaverton, an audio book store, and a calendar store in a mall. In 1998, the 
Hawthorne culinary book outlet broadened its specialization and became Books for 
Cooks and Gardeners.174 Competition for new book sales at this time shifted from B. 
Dalton’s and Waldenbooks, to the superstores of Barnes & Noble and Borders. While 
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Barnes & Noble targeted suburbs and shopping center, Borders competed directly with 
Powell’s for downtown sales by opening a location on SW Third Avenue in 1996.  
Powell’s transition from a paper to a computerized sales and inventory system 
proved difficult, but resulted in a systematic consolidation of information that improved 
the company’s used book buying performance and allowed it to enter the digital 
marketplace. Powell’s was a pioneer in internet book sales, recording its first sale through 
a telnet to an Apple employee in 1993.175 Powell’s Books entered the digital marketplace 
in 1994 through the initiative of a single employee and a $10,000 company investment, a 
year before Amazon.com went online. By 2000, Powell’s collected half million dollars 
through its online sales, netting thirty-thousand visitors and a thousand buyers each 
day.176 All this with an internet staff of only forty-nine employees, far smaller than its 
Seattle-based competitor Amazon. Michael Powell recalled that the impetus came from 
local competition by the national chains: “At the time, Barnes & Noble and Borders were 
opening stores all around me. My wagons were circled and they attacked from the 
suburbs, these giant stores. And I thought, ‘If there’s any way to leap over those stores 
and reach a broader audience, there’s nothing better than this thing called the 
Internet.’”177 Nevertheless, unlike its chain competitors, Powell’s still used a manual 
system of inventory cards to track its sales. Creating a database of the store’s collection 
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took a full year, but by 1996 Powells.com featured the store’s inventory, tallying $1.5 
million in sales a year later and reaching $10 million in 2000.178 
By the late 1990s, Powell’s bookstore had become known as the city’s unofficial 
living room, a social and cultural destination whose owner reaped both social and 
financial capital. As the company’s profitability rose 10 percent in 1997, the press called 
Michael Powell “one of Portland’s city fathers,” a figure whose business became an 
anchor for urban commercial and residential development.179 “Powell and his books 
make Portland a better place in which to live,” declared the Oregonian.180 Nevertheless, 
increased competition from national chains and a burgeoning digital marketplace 
threatened the prized local store’s profitability. Surveying the national landscape in 
August 1998, Michael Powell described the moment as the “most critical phase in the 
history of American book selling.”181 The retail book sector appeared on a precipice, and 
industry experts observed that “Powell’s is simultaneously specialized and diversified, 
giving it a rare advantage in a ruthless market that rewards both qualities.”182 Earlier that 
year, Powell’s management embarked upon an ambitious expansion plan to secure its 
place locally and globally, while also restructuring the labor process. Consequently, the 
rapid changes that occurred internally at Powell’s, externally in the retail book sector, and 
nationally within the labor force converged in the summer of 1998, when Powell’s 
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bookstore employees chose to challenge these conditions through a union campaign, 
which became a public affair for nearly two years.
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Chapter 3 
Booksellers and Dockworkers: Organizing the Union at Powell’s Books 
(September 1998 - April 1999) 
The Powell’s Employees’ Association and Oregon Public Employees Union Drive 
Employees at Powell’s Books twice attempted to organize themselves in the 
decade prior to the 1998 ILWU union drive, confronting management collectively and 
demanding a voice in the company’s decisions. The booksellers’ first attempt was not 
explicitly a union drive, rather it was a self-organized committee of workers that 
identified as the Powell’s Employees’ Association. The loosely organized representative 
body formed in 1987 among employees at the Burnside location. Jeff Hensley, who 
began working at the store in 1984, and several other fellow association members held a 
series of meetings with management over the course of a year to recommend 
improvements on how the company communicated with staff about its changing and 
growing operation. The association proved short-lived, but appeared to have influenced 
Michael Powell’s decision to formalize the responsibilities of employee communication 
and hire a Human Resources manager.  
The first unsuccessful effort for union recognition at Powell’s Books came 
following the 1990 holiday shopping season. Powell’s management had anticipated a 
prosperous holiday season, hiring a crew of new workers to prepare for the expected 
increase in customers and sales. However, snow, ice, and frigid temperatures dropping 
into the teens devastated holiday sales expectations. Managers informed staff of 
imminent layoffs beginning in January, the first in the company’s history. Employees 
expected that the bookstore would respect the seniority of workers who had been with the 
company for several years. When management delivered the two dozen layoff notices to 
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store employee’s mailboxes, however, workers decried the company’s decision to let go 
several veteran staff members and retain workers hired only a few months earlier, calling 
it “The Christmas Massacre.”183 An employee association from the main store, where the 
majority of layoffs occurred, met in the aftermath and decided to unionize. The 
organizing committee ultimately decided upon the Oregon Public Employees Union 
(OPEU) as its bargaining agent.184 By the summer of 1991, union activists and OPEU 
organizers made significant progress outreaching to workers in the main store, but fell 
short of demonstrating a commanding majority believed necessary to win a union 
election.   
The OPEU’s effort to expand into the private sector proved a failure because of its 
service model approach with union activists and a lack of support company wide. 
Hensley described a “clash of cultures,” believing that the environment of Powell’s 
Books differed significantly from the public-sector workplace. In hindsight, the veteran 
bookseller thought that the OPEU underestimated “how much work it would take to 
reconcile everybody” to union life.185 With limited space for involvement from Powell’s 
employees, Hensley noted that it appeared organizers were inclined “to do too many 
things for us.”186 In practice, this service model approach and professionalization of 
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union organizing prioritized the role of union staff over rank-and-file leadership. Further 
hampering the campaign was the OPEU’s decision to only organize the main store and, 
forego outreaching to the satellite stores. Powell’s responded to the drive with measured 
reservation, issuing a few company memos that recognized that the company was 
experiencing some growing pains. In a letter to the ILWU organizing committee in 1998, 
former bookseller and union supporter Wayne Pernu noted a “real divisiveness among 
employees” regarding unionization, which negatively impacted the organizing drive and 
which management had no significant role in instigating.187 Even though the union 
collected over 30 percent of signed union authorization cards from booksellers 
(significantly less than the goal of 65 percent), the union decided to end its organizing 
efforts in July 1991. 
Despite the unionization defeat, the organizing committee successfully compelled 
Powell’s corporate management to make modest reforms. Managers hoped to 
demonstrate through these reforms that the OPEU’s union campaign was unwarranted. At 
the campaign’s conclusion, union activists presented Michael Powell with what they 
called a “Justice Doctrine,” which called for such reforms as a consistent wage policy, 
clear job descriptions, and a grievance procedure. Additionally, the letter encouraged 
Powell himself to increase the responsibilities of employees and create more 
communication channels between managers and booksellers.188 Although OPEU 
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organizer Jean Eilers recalled Powell reacting harshly to the letter presented to him, the 
company did institute a number of changes that seemed to respond to employees’ 
concerns, including an updated employee handbook in April 1992 that added a Problem 
Solving Process and procedures for termination.189 Nevertheless, many of the 
disheartened worker-organizers left the company when the union campaign folded.  
The third, and ultimately successful, 1998 organizing campaign began with 
informal discussions among workers about the possibilities of unionization, preparing 
workers to act when conditions for unionizing were most ripe. Mary Winzig, John 
McMahon, and Marty Kruse –three employees who emerged as early leaders of the 
organizing drive and who started with the company in the mid-nineties– all discussed 
unionizing with trusted coworkers periodically but neither took further action. “We just 
felt like our jobs were being pulled away. We felt like we didn’t have any control,” 
recalled Winzig about the sentiment of her early conversations. When filmmaker, author, 
and public proponent for the Borders union Michael Moore visited the store in 1997, 
Winzig approached him for advice on unionizing but later recalled that the process 
seemed too daunting to undertake.190 However, by the summer of 1998 a rapid sequence 
of management initiatives compelled workers to act. For McMahon who started at 
Powell’s in 1996 these changes to working conditions in summer of 1998 polarized the 
options in his mind, either “quit or do something about it.”191 
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The 1998 union drive at Powell’s Books arose from a convergence of 
precipitating and immediate factors, not dissimilar from those that typically spur 
organizing campaigns in other workplaces. Workers expressed concern about the 
increasing distance managers placed between themselves and front-line staff. 
“Management really just pulled themselves away, and had not a lot of personal 
relationships with what was going on,” recalled Winzig, adding that management was “so 
out of touch” that it benefitted the union campaign.192 The autonomy of employees to 
maintain their own work hours and job responsibilities became an area of contest where 
management proved determined to invoke its authority. A previous culture of flexible 
scheduling, in which workers could arrive late or early without reprimand so long as 
employees completed their hours and work tasks, became subject of increased scrutiny by 
managers in what workers described as a more “corporate atmosphere.”193  
The immediate factors for the union drive included a series of initiatives 
forwarded by upper management aimed at aggressively expanding the physical space of 
the store, centralizing knowledge of work processes, and curtailing labor costs. Although 
the region’s labor market in the late nineties appeared advantageous for union organizers 
for its low unemployment, Powell’s did not have difficulty attracting applicants. The 
ILWU campaign (September 1998 through August 2000) occurred during a period of low 
unemployment in the Portland metropolitan area, not exceeding 4.9 percent and reaching 
a low of 3.7 percent in December 1999.194 Nevertheless, General Manager Miriam Sontz, 
                                                          
192 Winzig, ILWU Oral History Collection, Tape 1, 12. 
193 Winzig, ILWU Oral History Collection, Tape 1, 14. 
194 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate in Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA (MSA) 
[PORT941URN], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed December 26, 2016 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PORT941URN. 
89 
who previously worked at J.K. Gill for seven years before joining Powell’s in 1980s, 
reported that a job opening typically received anywhere from twenty-five to one hundred 
applicants.195 In explaining why Powell’s employees chose to organize and, furthermore, 
proved successful in a prolonged dispute while most workers, particularly retail workers, 
have failed to unionize, Winzig believed that timing was the key factor. “Management 
pulled so many things all at once,” she explained, “we had the momentum and the anger 
that was able to sustain us.”196  
In 1998, Powell’s Books embarked upon an ambitious expansion of both its 
digital and physical presence to remain competitive on the growing internet and local 
marketplaces. Already, Powell’s maintained a reputation as the biggest independent 
bookstore in the country and likely the largest physical bookstore in the world. With 
nearly a million books on the shelves within a building that occupied an entire city block, 
Michael Powell compared his latest expansion plans to a high stakes wager: “It’s a bet on 
readers. It’s a bet on books. It’s my bet, and I’m betting I can do it.”197 Two building 
expansions planned to increase the size of the main store to 73,000 square feet, a 60 
percent increase in retail floor space that also included a new event space ten times the 
size of its predecessor.198 The first project broke ground in July 1998, followed by a 
three-floor expansion upward (known internally as “The Tower”) slated for completion 
by November 1999. An expanded space for the internet sales department accompanied a 
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push to compete with Amazon and Barnes & Noble for web sales. Rather than generating 
confidence in the company’s success and future, this $3.5 million expansion plan to the 
City of Books created uncertainty among employees regarding how the company could 
afford such plans during a period of increased competition from superstores while at the 
same time maintaining workers’ wages, benefits, and the store’s fiercely independent 
culture.199  
On the heels of the physical restructuring of the City of Books came a realignment 
of work operations that appeared to threaten the long-held power and responsibilities of 
booksellers. Powell’s employee Nancy Sturken recalled what she considered a 
disingenuous attempt by management to get staff input on the restructuring, creating a 
handpicked committee to offer feedback and then introducing the plan with miniscule 
alteration.200 In the summer of 1998, the company informed employees about a 
restructuring of operations that affected how sections were staffed, instituting a new 
“team” system, which centralized the power of book buying. Workers, particularly the 
one hundred section heads with the responsibility of ordering books, expressed their 
disapproval with this “Great Restructuring” in terms of power, skill deprivation, and an 
inability to provide customer service at the level expected by the store’s clientele.201 “My 
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job was seriously reorganized,” recalled bookseller Mary Zartman, “which is a nice way 
of saying that it was dis-empowered, discombobulated, and it was a disgrace.”202  
The restructuring of the labor process resulted in employees with specialized 
knowledge accustomed to working in specific sections being assigned duties in 
amalgamated section teams regardless of experience or familiarity with the subject 
matter. “It felt like a ‘dumbing-down’ of jobs that require a lot of maturity and expertise,” 
explained an anonymous worker.203 “We had a lot of autonomy, and they started 
switching that, and putting us on teams,” explained Winzig, who worked in the children’s 
sections with Zartman. Union activists noted that these changes had a much greater 
agitational effect on Burnside employees than booksellers at any of the satellite stores. 
Nevertheless, bookseller Jim Cowing argued that Beaverton store employees’ disapproval 
and frustration with an absentee manager acted as an important and generally overlooked 
factor in motivating the union drive beyond the boundaries of the City of Books.204 
The “September Surprise” and the Organization of ILWU Local 5 
Management’s “September Surprise” targeted workers’ expectations for 
economic advancement and proved the tipping point for their dissatisfaction. On 
September 14, 1998, an email sent by Corporate Manager Ann Smith titled 
“Compensation changes” transformed the underlying tension between staff and upper 
management into the beginning of organized resistance. The email informed employees 
that the previously announced 6 percent wage increase for all staff, administered in the 
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two previous years, required a reduction to 1 to 3 percent. Henceforth, management 
would determine an individual employee’s raise at its sole discretion. 
The economic benefits for Powell’s booksellers prior to the union campaign 
surpassed most other non-unionized Portland retail businesses, including Barnes & Noble 
and Borders. According to Powell’s, the company paid non-management employees an 
average of $9.81 per hour along with health insurance, child care, profit sharing, and 
holiday bonuses that surpassed the industry standard. Conversely, union activists asserted 
the average was $7.60 an hour with new hires beginning at $7.00, only fifty cents above 
the state’s minimum wage.205 Yet, many Oregon small and independent businesses 
similar to Powell’s Books continued to brood over a successful 1996 ballot initiative that 
raised the state’s minimum wage to one of the highest in the nation, increasing the hourly 
wage for the state’s lowest paid workers by a $1.75 between 1996 and 1999.206 
Simultaneously, two successful 1996 campaigns secured living wage ordinances in both 
Portland and the wider Multnomah County.207 Furthermore, union researchers concluded 
that while Powell’s employed twenty-five managers with annual salaries between 
$40,000 and $100,000, 70 percent of employees earned less than $20,000.208 
Corporate’s decision to disband the compensation committee, a grouping of 
managers and frontline staff organized by Powell’s to create recommendations regarding 
wages and raises, proved an important precursor to the September Surprise. Some 
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employees, including Marty Kruse worked in the small press section of the flagship store, 
believed that management used the committee as a tool to placate employee demands for 
input without making any substantive changes. Regardless, Mary Winzig explained that 
she and other workers throughout the company were affected by upper management’s 
decision to do away with the committee in favor of a subjective top down evaluation.209  
Kruse began organizing what became the first union meeting immediately 
following the September Surprise email, effectively ensuring that none of the worker 
agitation the compensation changes generated could dissipate overnight into resignation. 
“If you’re pissed off, meet at Ringler’s Annex 11pm,” was the simple instruction 
scrawled on a piece of cardboard and flashed to coworkers from behind Kruse’s coat as 
he made his nightly rounds through the stacks before the store closed.210 During this 
several hours long informal meeting at Ringler’s bar, the union’s first leaders emerged 
and helped guide the generalized discontent of individual workers into concerted 
resistance and ultimately decision to unionize. Kruse credited bookseller Paul Couey for 
providing focus to the emotionally charged gathering by advocating for a union and 
helping “[pull] the whole team together” to determine the next steps for the impassioned 
workers.211  
The Powell’s Books union drive originated from the initiative and self-
organization of the bookstore’s employees, setting the course of the campaign on a 
promising trajectory amidst difficult odds. In the days and weeks that followed the 
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Ringler’s meeting, those workers began quietly outreaching to trusted employees and 
community groups with the intention of building support for a larger meeting of 
interested staff members. The organizing committee called the local chapter of Jobs with 
Justice to learn about the unionization process, leading to a series of conversations with 
the coalition’s organizers to identify potential unions for the booksellers to contact for 
assistance. The worker-organizers also took the unconventional step of inviting 
representatives from the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union 
(UFCW), the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters to attend a meeting with employees interested in unionizing. While union 
critics might assert that this decision reflected the workers’ novice experience with the 
jurisdictional divisions of the labor movement, historians can also interpret it as an 
illustration of how the Powell’s workers disrupted the traditional power dynamic and 
positioned themselves in the unconventional position of shopping for a union. 
Essentially, organizers needed to explain (in the presence of other union representatives) 
how their union local would support the Powell’s workers and what resources they could 
commit. 
The decision to hold a meeting with all interested parties made practical sense 
because coordinating a single large group meeting proved logistically easier than 
scheduling a series of meetings with each union representative. Even though this 
assembly was scheduled for midnight to accommodate those who had closing shifts at the 
main store, over thirty employees packed into every corner of coworker Audra McCabe’s 
home to hear the union representatives speak. The unusual late-night crowd in the 
neighborhood prompted a brief visit from the police, adding to the paranoia of some 
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workers nervous about unionizing. Similar to Kruse’s memory of Paul Couey’s informal 
leadership role at the Ringler’s meeting, Winzig recalled that Couey stepped in to help 
start the meeting to ensure everyone introduced themselves and the reason why they 
chose to attend.212 Even though the IWW and UFCW had a record of organizing 
bookstores, the meeting ended without firm support for either of the unions.213 While 
many union activists sympathized with the radical ideology of the IWW, workers 
expressed concern at the Wobblies’ limited local resources and the inevitable red-baiting 
by management if booksellers aligned with an explicitly anti-capitalist labor organization. 
In contrast, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union’s (ILWU) 
revitalization of its organizing program under President Brian McWilliams, with its goal 
of creating a new warehouse local in the Columbia River District, positioned the union to 
respond wholeheartedly to the Powell’s employees interest in unionization. Following the 
indecisive meeting with the UFCW and IWW, Jobs with Justice organizers encouraged 
John McMahon to contact the ILWU because of its progressive principles. At an 11:00 
p.m. meeting during the first week of October, a delegation of over twenty Powell’s 
employees, including McMahon, Winzig, Kruse, Couey, and Miranda Altman, heard 
ILWU Regional Organizer Michael Cannarella make the case to organize with the 
longshore union. During his fifteen years of organizing experience, Cannarella recalled 
never meeting such a large group of workers at the start of a campaign as he encountered 
with the Powell’s workers that night at ILWU Local 8’s offices on NW Front Avenue. “I 
told them the first night that they had the basis of an organizing committee,” stated 
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Cannarella; however, he added that the task would take a lot of work from each of them, 
but that the ILWU would support them throughout the process.214 At the end of the 
presentation, the workers voted unanimously with a single abstention to join the 
longshore union and began signing their union authorization cards that night. The 
workers collectively signed letters stating their intent to organize “because we care about 
Powell’s and feel our contribution is vital to Powell’s success.”215 Cannarella later 
described the reversal of traditional roles between the workers and the union, explaining 
that the “[ILWU] didn’t choose them, they chose us!”216  
While management remained unaware of the union effort during the next several 
weeks, the organizing committee conducted targeted outreach to Powell’s employees 
with the instructional support of ILWU organizers and local workers’ rights 
organizations. The longshore union began directing staff and material resources to the 
campaign, including William Kramer who provided the new union with corporate 
research on their employer. In November, Cannarella assembled an organizer training for 
union activists to prepare them for the hundreds of necessary conversations required to 
build and maintain support for the union: “We did role plays,” recalled Cannarella, “we 
talked about how to educate - how to talk to your coworkers” about the union anywhere, 
whether at a bus stop or in the back shelves.217 ILWU organizers described their internal 
organizing strategy as both a relational and educational campaign. These dual 
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considerations meant union activists conducted individual organizing conversations with 
coworkers by arranging meetings before or after work at nearby coffee shops, bars, or 
otherwise comfortable and familiar settings. Although leafleting workers outside 
workplaces and unannounced home visits have long existed as hallmark organizing 
tactics for unions fighting for employer recognition, the Powell’s unionists considered 
these tactics intrusive to their coworkers. “We had gone to a couple of houses and were 
totally rebuffed,” recalled Winzig about her and John McMahon's effort to outreach to 
Tech Store workers. “Nobody wanted to talk about unionizing.”218 After minimal 
success, the organizing committee transitioned to outreach tactics more in line with the 
culture of the workplace relying upon one-on-one educational conversations to create 
space for workers to learn about their rights, successful organizing tactics, and what anti-
union responses to expect from employers. 
The burgeoning Powell’s union’s selection of the ILWU as its bargaining agent 
made sense to the activists on the organizing committee. Jeff Hensley, an early union 
supporter, discerned a difference between how the ILWU and other union representatives 
approached the campaign, recalling that the ILWU organizers asked lots of questions 
about Powell’s and stated upfront that the workers needed to take the lead in the 
campaign. “All the other unions,” Hensley recalled, “were like ‘we’re the cavalry that’s 
going to come over the hill to take care of this for you’ and the ILWU is not like that.”219 
The longshore union’s progressive, militant, and democratic traditions appealed to others, 
including Winzig and McMahon, who saw the Powell’s campaign both in a historical and 
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external context. “It made us realize we were linking up with a union with a proud 
progressive tradition,” stated Winzig in a union newsletter in 1999, adding that it “helped 
us to imagine how we could make ILWU Local 5 a force for progressive change in 
Portland.”220 McMahon pointed to the ILWU’s long record of taking action for social 
justice causes, including against apartheid in South Africa, as evidence of the shared 
values between the union and Powell’s employees: “It seems to me that the ILWU has 
always been at the forefront of progressive issues and this is a progressive workplace.”221  
 The creation of a new ILWU local for the booksellers of Powell’s proved 
advantageous for both the booksellers and the longshore union. While activists stated that 
the organizing committee selected the ILWU because it offered the new union “the most 
autonomy” and “seemed the most free and fair,” the booksellers’ were also motivated by 
the ability to form a new local.222 ILWU Organizing Director Peter Olney clarified that 
the international decided to charter a new local for the bookstore employees because it 
aligned with the longshore union’s priorities and strategic direction.223 Although unaware 
of the administrative responsibilities associated with operating a local that later arose, the 
Powell’s union activists welcomed the freedom of creating their own local. 
Yet, most Powell’s employees had no previous experience and little knowledge of 
the ILWU, leading to surprise, uncertainty, and skepticism among many employees at the 
start of the campaign. Jim Cowing and Carole Reichstein, booksellers at the Technical 
                                                          
220 ILWU Local 5, Fearless, ILWU Library, ILWU Local 5 Document Archive, February 1999, 4. 
221 McMahon, Local 5 Oral History Project, 3. 
222 ILWU Local 5, “To the Unconvinced...,” Fearless, ILWU Library, ILWU Local 5 Document Archive, 
February 1999, 1. 
223 Peter Olney, interviewed by Harvey Schwartz, Local 5 Oral History Project, ILWU Library, June 3, 
2002, 22. 
99 
Store, recalled early on not having any reaction to the organizing committee’s decision to 
join the ILWU. Cowing, who started working at Powell’s in 1995, believed that the 
emphasis on creating a new local “seemed like empty rhetoric.”224 Other workers vocally 
opposed the unionization effort because of the selection of the ILWU. In an open letter to 
coworkers, Powell’s employee Doug Chase stated that he grounded his opposition to the 
ILWU on news reports of lawsuits filed against the union for discriminatory hiring 
practices and sexual harassment. “I don’t want a portion of my mandatory dues,” stated 
Chase who identified himself as having previously been a member of three different 
unions, “going to settle someone else’s practices, practices which really disgust me and 
which I think should be punished with far more than what was actually paid.”225 In 
Winzig’s conversations with reluctant coworkers, she interpreted one oppositional trend 
amongst some employees as a degree of prejudice against dockworkers and unions 
because of the booksellers’ college education.226 A union survey conducted in September 
1999 revealed that 90 percent of respondents possessed some college education with 58 
percent completing a Bachelor’s degree.227 Therefore, since the workforce was divided 
on the union question, college experience proved an unreliable indicator of union support 
or opposition.  
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 The initial Powell’s union activists possessed marginal to no formal union 
experience or familiarity with conducting an organizing campaign, although a larger 
number expressed support based on previously established principles. While a few 
booksellers, including Nancy Sturken, Lori Kooyers, and Marc Perry, had direct union 
experience, Powell’s employees more commonly cited tangential experience with unions 
either from political activism or through an older family member.228 Winzig, McMahon, 
and Ryan Takas cited being from “right-to-work” Southern or Southwestern states as an 
important factor limiting their exposure to unionism.229 Although raised in Texas, Winzig 
described her Wisconsin born parents as “dyed in the wool Republicans,” who 
nevertheless instructed her to respect and never cross a workers’ picket line. While 
attending the University of Texas in the 1980s, Winzig described being politicized by her 
involvement in protests against South African apartheid and the policies of the Reagan 
administration. “I always thought labor was a good idea,” attested Winzig, “but I hadn’t 
met any union people until I moved to Portland.”230  
John McMahon was one of the few union activists with any union organizing 
experience, having left a job at Tower Books to participate in the AFL-CIO Union 
Summer program in Seattle in 1996. Earlier that year, McMahon witnessed picket lines 
outside of Portland Safeway grocery stores during a UFCW strike. “It was the first time I 
had ever seen one,” recalled McMahon, “it made me realize how much power unions 
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could have, if done right. That sort of inspired me to go to Union Summer.”231 While 
Powell’s employee Marc Perry had multiple years of experience as a union member in 
the steel industry and construction trades before starting at Powell’s, he was initially 
hesitant to join the organizing campaign because of hearing how the 1991 union drive 
failed.232 Furthermore, Kruse recalled, some employees’ negative union experiences 
became obstacles to overcome in conversations about the Powell’s campaign. Although 
unfamiliar with unions, Meredith Schafer, who started working at Powell’s in November 
1998, supported Local 5 because of previously ingrained progressive principles. Like 
Winzig, Schafer participated in political activity while in college, but not directly in labor 
campaigns. “It was less out of a sense of personal experience, or injustice that I had 
witnessed at Powell’s,” explained Schafer regarding her decision to vote for the union, “it 
was just out of principle.”233 
Familial relationship with positive union connotations informed several 
employees’ decision on whether or not to support unionization. Marty Kruse’s father was 
an active unionist in the merchant marines and used book buyer Ian McCullough became 
an early member of the organizing committee and drew motivation from positive 
experiences with unions while growing up in Detroit as the son of steelworker and union 
activist.234 Carole Reichstein’s grandfather was a proud union carpenter, but this positive 
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union experience among family did not immediately convince her to vote for the 
Powell’s union and conversely contributed to the belief that unions were only for certain 
occupations. She recalled her grandfather pointedly asking her after the election, “Are 
you for the union or against the union?” Carole, who previously worked at Barnes & 
Noble before starting at Powell’s in 1996, recalled thinking that “unions were for people 
who worked in factories, coal mines, and steel workers. We’re booksellers, what do we 
need a union for?”235 Although Jeff Hensley had no personal union experience and 
bookseller Mary Zartman had only a short, unremarkable stint at a unionized job, both 
cited their parents’ involvement in labor activities as an influence on their support for the 
Powell’s campaign.236 “I haven’t had a lot of union exposure,” stated Zartman, who was 
first hired at the company as a parking garage attendant in 1996, “but I always understood 
it to be people getting together to represent themselves.”237  
The Powell’s Books union leaders’ devotion to the cause seemed to inspire 
coworkers and establish confidence in the campaign. McMahon and Winzig expressed 
how their commitment to the union drive and the improvement of working conditions at 
Powell’s necessitated sacrifices to their personal lives. “I put my life on hold for this,” 
remembered Winzig, “[a] lot of people did because we care about the company.”238 
Lengthy planning meetings and organizing conversations dominated the after-work hours 
of union activists. Scheduled at prime social hours, on Friday’s at 8:00 p.m., the 
organizing committee’s weekly meeting reflected both its members’ immersion into 
                                                          
235 Reichstein, Local 5 Oral History Project, 7, 2. 
236 Hensley, Local 5 Oral History Project, 7. 
237 Zartman, Local 5 Oral History Project, 3. 
238 Winzig, Local 5 Oral History Project, 12. 
103 
organizing and their ability to fuse their social and union lives. Cal Hudson, who worked 
in the physical plant department, recalled first being approached about organizing by 
Winzig. Hudson recalled being “very impressed” with those who attended his first 
organizing meeting.239 “They were generally considered good workers and level-headed 
people,” Hudson noted, “they weren’t the whiners that I kind of expected to see when I 
went to my first meeting.”240  
The formation of a strong relationship between Powell’s Books employees and 
community activists, who provided strategic pressure on the bookstore’s management 
and moral support for workers throughout the campaign, began to take form in the 
immediate days and weeks following the September Surprise. Early in the campaign, 
booksellers Marty Kruse and Carol Edwards took the union’s message on the road to 
other Portland union halls, building support for Local 5’s cause among the local labor 
movement.241 The longshore workers of Portland’s ILWU Local 8 provided consistent 
solidarity through various means, including financial support, access to the local’s large 
hall, and participation at public actions.242 The AFL-CIO quickly took a supportive 
position of the Powell’s campaign with Jean Eilers, who became the federation’s Western 
Regional State Director in 1998, assisting with a one day organizing training in 
November.243 Nationally, president John Sweeney speculated in a letter to Michael 
Powell sent during the recognition campaign that a unionized workforce at Powell’s 
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would translate into a windfall of sales for his store from the federation’s 30 million 
union members.244 “Powell’s was kind of a sexy place to organize,” explained Winzig, 
regarding why the booksellers received such an outpouring of community support.245  
Organizing in what became known as Portland’s living room meant that the union 
drive “was a community campaign from the beginning,” stated Michael Cannarella, 
“because everybody has an opinion [...] on Powell’s.”246 Indeed, the campaign caught the 
attention of novelist and Portland resident Ursula K. Le Guin as well as Oregon Fourth 
District Congressman Peter DeFazio (D), who both contacted Michael Powell voicing 
their support for the union.247 The organizing committee’s early demand for a “living 
wage” illustrated the success of community organizations, such as Jobs with Justice, to 
challenge the low wage economy and bring the issue of local economic inequality to the 
forefront of worker’s attention. Jobs with Justice, comprising forty community partners 
by the start of the Powell’s campaign, helped coordinate a letter writing campaign to 
Michael Powell with a hundred organizations and individuals during the months leading 
up to the union vote. Ultimately, Jobs with Justice proved crucial in harnessing and 
directing the community support, acting as the new union’s most important local partner 
and conduit to sympathetic organizations and individuals.  
The Workers’ Organizing Center (WOC) opened its doors to the Powell’s 
campaign soon after the union’s formation, providing worker-organizers an outpost to 
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operate from during the organizing and recognition phases. While initial gatherings in 
bars and coworker living rooms strengthened the bonds between those who formed the 
early organizing committee, a central and neutral meeting space proved necessary to 
welcome workers from other store locations, many of whom were not socially connected 
to the organizers. “They were so helpful to us,” recalled McMahon appreciatively of 
WOC, who assigned a staff member to the campaign and provided the new bookstore 
union with the “space we needed when we needed, helpful advice, or just pats on the 
back when you got beat down all day at work.”248 WOC’s location on East Burnside 
Street between multiple Powell’s locations (one mile east of the downtown store and 
Hoyt warehouse and two-and-half miles from the Hawthorne locations) provided 
employees a convenient meeting and workspace. 
A Contest of Culture 
 The union organizing committee emphasized that its campaign sought to preserve 
the unique and independent culture of Powell’s Books, while simultaneously altering the 
workplace culture. Fear of the “Killer Bees” (Borders and Barnes & Noble) permeated 
the minds of both management and employees, who set upon divergent courses to 
preserve the future of Portland’s premier independent bookstore. A slogan that generated 
the significant traction among workers was emblazoned on stickers and recited often in 
organizing conversations: “No Decisions About Us Without Us.” The slogan and its 
popularity reveal the emergence of a collective identity among Powell’s employees that 
stood at odds with company’s increasingly corporate structure, leadership, and vision for 
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the future. “We didn’t sit back and watch the company become a locally owned version 
of Barnes & Noble,” explained the union’s February 1999 newsletter, “Instead we 
decided to do something.”249 Rather than insisting on the inclusion of workers in the 
decision-making process as previous bookstore union campaigns had argued, the 
organizing committee presumptuously took issue with how booksellers’ “voices were 
being stripped and removed from the decision process” that already existed at 
Powell’s.250 “Something at Powell’s was lost,” stated an editorial in the February 1999 
issue of the union’s newsletter Fearless. The article explained that the union drive began 
because management’s decisions impacted workers “out of the blue and without apparent 
recourse,” a reference to the staff restructuring and the September surprise. The solution 
and reasoning offered by Paul Couey illustrated the radical ambitions of some union 
activists: “a democratic work place is a basic human right.”251 
Union activists explicitly connected the culture of Powell’s Books to the working 
conditions of booksellers. Despite a perception among activists that management 
increasingly treated the workforce like a commodity, the employees nevertheless 
continued to take great pride in their skills and their role in the shepherding books to 
customers and customers to books. “We cared about our jobs and we liked what we did,” 
stated Winzig, adding “we wanted to save what we thought was the culture of Powell’s or 
what we thought made Powell’s a great place to work.”252 The emphasis on working 
conditions extended beyond wages and benefits, encompassing both a voice in the labor 
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process and a recognition of the position of the bookseller in the retail interaction. 
McMahon elaborated on this relationship, explaining that “the union was an attempt to 
retrieve that feeling that the employee was as important as the books that the employee 
sells to making this place successful.”253 “To preserve something,” stated McMahon, “not 
to alter it so it’s unrecognizable.” Nonetheless, challenging Michael Powell demanded a 
loyalty that extended beyond the patriarch of a landmark store and to a much larger ideal. 
Bookseller Meredith Schafer, who started at Powell’s in November 1998 and became a 
union supporter in the spring, described why her coworkers started to organize: “They 
weren’t loyal to him, they were loyal to the books. They were loyal to the idea.”254 
 Management eventually learned about the union campaign in November and 
implemented a union avoidance strategy that paired well with the liberal identity of 
Michael Powell and the culture of his store. In addition to a contest of power, the union 
campaign created a discourse over the culture and values of the workplace. In a March 16 
statement to employees that reflected the tenets of neoliberalism, Michael Powell wrote 
of his store, “This is a special culture built on individuality, on diversity, on respect for 
the individual. I do not want to see us trade that in for the kind of adversarial relationship 
that the union is already bringing us.”255 Reactively, the Powell’s upper management 
responded to the ILWU campaign by spearheading a counter-organizing effort, which 
similarly sought to educate workers. Michael Powell hired on the services of Amburgey 
and Rubin, a Portland labor law firm experienced with negotiating with unions, to 
achieve this goal. On November 12, managers sent a notice informing employees of their 
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legal right to oppose the unionization if they did not want to be represented by a union or 
if they believed a “[union] isn’t the right thing for Powell’s.”256 Additionally notices 
followed, both inside the store and directly to employees’ homes.  
Management’s educational strategy backfired when the company confused the 
ILWU with its rival East Coast counterpart, the International Longshore Association 
(ILA). Earlier in November, a letter sent to employees by Michael Powell, Miriam Sontz, 
and Corporate Manager Ann Smith stated, “We do not believe that a third party in the 
form of the Longshoreman’s union (or any other union) is needed here.”257 When union 
activists promoted the fact that the longshore union president voluntarily took a pay cut, 
Powell’s management cried foul and released a five-page letter cautioning support for the 
union campaign because the ILA’s president received a $302,324 annual salary.258 
Powell’s employees leapt at the opportunity to showcase the error made by the company 
and its legal counsel, printing flyers highlighting the differences between the two 
longshore unions and the fact that a Powell’s marketing manager could receive a larger 
annual salary ($83,200) than ILWU President Brian McWilliams ($72,800).259 Peter 
Olney years later recalled how this series of events captured the dynamic between the 
union and management: “You have a very intelligent, erudite, articulate, well-read 
workforce who were very much tit-for-tat in terms of matching wits with the employer 
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around facts, figures, and intelligence.”260 For similar reasons as to why union activists 
did not support house visits, organizers asserted that their coworkers found the 
company’s several letters sent to their homes as out of step with the culture of the 
bookstore.261  
 Powell’s management conducted a tour of captive-audience meetings, generally 
considered by labor relations experts as a company’s best antidote to union drives, at 
several store locations between November 1998 and February 1999.262 Powell, Sontz, and 
Smith used these meetings to create a controlled environment to ingratiate themselves to 
front-line workers and to address employees about potential repercussions of 
unionization, subtly personalizing the conflict as an assault upon Powell. The organizing 
committee struggled with how to respond during these meetings, knowing that speaking 
up meant outing themselves as union activists and remaining silent meant appearing 
weak. Nevertheless, organizing committee members took a variety of actions, including 
taking strategic seats in the room and taking copious notes for written rebuttals. An 
argument between McMahon and Powell ensued at the first Burnside meeting, 
convincing Marty Kruse that direct dialogue with management without union recognition 
was naive and generated a negative effect.263 Nonetheless, the meetings also created an 
opportunity for the union to display leadership, as was the case when Winzig stood 
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before management and coworkers at a meeting to announce publicly her support for the 
union.264 While actions such as Winzig’s helped to neutralize the negative impact of the 
captive audience meetings, Carole Reichstein considered Michael Powell’s behavior 
demeaning and observed other workers becoming agitated by his patronizing attitude.265 
By the time Powell’s learned of the union campaign, the organizing committee 
had already created a communication network that relayed information throughout the 
company and drew upon the skills of the workforce. “The best organizing tactic,” stated 
Cal Hudson and echoed by other organizers, “is just the face-to-face talk with 
coworkers.”266 From the outset, organizers talked to coworkers about what they wanted to 
see in a contract and explained to workers how the company would respond, inoculating 
them to the letters sent to their homes, the captive audience meetings at work, and the 
depiction of the union as an outside third party.267 Hudson, who started with the company 
in 1995, also highlighted the “caliber” of the union activists and frequency of their 
contacts with fellow coworkers.268 In order to trigger and enter a union election with 
confidence, the organizing committee sought to collect authorization cards from 60 
percent of the Powell’s workforce. Organizers gathered these signed cards through one-
on-one get-togethers and by holding informational sessions immediately prior to its 
Friday organizing committee meetings for booksellers interested in signing authorization 
cards. Simultaneously, organizers recruited union supporters to serve as communication 
stewards, who relayed information on to coworkers within their informal work groups. 
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“We became sort of the muscle of the union that made everyone else move in concert,” 
stated Meredith Schafer.269  
The Powell’s Books union activists wrote prolifically about the campaign, using 
the written word as one of their primary organizing tools. After the first meeting at 
Ringler’s, Marty Kruse began writing and circulating a pamphlet he called Fearless, 
which eventually led to the creation of the local’s newsletter Bridges. Kruse’s description 
of Fearless as a zine highlighted both the literary character of the workforce and the 
publication’s purpose as a propaganda and organizing tool during the recognition 
campaign. The zine, passed clandestinely among workers, made the case for unionization 
and informed workers about upcoming opportunities to meet and socialize as a union. 
Kruse’s creation quickly transformed into a collaborative project of the union’s 
communications committee, giving space to other workers, including John McMahon and 
Call Hudson, to contribute their writing skills. Winzig described how these writing 
opportunities allowed the union to regularly counterpoint information circulated by 
management, while simultaneously providing an avenue for Hudson and others to plug 
into the campaign.270 After learning about the union drive from Winzig and attending an 
early organizing committee meeting, Hudson got involved with the communications 
committee writing the “Question and Answer” section of the zine.271  
 Employees opposed to unionization succeeded in helping shape the discourse on 
the controversial topic among the workforce, but failed to coalesce into a substantive 
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anti-union movement. Most of the opposition to the union organizing campaign came 
from workers who did not identify with the union or who feared change. The divide 
among employees on the issue of unionization became visibly apparent when both sides 
began wearing buttons. Kruse and the organizing committee spearheaded an effort to 
distribute ILWU Local 5 buttons to supporters to wear on shift and on coordinated 
“button days.”272 Union activists hoped to show their numbers and create opportunities 
for coworkers to support the union. In response to the appearance of pro-union buttons, 
the opposition hastily made anti-union pins that also began appearing on the lapels and 
lanyards of Powell’s employees. Using one of the union’s own buttons, Carole Reichstein 
designed and produced the opposition pins. Reichstein distributed the anti-Local 5 pins 
amongst her Tech Store coworkers.273 In recalling her early opposition to unionization, 
she made the distinction that the buttons “weren’t anti- union, but they were anti-Local 
5.”274 
Even organizing committee members feared that public actions, such as wearing 
pins, could lead to management retaliation. “I had my union button in my pocket for the 
longest time,” admitted Mary Winzig, who grew more confident after seeing other union-
activists display their pins.275 When British musician-activist Billy Bragg visited Portland 
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while on tour playing previously unpublished Woody Guthrie songs, Bragg made a point 
of visiting Powell’s workers at the downtown store.276 Winzig gave him a union button 
and introduced him to general manager Miriam Sontz. In response to her fear of 
retaliation for that encounter and other union activity, Winzig remembered Bragg 
thoughtfully asking her, “What would Woody do?” and inspirationally telling her that she 
was “doing Woody’s work.”277 That night, Bragg dedicated his union anthem “There Is 
Power in a Union” to the Powell’s booksellers and record store workers of Music 
Millennium, both of whom were organizing unions.  
In dialogue with the union activists, opponents to the ILWU union drive also 
made their case publicly known using the written word. Through entries in the staff’s day 
book, open letters, and pamphlets, opponents often stated their general support for unions 
but not specifically at Powell’s Books or with the ILWU. The Burnside store’s employee 
day book located in the break room became an open venue for discussion about the union 
campaign. Cal Hudson remembered that some the union’s first propaganda came out of 
the anonymous discussions being held through entries in the day book among union 
activists, opponents, and undecided workers. In one such propaganda flier, titled “Making 
a great place to work even better,” union activists listed thirteen qualities that characterize 
Powell’s Books “Now” and “With a Union.” The flier argued that a union “guaranteed” 
the continuation of many of the qualities Powell’s workers enjoyed.278 Management, 
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aware of the discourse, took keen notice; Hudson recalled witnessing a Human Resources 
manager coming in early to photocopy the discussions in the day book.279  
Not all booksellers believed that a union guaranteed the maintenance of the most 
valued qualities of working at one of the nation’s finest bookstores. Employees Jim 
Cowing and Doug Chase both penned public letters to their coworkers opposing the 
union drive. In response to union organizers’ calls for a living wage for Powell’s 
employees, Cowing wrote what he described was a “four-page diatribe” mathematically 
detailing how the company could not afford even a dollar an hour raise for workers.280 
Doug Chase, in his own four-page letter titled “Why I Don’t Think This Is a Good Idea 
Right Now,” raised eight concerns about a union’s ability to improve working conditions 
beyond those currently existing at Powell’s. Working single and co-parents, such as 
Chase, worried that a union could mean an end to the child care benefit provided by 
Powell’s. Chase concluded that the benefit would likely be “dropped” to provide wage 
increases for the majority of employees since working parents represented a fraction of 
the workforce, a turn of events, requiring him to quit and find work elsewhere. Although 
he began his letter agreeing with an article in Fearless that asserted that unions remain a 
relevant and positive force for workers, ultimately Chase’s memo articulated fears he and 
other employees had about how ILWU representation would not improve working 
conditions but actually “bring a net loss” to employees. “[This] doesn’t mean we are 
against unions,” clarified Chase speaking for himself and other opponents of the drive, 
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“we just feel that this particular drive at this particular time is not addressing all salient 
points.”281  
The organizing committee responded publicly to Chase’s concerns with a set of 
open letters to Powell’s employees. ILWU organizer Michael Cannarella, who previously 
served on a child care advisory board to the governor, described Chase’s allegations as 
“upsetting” in a letter titled “Childcare Credit giveaway or scare tactic?” Cannarella fired 
back at the assumption that “a co-worker would sacrifice these support systems for 
another ten cents an hour,” adding that “without a doubt fear is the best anti-union 
technique.”282 A second letter from the organizing committee reiterated that organizing a 
new local with the ILWU provided Powell’s employees with the independence to bargain 
for a contract “tailored to our individual and cultural needs.”283 Ultimately, opposition to 
the ILWU failed to coalesce into an anti-union movement and depended primarily on 
select independent actions. 
Six months after the union’s first meeting, the organizing committee had collected 
the prerequisite number of signed union authorization cards from Powell’s Books 
employees necessary to trigger a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. On 
March 12, Powell’s employees rallied and held a press conference on the front steps of 
the Burnside store to announce their intention to file for an election with the support of 64 
percent of the workforce. A crowd of one hundred community supporters (largely 
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connected to Jobs with Justice) looked on and cheered the Powell’s employees, who 
together called for a “fast and fair union election.”284 The assembly then took this 
message, in the form of a four-foot-long petition, directly to Michael Powell, who agreed 
to the speedy election but still hoped staff would align their priorities to those of his 
company. “They’ve got to ask themselves,” Powell told the Oregonian about his 
employees, “whether this is really in the best interests of the company.”285 A day earlier, 
the organizing committee and Jobs with Justice coordinated a “Union Shop Day” (the 
equivalent opposite of a boycott) to move the message to store employees that the local 
labor community supported them and the unionization effort. With the NLRB mediating, 
the ILWU and Powell’s quickly agreed on the terms of the election, including the 
classified workers considered part of the bargaining unit.  
Workers, management, and the public anxiously awaited the April 22 election 
results. Both management and the union disputed their counterpart’s claim of majority 
support, and many observers anticipated a close vote. By chance, Winzig was called for 
jury duty the week of the election and found herself detached from the workplace at a 
critical moment when every conversation with coworkers about the importance of voting 
and voting union seemed like the deciding ballot. Yet, Winzig recounted needing to share 
with the other jurors, who were following the reports about the campaign, the perspective 
of her fellow booksellers, which she felt the local media misrepresented. “Why would 
employees,” questioned Oregonian reporter Gail Kinsey Hill, “want to put Powell’s 
                                                          
284 Rein, “Organizing by the Book,” http://archive.ilwu.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/19990301.pdf; 
ILWU Local 5, “A Message to Michael Powell,” petition, ILWU Library, ILWU Local 5 Document 
Archive, March 12, 1999. 
285 Gail Kinsey Hill, “Powell’s Employees Say Changes in Pay, Operations Force Union Push,” Oregonian 
March 12, 1999, B1. 
117 
literary culture at risk by forming a union?” Winzig recalled fondly the support she 
received from her fellow jurors. Nevertheless, she remembered being convinced the 
union would lose on voting day.286 Alternatively, John McMahon recounted being 
confident that the union would win solidly.287  
Seemingly, the future of Powell’s Books and its idealized cultural position in 
Portland teetered on the results of this union election. If a simple majority of eligible 
employees vote “YES” on unionization during a NLRB’s election process, the employer 
is legally mandated to recognize the union and provide the selected labor organization 
exclusive bargaining rights for a year. A tie or less awards no rights to the union and 
creates a one-year waiting period before conducting another election, thus creating a 
zero-sum contest for labor organizations. While for the organizing committee a victory 
represented the opportunity to bargain over wages and working condition with 
management for the first time, a defeat meant an affirmation of management’s unilateral 
ability to determine the working conditions and future of the iconic Northwest bookstore. 
Additionally, the more ambitious unionists and labor activists believed that a success in 
the Powell’s election could lead to a broader shift of power in the retail economy, 
inspiring other low-wage retail workers to organize, swelling the ranks of Local 5 and the 
labor movement. 
Altogether, 321 employees from all seven retail locations and supporting facilities 
(approximately 90 percent of all eligible workers) turned out to vote. As the NLRB agent 
counted the ballots in front of observers from both the union and Powell’s management, 
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Michael Powell awaited the results of the election by pacing the aisles of the Tech Store 
where nearly all employees opposed the union.288 The final tally counted 161 votes for 
the union, 155 against, and 5 challenged ballots not counted.289 The Powell’s booksellers, 
the ILWU, and the Portland labor community had won (albeit narrowly) the seven-month 
organizing and union recognition campaign within an economic climate where labor lost 
more than half of all elections in 1999.290 Local 5 made history as the largest bookselling 
workforce to vote in favor of unionization, yet the election proved far from a mandate.  
 For Local 5 to transition its election success into a voice within the company’s 
affairs and improvements in working conditions, the union needed to successfully bargain 
a contract with Powell’s Books or face potential decertification. Whereas Local 5 had 
won the debate on the question of unionization through one-on-one conversations and the 
printed word, a defiant management soon tested the solidarity of the union and its ability 
to act. The next stage of contract bargaining would last sixteen months and prove 
rancorous beyond all expectations, including strikes, street theater, and police lines that 
escalated the tension within both the bookstore and the Portland community.
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“The Street Drives the Table”: Bargaining a First Contract 
 As a result of the union’s election success at Powell’s Books, federal labor law 
required the store’s management to bargain in good faith with Local 5 booksellers over a 
first contract. Yet, negotiations proved anything but cordial, unfolding into a protracted 
power struggle between Michael Powell and booksellers that lasted eleven months. 
Coincidentally, the first bargaining session between labor and management occurred on 
the year anniversary of the September Surprise email that ignited the union organizing 
campaign. The subsequent series of escalating actions and reactions by both parties 
created a tension in the workplace that spilled over into the streets of downtown. The 
conflict compelled the city and the media to choose sides in a manner reminiscent of 
Portland’s 1959 newspaper strike or the 1934 longshore strike. In particular, Local 5’s 
struggle for a first contract provided Portland’s radical and progressive communities a 
campaign around which to organize and participate alongside an already growing anti-
globalization movement.  
 Following the election, ILWU Local 5 transitioned from primarily organizing 
booksellers for union recognition to conducting the myriad of tasks necessary to negotiate 
and win a first contract. Simultaneously, the union needed to organize “No” voters 
behind the union’s future, establish mutual aid relationships with local social justice 
movements, and demonstrate that booksellers could take collective action. These and 
many other related concerns converged into the most imperative demand of all: Local 5 
needed to exert sufficient economic and social pressure upon Michael Powell to compel 
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him to agree to a first contract that forfeited power and a greater share of the company’s 
profits. 
Although Local 5 could claim victory in the union election, the narrow margin left 
space for varying interpretations of the election’s outcome. Booksellers John McMahon 
and Mary Winzig both attributed the close election results to employees’ fear of the 
unknown, specifically a feeling of uncertainty about how their day-to-day work lives 
would change with a union.1 Powell and his team of management and lawyers proved 
unwilling to accept the results of the election. The store owner himself refused to meet 
with the union and continued to make statements to journalists that illustrated that he did 
not think unionism was something his employees needed. “You say the word ‘union,’ and 
everyone’s supposed to feel all squishy. I don’t get it,” Powell stated to a reporter in the 
months between the election and the start of bargaining. “I understand if you’re 
organizing farm workers, or people in Bangladesh,” conceded Powell, “But this is not 
that kind of situation.”2 ILWU Regional Organizer Michael Cannarella explained how 
management misunderstood the vote tally, wrongly interpreting the “No” vote as a vote 
for management: 
I think the [recognition vote] was very close and I think that made the 
management team feel as though there were a lot of people on their side. I think if 
you talk to some of the tech store [employees] and some of the people that came 
our way after the vote, what you’ll find out is that they weren’t necessarily on 
management's side. They saw there were a lot of problems. [...] Over the course of 
the next year and a half, as we’re bargaining and we’re bringing those issues to 
the table, one after another, we slowly brought people to our side because they 
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realized that we’re the only ones trying to deal with the problem. Management 
was just saying, ‘Hey, you don’t have any problems here, everything is OK.’ So, 
if there was a strategic mistake [management] made, it was thinking that the NO 
votes thought everything was OK. The NO votes didn’t think everything was OK, 
but they hadn’t really decided the union was the way of addressing those 
problems.3 
 
Thus, the outcome of the contract negotiations depended upon which of the two opposing 
sides could polarize the workplace towards its position. 
Open Bargaining and the Polarization of the Workplace 
In the five months between the election and the start of bargaining, both sides 
prepared their teams of negotiators. Michael Powell assigned the duty to his management 
team and lawyers, a common practice in corporate circles but a decision that booksellers 
nevertheless held against him. Powell’s legal counsel prepared a post-election strategy 
seemingly aimed at stalling contract negotiations for as long as possible. Local 5’s 
organizing committee and communication stewards, established during the union’s 
organizing phase, carried on the vital role of coordinating the activity of the union and 
outreaching to booksellers. On the opposite side, union activist continued outreaching to 
employees following the election by circulating a bargaining survey, conducting 
organizing conversations with booksellers, and meeting with new hires. Local 5’s first 
bargaining surveys after the election provided the contract team a snapshot of the 
workforce and their priorities for the union’s first contract proposals. Demographically, 
the survey of 181 respondents confirmed many of the public’s assumptions of Powell’s 
employees: half were between the ages of 25 - 35 years old and 90 percent reported at 
least some college education.  
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As for the booksellers’ bargaining priorities, workers repeatedly identified wages 
as a top priority throughout the survey. Overwhelmingly, workers thought the minimum 
wage for new employees should increase from $6.50 to $7.50 per hour. More than half of 
respondents stated they needed a raise or a fair wage in response to the question, “What 
can Powell’s do to make you a better employee?” As for benefits, employees did not 
want to trade away any current benefits and prioritized improvements to the company’s 
vision health program, educational stipend, and 401K program. Booksellers were 
particularly discontented with the company’s profit sharing program with only 9 percent 
of respondents wanting to keep the program’s current set up, preferring to either 
eliminate the threshold for sharing or trade away the program for a permanent wage 
increase.4  
Whereas the bargaining survey helped determine the priorities for the union’s first 
contract, the outreach to new workers and those who voted against the union proved 
critical in building unity to achieve an agreement with management. ILWU organizer 
Michael Cannarella recalled reaching out to new employees was a significant task for 
organizers since ten to twenty new employees started with the company each month.5 
Communication stewards identified and recruited new leaders, including Meredith 
Schafer by keeping the conversation regarding the union at the forefront for both 
seasoned and green booksellers.6 Subsequently, Schafer became a communication 
steward herself in the wake of the election. By January 2000, Local 5 had thirty-nine 
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stewards spread out across nine worksites and twenty teams.7 Furthermore, for Local 5 to 
successfully secure a contract and its bargaining goals, organizers understood the urgent 
need to build support amongst the other half of the workforce who voted against 
unionization.  
Anti-union strongholds, such as the Tech Store, required immediate attention after 
the election. Tech store employees Carole Reichstein and Jim Cowing indicated that their 
coworkers’ opposition to the union derived from a more congenial management approach 
taken by supervisors at their store compared to at the City of Books.8 Moreover, Cowing 
described a prevailing culture within their work group that was “conditioned” to hold 
suspect any interference from the outside.9 Soon after the election, Cannarella met with 
Tech Store booksellers to discuss what the workers could expect now with a union in the 
workplace.10 Such efforts proved successful, as demonstrated by the leadership roles both 
Reichstein and Cowing took within Local 5 after voting “No” during the election. 
Reichstein served as a communication steward for her worksite and Cowing joined the 
bargaining team. Both had the support of unionists at the Burnside store and many of the 
anti-unionists at the Tech Store that saw them as their advocate within a union dominated 
by the City of Books workers.11 Cowing proved a consistent and reliable Local 5 
representative throughout the many incarnations of the union’s bargaining team, holding 
                                                          
7 ILWU Local 5, “Bargaining Team, Stewards Contact List” ILWU Library, ILWU Local 5 Document 
Archive, January 3 & 4, 2000. 
8 Carole Reichstein, interviewed by Edward Beechert, Local 5 Oral History Project, ILWU Library, April 
17, 2002, 3. 
9 Jim Cowing, interviewed by Edward Beechert, Local 5 Oral History Project, ILWU Library, August 28, 
2001, 3. 
10 Reichstein, Local 5 Oral History Project, 3-4. 
11 Cowing, Local 5 Oral History Project, 5-7. 
124 
the distinction along with Keith Brooks as the only two members who were a part of 
bargaining team for the full eleven months of negotiations.12 
Union activists believed that the Powell’s management team’s bargaining strategy 
from the outset was to stall the proceedings for as long as possible and, if necessary, 
bring in a federal mediator. “Our feeling,” bookseller John McMahon speculated, “was 
that they were going to try to take it all the way to impasse.”13 A declared impasse could 
potentially send the contract negotiations to binding arbitration.14 “That would be it,” 
concluded McMahon, “Make us put up or shut up.”15 While stalling represented a tested 
and true union avoidance tactic for Powell’s attorney Larry K. Amburgey, Schafer 
conjectured the strategy dually served to legitimize his role and maximize his financial 
gain.16 Mary Winzig, who started working for Powell’s in 1995, recognized that the 
company hired a noticeably younger workforce after the union election, which suggested 
to her that the company believed these workers would have little interest in the long term 
goals of a union. Contrarily, Winzig described that many young new booksellers making 
$7.00 per hour proved to be enthusiastic supporters of the union compared to other 
Powell’s booksellers, who had the privilege of a “nice little niche carved out for 
themselves.”17  
Local 5’s early decision to insist on open bargaining, an arrangement in which 
any Powell’s employee could attend and observe contract negotiations, proved a decisive 
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factor in mobilizing support. The ILWU’s Michael Cannarella viewed bargaining as a 
component of organizing and described the open sessions as an educational opportunity 
that facilitated the attendance of crowds of booksellers, but never Michael Powell.18 The 
union opted for a large bargaining team consisting of at least nine booksellers plus 
Cannarella and later Olney.19 Lack of previous bargaining experience did not prevent 
bookseller Carol Edwards from emerging as a leader on the union’s team. “Everyone’s in 
awe of Carol,” expressed Winzig, “nothing rattles her.”20 Amburgey and Howard Rubin, 
two seasoned labor law attorneys, provided Powell’s the labor relations negotiating 
experience the store’s management team lacked. “I knew his style,” recalled ILWU 
organizer Michael Cannarella of Amburgey, since the two had negotiated against each 
other in the past.21 Cannarella anticipated Amburgey’s confrontational approach, 
believing that open bargaining would allow “the rank and file to see who their employer 
had hired to deal with them,” Amburgey “didn’t let me down at all,” he added.22 
Contract bargaining moved the workforce toward the union more successfully 
than any other action taken by the union or Powell’s management between 1998 and 
2000.23 Unanimously, Powell’s employees agreed that Amburgey’s role in the 
negotiations reflected poorly upon Michael Powell. McMahon attributed the local’s 
bargaining power to its open structure and expressed gratitude for Amburgey’s ability to 
solidify union support. “We owe Larry a debt of gratitude,” McMahon sardonically 
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stated.24 Similarly, Jeff Hensley concluded that rather than strike fear in the hearts of 
employees, Amburgey's caustic and obstructionist behavior in front of large groups 
activated and polarized the workers “marginally interested” in the contract around the 
union’s bargaining committee.25 For these reasons, bookseller Jim Cowing counted 
Amburgey as one of the union’s “greatest assets in holding the bargaining unit 
together.”26  
Amburgey’s bargaining approach not only strengthened the resolve of union 
activists but proved a key influence in turning previously anti-union workers into union 
supporters and leaders. Winzig credited the attorney’s behavior for inspiring important 
discussions about work, class, and capitalism among employees.27 Similarly, Zartman 
described the bargaining sessions as a “wake up call” that brought to light the power 
dynamics previously obscured.28 Reichstein and Schafer credited the open bargaining and 
the witnessing the behavior of a lawyer selected by Michael Powell as a decisive factor in 
swaying fence sitters to support the union.29 Several of these workers, who Schafer 
recalled voted against the union, later became active members and officers, were 
“completely swayed by watching the way this lawyer talked to workers across the 
table.”30  
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Cowing, who had previously penned an oppositional letter to the union’s living 
wage argument during the recognition campaign, found himself engaged in a heated 
argument with Powell’s lawyers over the subject. “I sort of gave a whole bunch of people 
a shot in the arm,” reflected Cowing on the incident that culminated with him pounding 
his fist into the table and warning Amburgey not to underestimate the union.31 Such 
events as this illustrated what Carole Reichstein described as her fellow booksellers’ 
“collective anger” towards Amburgey and his persistent belittling of booksellers and their 
demands.32 Although Amburgey’s behavior proved agitational, the lawyer absorbed a 
portion of anger from booksellers that would otherwise have been directed at Powell’s 
management.33 
Booksellers Take Action as a Union 
Local 5’s ability to conduct an array of creative actions with varying levels of 
intensity and militancy, allowing workers to participate in a manner that matched their 
comfort level and encouraged them to take on bolder actions, represented a major factor 
in the union’s success. The workers’ gradual escalation of tactics and scale began with 
management’s firing of bookseller and union activist Marty Kruse in October 1999. 
During a series of disciplinary meetings, Kruse evoked his legal right to have a union 
representative in the meeting. Fellow bookseller and communication steward Jen 
Dahlstrom and Cannarella attended the meetings and witnessed the firing. As Kruse left 
the store, an employee announced, “We love you, Marty” over the store intercom.34 The 
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termination served as a catalyst for Local 5 to initiate a direct-action campaign to impact 
Powell’s Book economically, as union members seemed to grow bolder with every job 
action.  
The escalation of direct actions began one week after Kruse’s termination with a 
modest rally. On October 27, Powell’s employees gathered outside the City of Books 
front doors for a “break out,” which preceded Kruse filing an Unfair Labor Practice 
(ULP) with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).35 The ten minute ULP strike 
“broke the ice for a lot of people,” recalled Cannarella.36 Staff organizer Anissa Couey 
summarized the importance of the legally protected ULP strike with a metaphor, 
comparing the tactic to the feather in Dumbo’s cap.37 Peter Olney, whose start in the 
labor movement came in 1973 as a worker-organizer in the United Electrical Workers 
(UE) union, noted that the Local 5 succeeded in coordinating an offensive reaction in 
order to temper the fear brought on by the termination.38 The escalation primed the union 
for forthcoming negotiating roadblocks. “Every time we had an action,” recalled 
Meredith Schafer, “we brought them to the table more willing to deal.”39  
Throughout the contract campaign, a consistent component of union activity 
centered on worker creativity and use of the written word. “We had enormous printing 
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costs,” recalled Cannarella, “We did a lot graphs, a lot of buttons, a lot of stickers, 
newsletters.”40 In particular, stickers proved most popular among booksellers.41 Stickers 
“made people feel strong, part of group,” stated Schafer.42 Workers also participated in 
rallies on the front porch of the store as well as “chalk outs” where workers would 
collectively write messages to customers and store management on the sidewalk that 
surrounded the store using sidewalk chalk.43 Schafer also described getting union’s 
message out to customers around the world by inserting union leaflets in books being 
prepared for shipping.44 Marcy Rein, in the ILWU’s Communication Department, 
described a tension common to most campaigns regarding direct action tactics between 
those “who push the limits of dissent” and those “who want it to be very clear that they’re 
acting within the legal limits.”45 Success and unity depended upon Local 5’s ability to 
balance these mutually shared but conflicted interests, not allowing either group to 
become disillusioned or marginalized. 
Local 5’s vigilant observance and application of its rights under the NLRA, 
specifically Sections 7 and 8, outmaneuvered Powell’s management’s efforts to dissuade 
support for the union during contract negotiations. Unlike strikes for economic demands, 
the NLRA protects employees’ right to return to work without condition after a work-
stoppage over an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). From the beginning, the ILWU took a 
proactive approach to preparing workers to confront management retaliation for union 
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activity by educating booksellers on what constitutes an ULP and conducting trainings on 
their rights under Section 7 of the NLRA.46 At a January 2000 training, ILWU organizers 
highlighted that an effective use of Section 7 and 8 of the NLRA was necessary “to lay 
the legal basis for bringing home the contract” and to block any efforts by the employer 
to decertify the union.47 The local alertly filed complaints with the NLRB and took 
advantage of the union’s right to strike under protection of labor law. Case in point, the 
ILWU filed a total of ten ULPs against Powell’s management between October 1999 and 
May 2000, striking eleven times and receiving a favorable NLRB ruling in four of the 
charges.48 The bulk of ULP allegations were related to actions taken by managers at the 
City of Books, where booksellers used the ULP strike tactic and its legal protections to 
disrupt Powell’s operations in hopes of leveraging concessions at the bargaining table.  
The holiday season presented an opportunity for Local 5 to present its cause to 
throngs of shoppers, while simultaneously applying pressure upon Powell’s management 
during its busiest and most profitable time. The union hoped that this public action could 
spur movement from the Powell’s bargaining team, who had yet to bring any economic 
proposals to the table after twelve sessions over the two previous months. Furthermore, in 
mid-November, Powell’s management made changes to the company’s timekeeping 
policy. The unilateral change prompted Local 5 to file its second ULP, arguing that the 
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move by the company violated an NLRB’s mandate to maintain the status quo as it 
pertained to working conditions during contract negotiations.49 
The ULP also set the stage for another strike. Booksellers expressed their 
disapproval with a walk-out and coordinated their first large scale action in partnership 
with the local labor community. On Black Friday, the day after Thanksgiving, 
booksellers began the day leafleting customers at the City of Books entrance, where 
booksellers later assembled for a ten-minute “break out.” The workers were met by the 
labor folk band General Strike! and a mass of community supporters organized by the 
ILWU and Jobs with Justice. Bookseller Stephen Strausbaugh provided the crowd of 
longshoremen, teamsters, and carpenters, with an update on ULPs and contract 
bargaining as curious customers looked on while passing in and out of the store. Local 5 
conducted a similar action later in the day at the Hawthorne store location, demonstrating 
that the union’s activism spread beyond the downtown City of Books and Hoyt 
warehouse locations.50 
Bringing the “Spirit of Seattle” to Portland  
As Local 5 began contract bargaining and developed an action strategy to pressure 
Powell’s Books to negotiate, progressive forces around the country planned to converge 
on Seattle, Washington to disrupt the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) third 
ministerial conference. A coalition of environmental, labor, and human rights groups 
prepared to flood the streets of Seattle to protest the WTO’s neoliberal international trade 
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agenda. Portland Jobs with Justice helped mobilize six thousand Oregonians, the majority 
of whom were from interfaith and social justice organizations including Local 5, for the 
trek to Seattle to join tens of thousands of other protesters for nine days of action between 
November 26 and December 3, 1999.51 Nancy Hoque, a Portland staffer for Jobs with 
Justice, was one of about five hundred demonstrators detained or arrested during a protest 
marked by the police’s use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and mistreatment of demonstrators 
while in custody amid property damage by some protesters in the downtown business 
district. 
Local 5, through the attendance of twenty-plus booksellers at the WTO protests, 
participated in one of the union’s first actions not directly related to its organizing 
campaign and demonstrated the desire of participants to join forces with the broader labor 
movement. As a union highly involved in international trade, the ILWU and its local 
memberships took an unambiguous oppositional stance to the WTO. The longshore 
workers shut down North America’s West Coast ports for the day as 1,500 of its 
members participated in a Labor March and Rally in Seattle, where Brian McWilliams 
addressed 30,000 fellow unionists. The disturbances outside of the conference and the 
subsequent international attention compounded differences between the developing and 
developed countries inside the ministerial, resulting in a failure to agree upon a series of 
multilateral trade agreements. Subsequently, conference chairperson and U.S. Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky announcing a “time out,” prompting many in the 
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anti-globalization movement to claim victory.52 “One of the results of doing this work,” 
recalled Margaret Butler of Jobs with Justice, “was lots and lots of young energy coming 
into the struggles that we were taking on including the Powell’s struggle.”53 Whatever the 
outcome of the protests, demonstrators from around the country returned home with the 
intention of bringing the “Spirit of Seattle” to their local struggles.54 
In the months following the WTO protests, the Powell’s union struggle became a 
focal point for the city’s progressive organizations just as the union’s need for mutual aid 
and solidarity became most necessary. While the relationship between Local 5 and 
Portland’s progressive community began during the union’s recognition campaign, the 
union’s newsletter reported in March that “the ties forged in Seattle at the WTO have 
remained here with us in Portland.”55 When AT&T relocated a union telecommunication 
office two blocks from Powell’s Books to Texas, Local 5 booksellers joined the displaced 
workers on the picket lines.56 The resulting interplay between the union and social justice 
organizations produced informative and interactive solidarity actions at the bookstore that 
helped broaden the Powell’s struggle from a private union issue to a community 
campaign. Case in point, Local 5 and its community partners conducted a “Christmas 
Carnival” inside the City of Books a week before the holiday and the day after the union 
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filed its third ULP charge against Powell’s. In conjunction with the ULP, moreover, 
Powell’s employees at the Hoyt Street warehouse walked out again asserting that 
management violated the status quo by making unilateral changes to employees’ 
schedules.  
The Christmas Carnival gave community organizations the opportunity to 
demonstrate their support for Local 5 to both Powell’s management and rank-and-file 
employees. Much of the character of the event derived from the Art & Revolution 
Collective, whose members contributed an adaptation of Dr. Seuss’s How the Grinch 
Stole Christmas! that included “Mr. Pool’s Planet of Books.” The action also invited 
customers, many of whom wore stickers stating how many years they had shopped at 
Powell’s, to express their support for a fast and fair contract directly to store 
management. Meanwhile, a union chorus and labor folk band played both union songs 
and holiday carols inside the store as the Teamsters’ tractor-trailer continually circled the 
store playing holiday songs. Over two hundred community allies participated in the 
action, which concluded with a march through the store demanding a contract for the 
booksellers.57  
The December action represented a major escalation in Local 5’s response to 
Powell’s stalling at the bargaining table and prepared the workforce for future labor and 
community involvement on the booksellers’ behalf. Nevertheless, Mary Winzig recalled 
that the presence of so many people from the public disrupting the store annoyed some 
booksellers, who thought the Powell’s employees did not need any outside help.58 
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Bookseller Jeff Hensley agreed that some workers felt the carnival action was “over the 
top,” but concluded the action was effective for creating disorder for management and 
compelling their bargaining team to negotiate.59 Turning the tables on the union, Powell’s 
Books filed a ULP against Local 5 for disrupting business. The NLRB sided with the 
bookstore several months later giving no merit to the union’s counter argument that the 
store achieved record high sales the same day as the rally.60 Yet, within a week after the 
holiday action, Powell’s management brought its first compensation counter proposal to a 
bargaining session attended by twenty-five employee observers. Among the differences 
between the two economic proposals, Powell’s proposed a $6.63 starting wage to the 
union’s proposal of $7.00.61 
Despite some progress made in narrowing the difference on wage proposals, 
bargaining sessions in January 2000 proved increasingly contentious. In response to 
Powell’s compensation plan, health care proposal, and management’s rights clause, the 
union declared a “philosophical difference” with its employer.62 The management’s 
rights clause was at the center of the tension. As Burnside bookseller Robert Gerke 
stated, the “union is asking to be partners in making decision and you (the Corporate 
Team) are saying that you want to call all the shots and run things.”63 Powell’s bargaining 
position divided issues into two boxes, those that were bargainable (wages and benefits) 
and those topics that were exclusively the right of management (the labor process). “We 
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shouldn’t be obligated to bring everything to staff,” stated Human Resources Manager 
Sylvie Horne.64 “It’s only about clarifying management’s role. If we don’t take on that 
responsibility, we’re not doing our jobs,” explained Corporate Manager Ann Smith.65 
Michael Powell speculated that the union intended to run his store like a co-op.66 
Management demonstrated that they, too, could protest by cancelling a scheduled 
bargaining session with only a day's notice, stating “It seems clear to the company’s team 
that absent a significant breakthrough [...], we could shortly be at impasse.”67 As 
management continued its stalling tactics, workers and their community allies continued 
to respond with increasingly larger and more disruptive actions. 
Valentine's Day 2000 proved bittersweet for Michael Powell as Local 5 and its 
community allies began to demonstrate that they held Powell himself responsible for the 
prolonged contract negotiations. Powell’s Corporate Manager Ann Smith refuted the 
union’s claim that her side was intentionally dragging out negotiations, pointing to the 
fact that it took the union five months following the election to initiate bargaining. 
“We’re not stalling,” Smith told Publisher’s Weekly, explaining that in December 
Powell’s presented its wage and health care proposals and presented all proposals by 
mid-January.68 By February, however, the trust between the two sides was at a 
punctuated low as the union claimed management had attempted to spy on the bargaining 
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committee by having a new manager attend the bargaining session and eavesdrop on the 
union’s caucus sessions.69 Consequently, Local 5 filed a ULP on February 11 that 
provided legal protection for a work stoppage that coincided with a planned pre-
Valentine's Day demonstration the following day. Anissa Couey, hired on to the ILWU 
staff to support the organizing campaign, choreographed and implemented the 
Valentine’s Day themed action by coordinating support from the Art & Revolution 
Collective.70 In a repeat performance of the Christmas Carnival, the labor community, 
including Jobs with Justice, the Teamsters and union carpenters, joined the activist artists 
at the rally to demonstrate solidarity for the union book clerks.71 
The pre-Valentine’s Day “street party,” as the union described the event, 
disrupted Powell’s business in a manner characteristic of the “Spirit of Seattle.”72 
Bookseller and community allies began to assemble at the store’s main entrance carrying 
Jobs with Justice picket signs, red ILWU balloons, and makeshift drums. While 
bookseller Mary Winzig led a contingent of union carpenters to join the rally, John 
McMahon took to the megaphone to address the crowd of over seventy-five booksellers 
and over three hundred community allies. The Teamster’s semi-truck repeated its winter 
holiday performance, circling the store and blowing its horn. “We’ve been showing our 
love to Michael Powell for a long time,” stated McMahon, playing on the Valentine’s 
Day theme. “As you can see, we have a big building that our love helped build,” 
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connecting his fellow booksellers’ labor to the recent City of Books expansion and 
Michael Powell’s personal real estate success, “He owns several buildings downtown that 
we funded with our love.”73 Previously, at a recent bargaining session, the management 
team had acknowledged that the end of 1999 brought “banner sales” to the company. 
However, Powell’s argued that expenses had also increased, including the rent brought on 
by the downtown store’s expansion.74 In a handbill for the Valentine’s Day action, the 
union took issue with the “rent went up” argument by drawing attention to the fact that 
Powell’s Books paid rent to the bookstore’s owner Michael Powell, who owned the 
Burnside store, Hoyt Warehouse, Tech Store, and corporate office building properties.75 
Local 5 countered Powell’s rent dilemma with their own “Book Store Blues,” a song 
penned by a bookseller for the union’s demonstrations. The song’s chorus bemoaned how 
Powell’s employees “may not starve, but we’ll always be poor” working at a bookstore, 
explaining that: 
Rents are risin’ every day, 
Rich folks come take our homes away, 
Can’t afford to buy our homes ourselves, 
Can’t even afford the books we shelve.76 
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As McMahon led a rhetorical chant of “Where’s Michael Powell?”, drawing attention to 
the fact that the owner had refused to attend the bargaining sessions, a twenty-foot-tall 
puppet of Powell appeared from around the corner of Southwest Oak Street.77  
The symbolic street theater wedding between figures of capital and labor 
communicated the union’s goals to a public audience divided on an intensifying conflict 
smack dab in the city’s so-called living room. Activists from the Art & Revolution 
Collective constructed the larger than life puppet of Powell for a theatrical parodied 
wedding ceremony with a bearded “Larry the Longshoreman” puppet, dressed in a white 
dress and carrying a docker’s hook. The art activists officiated the wedding, including an 
exchange of vows that articulated the union’s goals and the barriers created by Powell’s 
management: “I, Michael Powell, do take this worker to be joined with me in a union. 
[...]. I promise to support you in good times and in bad with fair wages based on Powell’s 
financial success, in sickness and in health with a clear benefits package, and no take 
backs.” The call and repeat chants between Art & Revolution and the crowd continued 
with Larry vowing that “for better or for worse, I will assert my rights in the grievance 
process so long as good faith on the part of management shall last.” After the Michael 
and Larry puppets embraced, the emcee reminded the gathering of the importance of the 
community to get involved and stay involved in the struggle.78 
The rally then moved inside the City of Books, disrupting management’s control 
of the store with music and dance. As Michael Cannarella led the rally into the store, he 
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explained that the purpose was to show employees and management “the power of this 
community and the importance of this union contract to everybody in the Portland area.” 
The rally split up inside the store, occupying both the Green and Orange rooms that 
contained the store’s two checkout stations and entrances. There, attendees danced in the 
aisles as musicians led singalongs to “Solidarity Forever,” “Which Side are You On?” 
and other classic union anthems. Some demonstrators carried “Ask Me” signs with 
pictures of Powell’s Books bargaining team, designed to help community allies identify 
managers and press them on their bargaining positions. 79 Following the store action, a 
delegation of Local 5 members and community supporters bussed across the river to 
Michael Powell’s home residence in a well-to-do Mount Tabor neighborhood. The union 
supporters, full of confidence and resolve in their goals, delivered union Valentines to the 
obstinate boss and then ended the day claiming victory.80 
A new volley of ULPs from both management and the union ensued following the 
February 12 demonstration, leading to another bookseller strike four days later. 
Management followed the action by filing a charge against the union for disrupting 
business, while the union charged that management had intimidated bookseller Kathy 
Cunningham from participating in the day of action. “Instead of negotiating,” Stephen 
Strausbaugh said of Powell’s management, “they’d rather try to undermine the union by 
coming down on union activists in the store.”81 On February 16, sixty-five employees 
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walked-out off the job on a ULP protected strike at multiple worksites to join another 
twenty booksellers attending a contract bargaining session. The action not only 
temporarily halted Powell’s shipping department for the day but compelled management 
to walk-out of the bargaining session room after fifteen minutes, stating that they needed 
to return to the store to assist those still working their shifts.82 In addition to applying 
direct economic pressure on Powell’s management by halting the labor process, the 
actions served as a consciousness raising moment for booksellers as well as another 
opportunity to learn to take bigger and bolder collective actions together. Bookseller 
Mary Zartman described the experience by stating that “When you see a manager kind of 
panic and you realize that they can’t run the store without you,” then you realize the 
important position of the bookseller in the labor process.83 “People were so excited to be 
doing something together,” remembered Powell’s internet service rep Jean-Paul 
Jenkins.84 
Counter Organizing Movement 
 Powell’s employees who continued to oppose unionization remained hopeful that 
probability and time would soon lead to a union-free shop. As both the company and the 
union tried to sway booksellers to their respective side, some booksellers found the 
confrontational tactics of the labor movement troublesome and probed for a possible vote 
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to decertify the ILWU as the union. The NLRB allows a union decertification election to 
occur if a year has passed since the union’s election and the company and union have yet 
to sign a contract. Even though the NLRB bars employers from getting involved in 
decertification campaigns, Powell’s management appeared to have the advantage of time 
as the one-year anniversary of the union’s election victory loomed over Local 5’s 
bargaining team. In March, talk around the bookstore of a decertification campaign 
compelled the union to seek legal counsel about strategies for defeating such an effort.85 
Around the same time, union opponents began speaking openly to the Oregonian about 
their wishes to decertify Local 5.86 The union caught wind of the decertification 
campaign when an employee mistakenly forwarded an email about a loosely organized 
decertification campaign to union activist Meredith Schafer instead of assistant manager 
Meredith Schreiber.87 Under the name of Employees for an Independent Powell’s, union 
opponents distributed fliers promoting a website and email address the group created 
other employees interested in decertifying the ILWU.88 The group's statement of goals 
(signed by sixteen employees) criticized the union’s actions as “sabotage,” echoed the 
pre-election management critique of the union as a third-party, and defended Michael 
Powell’s character.89 
In the end, however, union activists unanimously agreed that the decertification 
campaign failed because its proponents proved poor organizers.90 Cannarella stated that 
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the Powell’s bargaining team informed him and Brian McWilliams at a meeting in May 
2000 that the company had waited a year to begin serious negotiations in hopes that a 
decertification campaign could materialize.91 “People who don’t want a union,” explained 
Schafer, “aren’t very good organizers,” adding that it was her belief that those who 
advocated for decertification held management aspirations.92 On the other hand, Schafer 
considered the increased numbers of employees participating in union actions as a sign of 
a greater identification of booksellers as workers.93 Yet, even if the campaign had 
collected signatures from 30 percent of the bargaining unit to trigger an election, the 
NLRB would have likely needed to resolve the outstanding ULP charges filed against the 
company before the decertification election could occur. Mary Winzig wrote to Powell 
stating that a decertification campaign would fail because the union had grown from its 
narrow election victory to represent the majority of booksellers.94 In fact, by March of 
2000, Local 5 claimed that 70 percent of the workforce had signed a petition supporting 
its contract bargaining goals.95 
Unity within a Diversity of Tactics 
Local 5 embraced a strategy that sought to apply not only direct economic 
leverage on Powell’s Books, but also social pressure on its owner through a diversity of 
creative actions. Michael Powell’s refusal to attend bargaining session proved a point of 
friction for booksellers and the union. Therefore, the union decided that if Powell refused 
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to meet with them that the union would find him. Local 5 and ILWU President Brian 
McWilliams publicly confronted Powell at the Port of Portland’s commissioners’ 
meetings, where Powell refused to respond to the union and turned his back on the 
delegation.96 Soon thereafter, McWilliams issued a public invite to his corporate 
counterpart to join him at a bargaining session in the hopes that the two leaders could 
help overcome some of the obstacles slowing down contract negotiations.97 Months prior, 
the two men had crossed paths inside the bookstore and discussed both the bargaining 
standstill and the idea of jointly attending a bargaining session.98 Unmoved, Powell 
ultimately declined the invitation and the bargaining stalemate persisted. 
While Powell and his bargaining team promoted its wage proposal as a $2.1 
million compensation plan, booksellers contended that the company’s offer included 
several takeaways that redistributed compensation elsewhere to give the appearance of a 
larger economic package. Booksellers, including Cowing, considered management’s 
proposal to discontinue paid lunches, holiday bonuses, and profit sharing disingenuous.99 
In particular, the proposal to end the paid lunch practice created rancor among 
booksellers, who overwhelming wished to hold on to the pre-contract practice. Stacy 
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Friedman argued in an article in the union’s newsletter that agreeing to these tradeaways 
would be “foolish,” adding that maintenance of these benefits is “self-evident and should 
go without saying.” In order to overcome these bargaining barriers, Friedman stated that 
it was “more important than ever for us to increase the pressure on management to 
bargain fairly with us and quit presenting us with proposals they know are 
unacceptable.”100 
The union initiated work stoppages and disrupted the company’s shipping process 
by continuing to take advantage of Powell’s management’s anti-union behavior and the 
NLRB’s ULP process. In mid-March, Local 5 filed its sixth ULP against Powell’s. The 
union alleged that management’s recent crackdown on timekeeping and lunch breaks 
deliberately targeted union supporters. In response, thirty workers conducted a work 
stoppage on St. Patrick’s Day and were joined by a dozen members of ILWU Local 8 and 
other community allies.101 The strike provided booksellers the opportunity to experience 
the power of solidarity among workers outside of Powell’s. UPS Teamster drivers and 
union postal workers respected the strike and refused to deliver or pick up packages, 
forcing management to make deliveries by driving to the post office.102 “We SHUT IT 
DOWN,” boasted Wendy Brown in the shipping department.103 The strike “made 
everybody feel strong,” recalled Mary Winzig after witnessing the solidarity of other 
workers. The success of the action “made us realize that we were the ones doing the work 
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and we could shut it down when we had to.”104 The union conducted its first all day work 
stoppage two days later when one-third of the Burnside store walked out to picket and 
leaflet customers outside the store.105 
While the St. Patrick’s Day strike proved a success in halting the shipping 
department’s operations, discussion about the action the next day centered around what 
became known as the “tire incident.”106 Management found a tire on one of Powell’s 
delivery van’s deflated during the strike and attributed the act to the union, which denied 
any maleficence. “I will not be bullied,” Powell told the Oregonian regarding his 
response to the March strikes.107 Powell’s employee David Weich penned and distributed 
a public letter to fellow Burnside employees condemning the actions of “three goons, 
ILWU pawns,” who disrupted the day’s business.108 Ryan Thomas, Tech Store employee 
and signatory to the Employees for an Independent Powell’s letter, took his opposition to 
the action public, submitting a Letter to the Editor of the Oregonian that denounced what 
he called “mob tactics” by the ILWU.109 The heightened attention over the slashed tire 
prompted the local to distribute a flier denouncing the “tire incident” and John McMahon 
to respond with a letter to his coworkers.110 McMahon attempted to re-center the 
discussion on the union’s primary issue: Michael Powell’s resistance to bargaining. 
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McMahon also took aim at the Oregonian’s “over dramatized” coverage of the event, 
which misrepresented picket signs as “wooden sticks.”111 
Although Michael Powell refused to participate in bargaining, he communicated 
his perspective on the company’s bargaining stance and goals for a first contract to 
customers and employees. In one letter to customers, Powell welcomed the involvement 
of a federal mediator to assist contract bargaining. Nevertheless, the bookstore owner 
reaffirmed his commitment for a detailed management’s rights clause and his opposition 
to a union shop clause he framed as a “mandatory union fee” for employees, who he 
believed should “have a right to choose who they associate with and what organizations 
they support financially.”112 Similar to the election phase, Powell continued to send 
letters with bargaining updates to employees’ homes. “Every time management tries to 
do something ‘smart,’ more people come to our side,” explained bookseller and 
communication steward Stephen Strausbaugh.113 Local 5’s St. Patrick Day action 
compelled Powell to send out an all staff letter denouncing the “belligerent and unlawful 
behavior” of the union’s action as “not consistent with the Powell’s culture.”114 Yet, this 
only prompted Mary Winzig to respond with her own open letter to Michael Powell, 
deriding the bookstore owner’s updates about bargaining when he had yet to attend a 
negotiating session.115 
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While accumulating social pressure upon Michael Powell and direct economic 
action were the union’s most effective tactics, Local 5’s creative lower intensity actions 
kept the bargaining question ever present and provided different ways for booksellers to 
participate in the struggle. Stickers again proved popular among employees, this time 
with slogans regarding their bargaining demands, including “Hands off My Lunch.”116 
The booksellers in the children’s section led one of the most popular actions, conducting 
a ten minute “read-in” that featured the reciting of Click, Clack, Moo: Cows that Type 
(2000) by Doreen Cronin. The children's book tells the story of a group of cows who 
acquire better living conditions from a farmer by organizing a strike with the solidarity of 
the farm’s hens and ducks. The union held several other read-ins in different sections of 
the store during the contract campaign.117 Bookseller Meredith Schafer recalled that these 
union actions “gathered a lot of attention and drove management crazy” because 
managers could neither predict nor prepare for when or where the actions would take 
place.118 The booksellers also utilized the store’s intercom system for solidarity pages. An 
employee initiated a union “hug-in” one day at the City of Books with a page of “Harry 
Bridges to the Green Room.” Such intercom pages calling for Harry Bridges, a founding 
leader of the ILWU, became calls for immediate collective action on the shop floor.119 
 Local 5 organizers sought to foment a social movement in Portland around its 
fight for a contract, in part, by providing opportunities for local activists in the emerging 
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anti-globalization movement to participate in the struggle. ILWU Organizing Director 
Peter Olney pointed to the fact that when Portland played host to the union’s 31st 
International Convention in May, the Powell’s campaign “was the number one story in 
the news.”120 A series of high profile events in May and June showcased Local 5’s 
effectiveness at organizing community support through open letters, stickers, pins and 
street actions.121  
At the same time, public opinion remained divided over Powell’s union struggle, 
particularly among the segment of Portland’s liberal and progressive populace that saw 
Michael Powell as a leading liberal benefactor, model business owner, and philanthropist. 
Frequently, Local 5’s detractors described the grievances of the booksellers as 
“whining.”122 This prompted Powell’s employees to deride the media coverage of their 
struggle as too friendly to Michael Powell. Following the March work stoppages, “an 
emotional Powell” gave the Oregonian an interview about the slow progress in 
bargaining and the escalation of the union’s actions. Powell complained of “going 
through all this pain” and being “hung out to dry” for not knowing all his employees’ 
names. “Other than that,” the bookstore owner confessed, “I don’t know what I’ve done 
wrong.”123 In an editorial entitled “Will the Union Ruin Powell’s?”, the Oregonian 
condemned ILWU tactics: “This may be the sort of thing you get used to out on the 
docks. Maybe even the bullhorns are necessary, what with all the ships and cranes and 
truck noise and such. But in a bookstore, it’s just raw intimidation.” The editors 
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concluded that the dispute would leave Powell’s, “the heart of the city,” inevitably 
scarred.124  
The public opinion battle continued the following week with two contrasting 
opinion pieces. Local 5 took aim at the Oregonian for its perceived collaboration with 
Powell and accused the newspaper of misrepresenting the booksellers’ actions. In a 
jointly written editorial, Michael Cannarella and John McMahon, challenged the 
Oregonian’s predisposition to silent protest over collective action, reminding the editorial 
staff that institutions involve collaborative efforts and not the product of one man.125 
Alongside the union piece ran an editorial by Lynne Saxton, a former business associate 
of Michael Powell. Saxton echoed the Oregonian editorial by deriding the union’s 
actions as a “circus of rhetoric and obstructionism” against an important local employer, 
asserting that Powell “deserves respect and civility for his commitments to his employees 
[...] and to his employees’ interests.”126 The discourse regarding the conflict seeped into 
the Oregonian’s Living Section, where staff writer Jonathan Nicholas explained why 
Michael Powell was winning the public opinion contest and why his struggle has created 
“pervasive civic sadness surrounding his situation.” Michael Powell, insisted Nicholas, 
represented “the embodiment of Portland’s vaunted ‘good citizen.’”127  
 Opinions on the Powell’s struggle also filled the editorial pages of the Portland 
Business Journal. In March, former labor history educator and SEIU administrator Shelly 
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Herochik contended that the Powell’s contract dispute differed little from bargaining in 
other economic sectors more frequently associated with labor disputes: “It’s business as 
usual at the Powell’s Books bargaining table,” Herochik noted.128 Yet, she pointed to the 
inexperience of the two bargaining teams as a contributing factor to the lengthy 
negotiations and escalation of tactics.129 The article compelled attorney Larry Amburgey, 
the most experienced negotiator on the corporate team, to respond two weeks later. “I am 
for the first time in my 25 years representing employers compelled to respond to a media 
article related to negotiations in which I am involved,” explained Amburgey.130 After 
interviewing Local 5’s bargaining team members, Herochik had quoted Amburgey 
lecturing the union on the negotiating process: “This is how it works. We put things on 
the table and you agree.” Powell’s lawyer now refuted this claim and insisted that the 
company “is trying its best to find common ground with the union.”131  
Three months later, Business Journal publisher Mike Consul backed “Mike” 
Powell by editorializing that the bookstore owner and the city of Portland deserved better 
than the actions taken by the union. Consul twice recommended that Powell’s employees 
should “kick out the union” and “call off the war,” describing a union movement that 
feared change, globalization, and the “new economy.” Instead, Consul called for 
disaffected employees to show “some entrepreneurial initiative or independence” and 
open their own bookstores.132 The editorial received criticism from two readers, who 
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contributed letters to the editor in the weeks that followed. “If it weren’t for the workers,” 
wrote Douglas Theriault of Portland, “Michael Powell would have nothing!!!”133 North 
Portlander Misha Wilson challenged Consul’s conclusion that the Powell’s booksellers 
should have opened their own stores instead of unionizing, writing of Consul that “he 
obviously lives in a different world than the world I live in–different, most probably, than 
the world inhabited by most workers employed in the low-paid service industry.”134 
Portland’s alternative news weekly, Willamette Week, did not portray the labor 
dispute any better for the union. Investigative reporter Nigel Jaquiss’ feature article on 
the contract struggle, “Powell’s a City Divided,” sought to uncover what issues were at 
the root of the labor struggle within one of Portland’s favorite institutions. Jaquiss 
concluded that while the store would likely survive the contract dispute, the culture that 
made the store an institution was at threat.135 In assessing the economic issues at stake, 
Jaquiss concluded that because of the wages (at an average of $9.00 per hour) and 
benefits (including purported use of Michael Powell’s beach house), the booksellers were 
“well-compensated.” The article described the workplace as a “replicated campus life -- 
minus tuition,” where employees were the benefactors of “indulgent bosses and 
subsidized coffee.”136 While Jaquiss described the ILWU as “one of the most aggressive 
outfits in the labor movement,” the reporter portrayed Michael Powell as a well-
intentioned philanthropist, whose shy and quiet personality prevented him from 
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communicating with his employees. “Sometimes, at 2 a.m. I despair,” Powell told the 
Willamette Week, describing how he had not slept well ever since the union drive began. 
“It’s clear that somehow I failed in deed or in words to convince employees that their 
working conditions were the most important thing to me,” he concluded. What led to the 
union at his store, he mused “was hard to internalize.”137  
In the weeks that followed Jaquiss’ article, booksellers and readers responded 
with letters airing either their disagreement with the piece or condemnation of the 
booksellers. Powell’s employee Cal Hudson and Weekly reader Luke Anavi challenged 
Jaquiss’ conclusion that booksellers were well compensated or even received a living 
wage. In the same issue as Jaquiss’ article, Anavi pointed to the Powell’s help-wanted ad 
that advertised a starting hourly rate of $6.50, the state’s minimum wage.138 While 
Powell’s employees Karin Dibling, Matt Baker, and Melissa Mae Anthony joined 
Hudson in challenging the negative characterization of union supporters and providing 
testimony for the union's’ economic demands, other readers condemned the booksellers 
as over-educated, ungrateful whiners. “Powell’s workers should be ashamed of 
themselves,” wrote J.P Davidson of Southeast Portland. “As a liberal I am tired of 
whining, self-interested ‘cause hawks’ who exist to protest and protest to exist,” declared 
Davidson.139 Other readers questioned why the employees did not find other jobs if they 
were so unhappy at Powell’s. Reader Ron Williams wrote that maybe the unappreciated 
workers would find a better job, “if they put Mom and Dad’s tuition money to use, sent 
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out a few resumes and bought some decent clothes.”140 In response, Karin Dibling asked 
who in society deserved a living wage and secure retirement? “Someone has to do the 
grunt work in our society,” argued Dibling, “and if anything they deserve a secure future 
more than the suits do.”141 
ILWU organizers and Local 5 booksellers assembled a media strategy that relied 
on telling workers’ stories through grassroots, rather than mainstream media outlets. The 
ILWU assigned Marcy Rein, an experienced writer and organizer to spearhead this 
campaign. “We started out really behind,” recalled Rein, acknowledging the glistening 
reputation Michael Powell had garnered over the past two decades. Rein, who wrote 
numerous campaign updates for the ILWU’s newspaper The Dispatcher, understood the 
correlation between how the union portrayed the booksellers’ struggle and how much 
pressure Powell received from the community.142 Rather than emphasis how the 
booksellers were uniquely special for their literary expertise in press releases and 
interviews, Rein knew that in order to connect with the public the booksellers’ needed to 
share personal stories about how the company’s working conditions impacted their lives 
as workers, neighbors, and Portlanders.  
Local 5 utilized Portland’s grassroots media outlets, such as KBOO Community 
Radio and The Portland Alliance newspaper, to get their message “out over” critical 
media, as described by John McMahon.143 Both McMahon and Kruse cited the vital role 
KBOO played in getting the union’s message through to the station’s progressive 
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audience.144 Nevertheless, rather than dismissing the mainstream media altogether, the 
union met with the Oregonian’s editorial staff about the cause and penned opinion pieces 
published by the newspaper.145 At the same time, the union took its message to 
progressive readers around the country, purchasing space in The Nation magazine in 
April.146 Nearly 70 percent of the workforce, 263 employees, signed their names to a 
letter calling upon readers to voice their support for Local 5 directly to Michael 
Powell.147 The ad drew criticism from Willamette Week reporter Nigel Jaquiss, who 
charged that the union had falsely calculated claims regarding Powell’s profitability.148 
However, Shelley Herochik had referenced the same figure in her article for the Portland 
Business Journal three months before Jaquiss’ challenge, citing business information 
leader Dun & Bradstreet as her source.149 
The protracted contract struggle led some segments of the ILWU, including some 
international officers, to question the amount of union resources provided to a retail 
workers struggle. Yet President Brian McWilliams was determined to win stating that, 
“Whatever they asked me for, we provided.”150 While the Local 5 booksellers worked 
double time, the ILWU contributed a considerable number of staff and attorney hours to 
the campaign. In addition to Peter Olney’s and McWilliams’ time spent on the campaign 
and bargaining, Michael Cannarella worked full time on the campaign alongside two full-
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time and one half-time ILWU project staff. Furthermore, Cannarella described 
“enormous printing costs” for the union, which he attributed to the culture of the 
workforce that necessitated a constant flow of written material.151 Subsequently, as 
ILWU members scrutinized the costs of the Powell’s Books campaign in the lead-up to 
the union’s officer elections in May, the longshore workers’ continued investment in 
Local 5 appeared uncertain.152  
                                                          
151 Cannarella, Local 5 Oral History Project, 14-16. 
152 Olney, Local 5 Oral History Project, 18-21. 
157 
Chapter 5 
“We Can Shut It Down”: May Day 2000 
Portland’s labor community remained steadfastly behind the Powell’s 
booksellers’ struggle. ILWU Local 8 proved a reliable supporter, “They kind of liked the 
idea that the longshore was moving inland,” recalled Peter Olney, “They liked the idea of 
working with these young people.”1 Labor activists and educators within the local 
community also continued to provide their services to the new local. The University of 
Oregon’s Labor Education & Resource Center (LERC) organized a “Union 101 Class” 
following the election for the new union members. Carole Reichstein attended this class 
and caught the attention of the mostly Burnside employees because of her previous 
opposition to the union at the Tech Store employee. Reichstein’s change in position also 
caught the attention of other Tech Store employees; she described it as a “big deal” 
among her coworkers when she switched from wearing an anti-Local 5 pin to a union 
pin.2 Fittingly, the labor movement and anti-globalization advocates demonstrated their 
solidarity in a manner that appeared to infuse both the newly emerged “Spirit of Seattle” 
and the union movement of the 1930s on International Workers’ Day.  
ILWU Convention and May Day 
The events of May Day 2000 and a Workers’ Rights Board hearing organized by 
Jobs with Justice the following month represent the two factors union activists held most 
responsible for the shift in momentum to Local 5 and the jumpstart in the stalled contract 
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bargaining. The World Trade Organization (WTO) protests seemed to breathe life into 
the moribund May Day holiday as Portlanders who participated in the Seattle 
demonstrations sought to carry on the anti-globalization struggle at home. In response to 
anarchist activity and instances of property destruction in Seattle, cities and police 
departments across the country, including Portland’s law enforcement officers under the 
new leadership of Chief of Police Mark Kroeker, prepared for unruly demonstrations.3 
“We are in a new era of public protest and police response to protests [...] and Seattle was 
the catalyst,” stated City Commissioner Dan Saltzman shortly after Portland’s May Day.4 
Incidentally, the ILWU had scheduled its international convention, held in May every 
three years within a rotating host state on the West Coast, for Portland in 2000. Thus, as 
bargaining remained at a standstill, the booksellers made sure that their union’s cause 
took center stage during the city’s International Workers’ Day celebrations.5 
May Day and the subsequent actions that followed exemplified the union adage 
that “the street drives the table,” meaning that how workers use public action determines 
if management makes concessions.6 In fact, Larry Amburgey --Powell’s experienced 
contract negotiator and attorney-- understood this dynamic as well as his ILWU 
bargaining counterparts. When the union warned Amburgey that five hundred longshore 
                                                          
3 Mark Kroeker, who previously worked for thirty-two years in the Los Angeles Police Department, was 
hired by Portland Mayor Vera Katz to the city’s Chief of Police position in August 1999. During the city 
council and community meetings that followed the May Day confrontations, critics levied fault upon 
Kroeker’s leadership and tactical decisions.  
4 Robin Franzen, “No Clashes Mar Union March, Rally,” Oregonian, May 5, 2000, A01. 
5 Olney, Local 5 Oral History Project, June 3, 2002, 22-24; Marcy Rein, interviewed by Harvey Schwartz, 
Local 5 Oral History Project, ILWU Library, June 14, 2002, 10-12; Mary Winzig, interviewed by Harvey 
Schwartz, ILWU Oral History Collection, ILWU Library, June 11, 2001, Tape 3-4, 17-20; Jeff Hensley, 
interviewed by Edward Beechert, Local 5 Oral History Project, ILWU Library, November 19, 2001, 13-14; 
Brian McWilliams, interviewed by Harvey Schwartz, Local 5 Oral History Project, ILWU Archive, July 
19, 2002, 10-15. 
6 Olney, Local 5 Oral History Project, June 3, 2002, 25. 
159 
workers in town for the ILWU Convention planned to visit Powell’s Books expecting a 
signed contract between the two sides, Amburgey’s response appeared dismissive of the 
union’s capability: “If you feel you need to take it to the public or feel you can apply 
pressure in some other way, that’s your prerogative.”7 In an interview with KBOO in 
March, Brian McWilliams had conveyed a message that the ILWU international was 
preparing itself for just that sort of situation, stating that the union’s convention activities 
might include some visits to Powell’s. “Who knows,” McWilliams speculated, “we may 
have the opportunity to go down and spend a lot of money and buy some books and enjoy 
shopping in an ILWU workplace or some other scenario may happen.”8  
Leaving nothing to chance, Local 5 and the ILWU prepared for the “other 
scenario” with their community and labor partners. Local 5 planned to occupy the space 
in front of the store for an afternoon rally and “Picnic for Justice” on Monday, May 1st, 
which would coincide with local International Workers’ Day celebrations. While Art & 
Revolution crafted puppets and 20-foot tall birds and flowers for the springtime festival, a 
team of radical cheerleaders planned to lead the chants for the booksellers.9 The union 
also planned to distribute solidarity postcards for customers to submit to Michael Powell, 
showing their support for the booksellers. True to form, the union filed an Unfair Labor 
Practice (ULP) with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) this time in response to 
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the promotion of an outspoken anti-union employee over union supporters with more 
experience and seniority in the shipping department.10  
In preparation for May Day, Central Precinct Lt. Mike Crebs of the Portland 
Police Department met with Powell’s Books management to discuss the upcoming 
demonstrations to take place in front of the downtown store. Following the meeting, 
Crebs met with Olney and other ILWU organizers, who asked the officer to close NW 
Tenth Avenue between West Burnside Street and NW Couch Street so Local 5 could hold 
its march, picnic, and rally.11 While Crebs agreed to the request, the police nonetheless 
planned to have eleven officers, including the Mounted Patrol Unit, present.12 Crebs 
attempted, but failed, to get information from the ILWU organizers about the individuals 
and organizations planning the May Day event. Instead, he received information about 
the May Day Coalition’s plans from Powell’s Books.13  
The May Day Coalition, a loosely organized action committee of progressive and 
radical groups created to conduct the celebration, symbolized the collaboration between 
workers’ rights advocates and environmentalists, which coalesced during the anti-
globalization movement’s surge in the Pacific Northwest. Ten days of events and 
preparations beginning on Earth Day preceded the celebration of “International Worker’s 
Day, Beltane, Spring, and resistance to corporation exploitation and control.”14 The 
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coalition intentionally embraced the holiday’s ecological and anarchist traditions by 
holding a picnic in the South Park Blocks complete with a maypole and an unpermitted 
parade through downtown.15 Along the parade route, speakers from four local social 
justice organizations spoke at City Hall, the World Trade Center, the U.S. Forest Service, 
and Powell’s Books to raise awareness for regional working-class and environmental 
campaigns.16 While the planners acquired a permit for the picnic set to begin after the 
parade stop at Powell’s, their decision to forego a permit for the march disrupted police 
preparations and responses since the May Day Coalition did not believe that “the rights to 
speech and assembly should be subject to police approval or regulation.”17 
The Coalition decided on a climatic show of solidarity for Local 5 by ending the 
May Day parade at the union’s rally in front of Powell’s at 5:15 p.m. The day began with 
a contingent rally at 11:00 a.m. in Northeast Portland’s Dawson Park for a “Reclaim the 
Streets/Pirate Parade” before departing on a march, complete with a papier-mâché pirate 
ship float, that progressed eastward as far as NE Fremont Street and NE 15th Avenue 
before turning southwest and crossing the Broadway Bridge on its way to downtown. By 
the time the crowd of over one hundred protesters reached its rally point in the South 
Park Blocks three hours later, the police had arrested seven protesters. At the outset and 
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in the weeks leading up to the event, the Portland police broadly characterized the May 
Day participants as out of town troublemakers and anarchists because the demonstrators 
“dressed in black with facemasks like anarchists often do.18 At the Park Blocks, the 
crowd of demonstrators grew to 350 and at 3:00 p.m. commenced its parade loop through 
downtown.  
Chief Kroeker’s approach to the demonstration, which he justified as necessary to 
protect the community from anarchist mayhem, matched the response taken by the 
Seattle police at the WTO protest and would became characteristic of police response to 
street protest in years to come. The Oregonian and City Commissioner Erik Sten 
estimated that Kroeker had one officer for every two May Day marchers.19 The clashes 
that erupted between the two sides prevented the parade from reaching Powell’s or its 
picnic destination. In response to a chipped window at the Nike Store and demonstrators’ 
resistance to commands to leave the streets, the police responded by pushing back with 
its Mounted Patrol Unit and recently acquired All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs). Video 
footage captured by police and citizen journalists recorded several demonstrators caught 
under hoof or wheel as police repeatedly charged into the parade crowd.20 As marchers 
attempted to prevent the arrest of demonstrators, the Portland police canceled the picnic’s 
permit, declared an emergency to disperse the crowd, and detained those who disobeyed. 
By 4:30pm, the police had surrounded the demonstrators and trapped the crowd against 
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the river wall in Waterfront Park. As demonstrators attempted to comply with 
contradictory police orders to disperse in two different directions, the police thrusted their 
batons into dozens of protesters, fired eight bean bag rounds at demonstrators in three 
separate incidents, and made multiple arrests for those who failed to comply with the 
confusing police directives. “Cops were not telling people where to go, just shouting 
‘go,’” reported Willamette Week’s on-site reporter who witnessed “10 people standing on 
the sidewalk, confused about where to go only to be arrested and placed in zip-tie 
handcuffs.”21 In the chaos and confusion that interrupted the parade, those able to evade 
the police’s kettle regrouped in front of Powell’s Books.  
 Local 5’s May Day rally dramatized the power of the social movement around 
workers’ rights at Powell’s Books. The rally began when booksellers walked out on the 
union’s largest ULP strike to date at the Beaverton location and the City of Books, where 
picketing began at the store’s entrance at noon in preparation for the 5:15 p.m. rally.22 In 
response, management directed customers to leave in preparation for a store lock down 
and pre-arranged request for police presence. Through the large glass windows at the 
store’s entrance, picketing booksellers watched police officers take the seats typically 
occupied by cashiers at the registers, supposedly guarding the store from looters.23 
Booksellers, including John McMahon, considered the request for police in response to 
employees and customers exercising their First Amendment rights a bit ironic for a free 
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speech advocate like Michael Powell.24 Undeterred, a half dozen demonstrators, 
including Margaret Butler of Jobs with Justice, ensured that they were locked inside 
where they sat down for a picnic in the Green Room and sang “Solidarity Forever” until 
the police escorted the group out of the store.25  
Initially, police presence outside the store was minimal, but by 4:00 p.m. riot 
police soon surrounded the store, holding back May Day marchers who regrouped at the 
Powell’s rally to escape the police violence at Waterfront Park. “It was scary as hell,” 
expressed Michael Powell to a reporter from the Los Angeles Times, particularly the “25 
people wearing gas masks, hard hats, and all dressed in black and walking toward my 
store.”26 Picketing booksellers interpreted the scene differently, believing that the police 
intended to again disperse the May Day march refugees. Accordingly, Local 5 members 
called out to them to join their picket.27 “It was one of the heaviest things that I’ve seen 
for year, I would say since the 60s, in terms of just police presence,” stated longtime 
activist and ILWU staffer Marcy Rein, “This was really menacing.”28 
Meanwhile, a Local 5 delegation and nearly three hundred ILWU delegates were 
en route to Powell’s from the Hilton Hotel where the first day of their convention had just 
ended. Along the way, the longshore union rejected a request by Lt. Crebs to cancel its 
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march and rally.29 When Carole Reichstein and Mary Winzig arrived at the intersection, 
they found the store surrounded by riot gear clad officers.30 “I could see my coworkers. I 
could see the people I’d worked with in the community being pushed up against with 
billy clubs, with shields, horses,” recalled Winzig, “I mean, it was like a war zone.”31 As 
Brian McWilliams stepped forward to lead the ILWU contingent across West Burnside 
Street to join the picket, an officer swung and narrowly missed striking the union 
president with a club. Undeterred, Rein recalled that McWilliams’ actions kept the police 
in check and as the union delegates pressed forward the police “melted back” in 
response.32  
There, in the middle of the street under a puppet of Michael Powell and his store’s 
iconic sign, Local 5 booksellers met their fellow ILWU members for the first time.33 The 
walk-out, combined with the hundreds of demonstrators rallying outside the store, 
compelled management to close early for the day, for only the second time its twenty-
nine year history.34 As managers stood watching the picket through the glass window, 
Jim Cowing recalled a witty bookseller appropriating and scribbling the word 
“SHELVE” (a typical management directive given to idle employees) on the back of a 
picket sign for a line of grinning supervisors to take notice.35 For the booksellers, 
longshore workers, and community allies that participated in the action, the importance of 
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this moment proved unavoidable. “It was amazing,” recalled Winzig, “It just made me so 
proud to be there with all those brothers and sisters just taking over the streets. I was like, 
‘Wow! This is what it’s all about.’ This is how revolutions start, this is what life is about, 
this is the workers together changing things.”36  
The energy Local 5 created during the May Day strike continued the next day and 
on throughout the duration of the ILWU Convention, contributing to what booksellers 
described as a power shift at the bargaining table during the following months. The next 
morning, over fifty Powell’s employees attended the ILWU convention to a warm 
welcome by fellow union members. After Winzig delivered a rousing speech, delegates 
gave the booksellers a standing ovation and a couple thousand dollars in cash collected 
from attendees for their strike fund.37 The ULP strike continued for a second day, with 
booksellers participating in the strike and disrupting operations at several of the 
company’s work sites, including the Hawthorne stores, Hoyt warehouse, and Internet 
computer support center.38  
The union kept up pressure on Michael Powell with a “Hands Around Powell’s” 
action on May 4 that again began with a march from the convention hotel to Powell’s 
Books. Booksellers Sarah Race and Ciara McEwan addressed the crowd, raising concerns 
of excessive force by local police on May Day.39 Oregon AFL-CIO President Tim Nesbitt 
and Teamsters Local 206 President Tom Leedham joined McWilliams in addressing the 
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rally, which included community members and a hundred booksellers, some dressed in 
black with dyed hair and piercings, standing arm-in-arm with ILWU convention 
delegates surrounding the store.40 Rein recalled the important role this action and the May 
Day demonstration played in breaking down previously held prejudices between the two 
groups of workers.41 
Jeff Hensley recalled that in his mind the ILWU convention and strike not only 
energized Local 5 but compelled motion at the bargaining table from the Powell’s side.42 
The local printed t-shirts with the slogan “We Shut Them Down” to commemorate the 
May Day strike and bolster confidence in future actions.43 Before the end of the month, 
Local 5 conducted two more ULP strikes, on May 6 and on the Memorial Day holiday.44 
Winzig remembered that the events of May Day and the Convention made her “believe 
what a union can do” as well as illustrate the reciprocal relationship between the union 
and Portland’s social justice community.45 In the wake of May Day, Police Chief Kroeker 
and Mayor Vera Katz received considerable blame for their role in the police violence 
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against the parade from citizens, community groups, and Local 5. At a City Council 
meeting in June, bookseller Matt Baker presented a statement from the union 
condemning the police department’s use of excessive force and its violations of civil 
liberties that included videotaping the booksellers’ picket lines. In his own statement, 
Baker called out police efforts to divide Local 5 and its rally from the May Day 
Coalition's activities earlier in the day: “Even though our tactics and strategies may 
differ,” he stated, “we fully support the Portland activist community in standing up 
against injustice, and likewise, we know the Portland activist community supports the 
ILWU local 5 in our struggle against injustice.”46 In years to come, May Day became an 
annual protest and celebratory holiday for Local 5 and the Portland activist community 
with the number of participants increasing into the thousands. 
Workers’ Rights Board 
Through a collaboration with Jobs with Justice, Local 5 escalated its campaign to 
apply social pressure upon Michael Powell. In April, Jobs with Justice began planning its 
signature Workers’ Rights Board (WRB) hearing for Powell’s employees. The WRB 
presented itself as a community alternative to the NLRB, which union activists criticized 
as slow and secretive. Conversely, Jobs with Justice designed the WRB as an open forum 
to amplify the testimonials of workers to both community leaders and the general public.  
The new WRB occurred in June 2000 two months after both sides agreed to 
federal mediation by experienced labor mediator Jim Bailey in closed door bargaining 
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sessions.47 The process began when Michael Powell received a letter from the WRB in 
mid-May inviting him to its public hearing on his bookstore’s contract dispute. The letter 
stated that Powell’s Books was a local institution and what happened there “either shines 
a light or casts a shadow over the entire community.”48 It listed the names of the fifty-
seven community leaders that comprised the membership of the newly formed board, 
including elected officials, professors, and clergy. The board included City Councilor 
Erik Sten and two Multnomah County Commissioners, plus leading Oregon Democrats 
State Senators Avel Gordly and Frank Shields, sitting State Representative Diane 
Rosenbaum and former Representative Margaret Carter. Moreover, the board members’ 
progressive character was reflected in their organizational affiliations, including the 
Oregon Human Rights Coalition, the Virginia Garcia Clinic, 1000 Friends of Oregon, and 
the Oregon State Public Interest Research Group (OSPIRG). 
The organized and public statement by the community leaders associated with the 
WRB signified a shift in the social pressure campaign directed at Michael Powell that had 
previously involved prominent citizens contacting the bookstore owner individually and 
privately. Michael Cannarella speculated that the names on the WRB letterhead may have 
convinced Powell to settle the contract because the union “finally got to a couple of 
people he cared about [...],” the politicians and community leaders who Powell saw as his 
peers.49 Powell declined the invite in a written response to the WRB signatories, but 
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expressed some optimism in the federal mediator’s ability to negotiate a mutually 
agreeable settlement over the union’s demand for a security clause, which Powell argued 
would force him to “fire employees whose personal convictions do not support a labor 
organization.”50 Winzig recalled the surprise and anger from Rabbi Ariyeh Hirschfield 
when he heard the testimony of booksellers, including Ryan Van Winkle’s testimony 
about how even during a good month his hourly wage did not leave him with enough 
money to replace his only pair of shoes and left him needing to choose between a 
doctor’s or a dentist’s appointment.51 Nine employees provided testimony, including 
Doug Chase, who was a vocal opponent of the union during the election campaign. Chase 
testified about how witnessing Larry Amburgey’s behavior at bargaining sessions swayed 
him to support the union, “It was difficult to watch the attorney insult my co-workers.”52  
The WRB summarized its findings and recommendations in a letter to Michael 
Powell, concluding that the company’s behavior during negotiations violated four 
“fundamental community values:” democratic rights, right to a living wage, right to 
healthcare, and freedom from discrimination. The WRB recommended that the bookstore 
owner agree to a union shop “as an affirmation of the democratic process and the 
principle of majority rule and equal taxation for services rendered.”53 Powell chose not to 
attend the WRB and instead called Multnomah County Commissioner and board member 
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Diane Linn to set up a private meeting that occurred in early July. Previously, Powell 
refused to meet with any employees or community leaders about the campaign and, for 
the first time, Powell admitted to the community leaders, including Rosenbaum who 
chaired the June hearing, that he understood now that he would have to sign a contract 
that included some version of a union security clause that required employees to become 
members of the local.54 Furthermore, with nearly 75 percent of the workforce 
participating in ULP strikes, management's hope for a decertification campaign to 
materialize and oust the union proved unrealistic by June. Still, after so much resistance, 
Powell’s reversal on bargaining surprised some booksellers, including John McMahon.55 
Forging a Contract 
 Michael Powell and the management team’s new motivation to bargain increased 
the pressure on the Powell’s negotiating committee and the booksellers to decide on 
priorities for a first contract. While some booksellers welcomed the entry of Jim Bailey 
as a federal mediator who could bring the two sides closer together, other union activists 
observed that the dynamic created by mediation “lowered the temperature” of the 
exchange and freed the company from the public scrutiny or public shaming that seemed 
to have proved so effective. Additionally, the mediation stage heightened the role of 
ILWU Organizing Director Peter Olney and decreased the role of the workers on the 
committee, as Olney became the lead negotiator for the union against Amburgey with Jim 
Bailey mediating between the two leaders privately.56 The tension within the local 
focused on the question of how much could the union achieve in its inaugural contract. 
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Olney expressed frustration with some Local 5 members’ aspirations for a first contract, 
recalling that some of the union-activists had expectations that were unattainable without 
significantly more union power and leverage.57 Olney clarified his point by detailing the 
difference between might and right; from the outset of the campaign, he sought to impart 
upon the organizers that regardless of whether a demand was just, in order to win the 
union needed to hold “the power to force the employer to accept [the demands].”58 To 
that point, Local 5 began collecting boycott pledges in April from customers to take place 
on Labor Day if management continued to resist the union’s contract terms.59 
After fifty-three bargaining session over the course of ten months and the 
assistance of a federal mediator, both bargaining teams finally agreed upon a three-year 
contract that included significant improvements for Powell’s booksellers. The 
breakthrough occurred on August 1, 2000, nearly a year after negotiations began, when 
management and Local 5 announced a tentative agreement for a collective bargaining 
agreement at the end of a five-hour meeting. Anxious to put an end to the conflict, 
Michael Powell looked forward to turning the company’s attention “to maintaining 
Powell’s position as the best independent bookstore in the land.”60 The twelve-member 
union bargaining team unanimously recommended membership ratification of the 
contract. “We feel it represents a positive step for us, for Powell’s Books, for retail 
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workers in general and for the Portland community,” it stated.61 In sharp contrast to the 
narrow union election sixteen month earlier, employees overwhelmingly voted to 
approve the first contract by 293 to 37 with an 80 percent turnout.62 Bookseller Meredith 
Schafer explained the dramatic reversal in numbers compared to the union election as the 
product of a cultural change that took place in the workplace, initiated by the union 
election campaign but ubiquitous during the contract campaign as workers lost 
confidence in management after seeing its antagonism at the bargaining table.63 Schafer 
added that employees no longer ascribed to the culture management propagated of 
trusting its decisions.64 In bright colored chalk, union members announced the final vote 
tally on the sidewalk outside the Burnside store and set their aim on growing their local. 
“Welcome to Powell’s. Ask us about organizing your workplace,” their message 
proclaimed.65 
The union claimed victory with the contract, pointing to both economic gains and 
new policies that protected employees from disciplinary mistreatment. The union 
solidified 18 percent wage increases for employees over three years and immediate full 
vesting in the company’s 401K retirement program, economic accomplishments that far 
outpaced any of the gains made by the UFCW at its unionized bookstores. Moreover, 
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Local 5 resurrected the Compensation Committee that management disbanded prior to 
the union drive. It also won a grievance procedure to settle disputes during the length of 
the contract and eliminated at-will termination with the inclusion of a progressive 
disciplinary procedure and just cause policy for discharge. Furthermore, the union fought 
off efforts by Powell’s to increase the employee cost for health care and preserved the 
popular childcare benefit.66 The local championed the contract’s Partner Program 
arrangement with Powell’s, through which the union would retain and distribute to 
members 10 percent of sales that originated from Local 5 directing visitors to Powell’s 
online store.67 While Michael Powell conceded on the union security clause, the union 
compromised by agreeing to a “conscientious objections” clause, that allowed a limited 
number of current employees to refrain from joining the union or paying the fair share of 
cost bargaining a contract so long as the booksellers contributed an equal amount to 
charity.68  
Although Michael Powell preferred not to deal with the union and was forced to 
give up some of his employer power by signing a contract with his workers, the 
agreement included several of his bargaining team’s initial goals and secured 
management’s authority over all aspects of the business not addressed in the contract. 
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Local 5 lost the fight for a successor clause in the contract that would have secured the 
union’s presence if Powell sold the company. The local also gave up its paid lunch breaks 
in return for a onetime 6.67 percent pay increase.69 Furthermore, Powell’s Books won a 
broadly written management’s rights clause over how to operate the business as well as a 
no strike clause that prevented workers from striking during the length of the contract.70  
Local 5 found involving members in the day-to-day needs of the union more 
difficult after signing the contract, but the union-activists who carried the weight of the 
campaign continued to provide critical leadership in the first months.71 The two-year 
union struggle left many booksellers exhausted and fatigued, helping to explain the low 
meeting attendance and voter turnout during the union’s first elections. The first task the 
union took on was the drafting of the local’s constitution, which took nine meetings 
totally over twenty hours.72 In comparison to ULP strikes and contentious contract 
negotiations, the task of the nineteen member constitution committee proved far less 
exciting and saw only thirty-one members of the bargaining unit cast ballots when the 
committee presented its proposal for approval in early October.73 In December, the union 
newsletter included discussion about the low member participation and the names of six 
newly elected officers, who ran unopposed. 
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The new officers discovered that they needed to simultaneously learn how to 
operate the affairs of a union local, continue organizing booksellers, and represent 
members against management's efforts to reinterpret the contract. As the ILWU 
international staff turned their attention to other issues, Local 5’s new leaders needed to 
learn as much as they could about running a union local.74 Fortunately for them, the local 
labor movement continued to help with LERC providing additional training to prepare 
members for enforcing their contract, conducting administrative affairs, and handling 
arbitration and safety concerns.75 Mary Winzig, who received the sole nomination for the 
local’s first president, stated that she hoped she could get booksellers to become active 
members in their union and participate in the local activist community.76 Expectedly, 
organizers and bargaining team members filled the other union officer positions. Jim 
Cowing, known as the “numbers guy” on the union’s bargaining team, became the 
union’s first Secretary/Treasurer, and veteran Powell’s employee Jeff Hensley became 
the union’s Chief Steward. Carol Edwards defeated John McMahon to become the 
union’s first Vice President in the only position that went to a ballot election. Hoyt 
warehouse worker Ryan Takas became the Union Representative and the only paid staff 
member of the union, responsible for internal and external organizing at a $2,250 
monthly salary.  
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When a series of management provocations and a shift in the nation’s political 
climate occurred in 2001, many employees again turned inward towards the union. Early 
disagreements between the union and management regarding the interpretation of the 
contract provided the context to motivate members into action. Certain workers perceived 
the conservative shift in national politics, in particular the incoming administration of 
President George W. Bush, as a fundamental threat to the labor movement. Such 
realizations compelled Cowing, McMahon, and others to stay involved in Local 5’s 
solidarity work.77 Yet, provocation or politics aside, many booksellers indicated that the 
union provided opportunities for them to share talents and develop new skills. For 
example, Mary Zartman described the enjoyment she found in writing a monthly column 
in the union’s newsletter.78 Nevertheless, Cal Hudson clarified that complacency proved 
a major obstacle for Local 5, more so than any anti-unionism from managers or fellow 
employees. “It’s easier to get people to fight a battle than it is get them to contribute to 
the day-to-day operations of the local,” noted Hudson.79 This dynamic was particularly 
true for workers new to the company, who did not experience the union organizing or 
contract campaigns.  
Early contract interpretation battles between booksellers and Powell’s 
management involved the company’s educational benefit, the contract’s automatic track 
promotions clause, and management’s changes to its timekeeping policy. Despite hopes 
for a new era of goodwill, there was little space for such sentiments during the first 
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months of the agreement as Local 5 and Powell’s management clashed over these 
contract interpretations. Powell’s Books began offering an educational stipend prior to 
the union campaign but Local 5 secured and increased the benefit within the first 
contract, providing thirty employees each quarter with a $300 maximum stipend for 
qualifying educational classes.80 When management changed its past practice of covering 
multiple classes as long as the total was under the maximum stipend to only covering the 
cost of one class, booksellers cried foul and initiated a resistance campaign on the shop 
floor. True to past form, booksellers began wearing stickers with the slogans 
“Unskooled” and “‘Class’ War” that conveyed their united opposition to management’s 
policies.81 The union campaign compelled management to agree with the original intent 
of the agreement, securing the full monetary benefit, without needing to go to arbitration. 
Additionally, Local 5 succeeded in negotiating a settlement with the company on the 
automatic track promotion clause, which Meredith Schafer attributed to both bookseller 
and Union Representative Ryan Takas’ leadership on the issue and the union’s 
democratic decision-making process.82 
Local 5 viewed store management’s changes to the timekeeping policy as out of 
line with its past practices, but consistent with the company’s recent shift to a more 
corporate approach to managing employees. Management’s unilateral timekeeping 
changes proved the most contentious issue with the booksellers in the post-contract 
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period and had an impact upon employees that continued for years. The transition from a 
lenient to a strict observation of timekeeping policies preceded the union campaign but 
was formalized by February 2001 into a new Timekeeping Policy. Winzig described the 
timekeeping policy as the union's Achilles’ heel, an issue that both challenged the 
booksellers’ previous control over their workdays and undercut their just cause contract 
clause.83  
The union believed that management, who lost its right to terminate employees at-
will with the union contract, sought to reclaim its control over firing employees by a strict 
enforcement of the timekeeping policy and filed a Class Grievance. Booksellers, who 
found their clock-in times and the length of their lunch breaks increasingly scrutinized, 
saw management’s pivot on timekeeping as retribution for the union and a means to 
terminate employees using the rules of the contract. Schafer was quick to observe that the 
company began using time keeping as a disciplinary tool “when they need to get rid of 
you.”84 Powell’s booksellers spoke out together on the timekeeping policy by wearing 
stickers that called attention to the issue and in writing an open letter to Michael Powell, 
requesting that he meet with employees on the issue. “We are not machines,” declared the 
letter signed by over 140 workers.85 The booksellers critiqued the company’s rigid 
application of the timekeeping policy, which the employees argued existed “to intimidate 
workers and make them forget about their rights on the job.”86 In February 2002, 
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management agreed to negotiate with the union on the contentious topic and as a result a 
settlement was reached before the issue went to arbitration. In return for the union 
dropping all grievances and foregoing arbitration, management revised the policy and the 
disciplinary actions that were taken against members for timekeeping violations in the 
preceding year.87 
Organizing the Unorganized 
 With the Powell’s contract bargained and signed, Local 5 union activists began 
looking to fulfill their primary non-Powell’s related goal: growing the local by organizing 
the unorganized. Although Local 5 gained two new bargaining units within six months of 
receiving its union charter, the growth did not come from new organizing campaigns in 
the Portland metro at its own initiative. Rather, the expansion resulted from the 
international union organizing workers into Local 5 to avoid placing them in traditional 
longshore locals. Subsequently, Local 5 came to represent distinctly different 
occupational groups geographically separated by hundreds of miles and, ultimately, 
pulled the union away from its goal of spearheading a new union movement in Portland.  
At the same time, the Powell’s Books campaign inspired the booksellers at 
Seattle’s University Book Store to begin organizing a union with the ILWU. Similar to its 
counterpart in Portland, University Book Store was its city’s largest independent 
bookstore and a local institution, operating on the University of Washington's campus 
since 1900. In September 2000, soon after Local 5 approved its first contract, four 
University Book Store employees drove to Portland to meet with a group Powell’s union 
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activists. The two groups of booksellers discussed organizing and shared their 
motivations for unionization. “They talked, as we have, about widespread dissatisfaction 
with pay” and worry about losing benefits, stated University Book Store employee 
Zachary Marcus.88 In December 2000, the Seattle booksellers initiated an organizing 
campaign modeled on the Powell’s experience and delivered a petition signed by thirty-
four booksellers that informed the company of their intent to organize a union with the 
ILWU. If the bookseller organized like the Powell’s workers, store management’s written 
response and warning that “a union would drastically change our culture” echoed the 
sentiments once expressed by Michael Powell.89 In January, Local 5 booksellers visited 
Seattle to share their experience with the booksellers interested in unionizing.90 Although 
the campaign did not succeed and was not an official Local 5 project, its existence 
demonstrated the power of Local 5’s story to inspire workers to organize. 
As the Powell’s booksellers were finalizing the details of the tentative agreement, 
two hundred miles away in Coos Bay workers at the South Coast Hospice voted to join 
the ILWU.91 When the hospice workers joined the ILWU in March of 2000, the 
longshore union found itself amidst uncertainty regarding where their new fellow 
unionists fit into the traditional longshore workforce. While the local ILWU membership 
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generally supported the international’s efforts to grow the union by organizing within 
new economic sectors, the longshore membership proved reluctant to allow non-
longshore workers into its established locals. The union’s tradition of autonomous rank-
and-file control of locals, dominated by longshore workers, led to the international union 
deciding to assign the thirty-five-member South Coast Hospice bargaining unit to Local 5 
instead of longshore Local 12 in Coos Bay. Without any deliberation with Local 5, 
international officials informed Powell’s union members of this decision and local’s new 
administrative duties for the Coos Bay workers. While from the beginning Local 5 union-
activists articulated a vision of organizing the unorganized, the ILWU’s inclusion of the 
Coos Bay bargaining unit into Local 5 created challenges for the Portland based 
booksellers that had the opposite reaction. First, the distance to Coos Bay proved 
exceedingly difficult for a workforce and union officers that relied on bicycling and 
public transportation, creating an obstacle for officers to stay in contact with the workers. 
Furthermore, the enthusiastic union activists envisioned Local 5 being more of a local 
leader in organizing within Portland rather than a regional repository for ILWU 
organizing campaigns. Second, the inclusion of the South Coast workers into Local 5 
occurred as the local’s officers adjusted to the new responsibilities enforcing the Powell’s 
contract, creating additional workload for a local trying to establish roots. 
In January 2001, Local 5 acquired another bargaining unit over one hundred miles 
away in Olympia, Washington. Similarly to how Powell’s employees selected the ILWU 
as their union, the food-service workers at Evergreen State College shopped for a union 
in the fall of 2000 after several months of organizing and ultimately decided on the 
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ILWU over the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and two other unions.92 Initially, 
the bargaining unit of over forty workers planned to join Olympia’s ILWU Local 47, but 
soon after the election the international union decided to place the workers within Local 
5.93 Within less than six months after receiving its union charter, therefore, Local 5 
expanded to comprise nearly five-hundred members all within their first collective 
bargaining agreement and spread out between worksites over 350 miles apart. Powell’s 
Books and their union hall one block from the City of Books became the geographical 
and administrative center for the new local. These challenges prompted the union to 
approve an amendment to its constitution in December 2001 that restricted Local 5’s 
geographical jurisdiction to Portland, Olympia, and Coos Bay.94 
 The contract agreement reached between Local 5 and Powell’s provided the union 
the security, foundation, and platform to speak out on political causes and integrate itself 
into the local activist community. Three days after the union signed its first union 
contract, the Local 5 joined the Cascadia Forest Alliance to host a public forum entitled 
Labor/Environmental Solidarity and a Sustainable Portland.95 The union marched in the 
streets with fellow unionists in opposition to fast track approval by Congress of the Free 
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Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a trade agreement similar to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but expanded to include nearly all countries of in the 
Americas.96 In another show of unity with the local labor movement, Local 5 joined 
several other unions and passed a resolution at its April membership meeting calling 
upon the city council to reverse its decision to join the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force. Unions feared that the FBI could use the partnership to 
suppress organized labor’s political activity.97 The union, under the leadership of Jim 
Cowing, joined in international solidarity actions to protest the felony riot charges levied 
upon a group of Southern longshore workers known as the Charleston Five for picketing 
a non-union dock company.98  
The ILWU’s expanded organizing program during President McWilliams’ term 
and the creativity of Powell’s booksellers intersected during a surge of activity and unity 
among social justice movements. The gains made by Local 5 booksellers in their first 
contract with Powell’s Books reaffirmed the union-activists’ motivations for organizing 
and positioned the small but ambitious new local with the narrative, experience, and 
community to continue its organizing and political work throughout Portland. Brian 
McWilliams officially signed the union charter for Local 5, describing the moment as 
“one of my proudest moments as President of the ILWU.”99  
Peter Olney described the Local 5’s founding as a “crowning achievement” for 
McWilliams that would not have happened “without his commitment and dedication.”100 
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Despite this success and other new organizing campaigns, the ILWU’s membership voted 
against McWilliam’s bid for a third term in office. Only three days after Local 5 reached 
a tentative agreement with Powell’s Books, sitting Vice President and McWilliams 
challenger James Spinosa won 61 percent of the vote to unseat the incumbent 
president.101 In his final report to the membership in the union newspaper, the outgoing 
official addressed the disturbing trends he observed within the union. At the top of 
McWilliams’ list was low member participation and voter turnout for the union election, 
which totaled only 20 percent of the membership. “What we are witnessing is the 
withering away of a dynamic democracy,” stated McWilliams.102 He went on to 
denounce the narrow self-interest of those factions with the ILWU that criticized the 
union’s new organizing initiatives as competing against the interest of the current 
membership. 
As for the booksellers of Powell’s, seemingly nothing could disrupt their 
aspirations for Local 5 or confidence in its future. When asked about the next steps for 
Local 5 in the spring of 2001, union President Mary Winzig expressed only excitement 
and confidence in the local’s future. “It’s not going to stop here, it can’t,” Winzig stated, 
“it’s too big of a movement.” The campaign and Local 5 “captured the imagination” of 
onlookers and the labor movement, because she declared: 
a bunch of booksellers stood up to a multi-millionaire and did creative things. We 
didn’t do the normal union type tactics, and because we are such an economy 
based on service, we definitely are going way beyond this. [...] We are going out 
here actively hoping to have people join up with Local 5. We want to start a retail 
association, we want to work more closely with other groups. [...] We want to be a 
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respected force in this community, and we want to do it right. [...] We have to go 
beyond Powell’s Books […].103 
Winzig’s described visiting the ILWU’s library in San Francisco after the contract 
campaign and the moment she realized the historical significance of the Powell’s 
booksellers’ actions. While there, she saw a display case with a Local 5 button placed 
alongside other medallions from the union’s past, prompting her to consider the 
“blending of past and future, longshore workers and booksellers.”104 With their union and 
contract certified in writing, Local 5 set itself to the task of organizing the unorganized 
and preparing for its next round of contract bargaining in three years.
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Conclusion 
The Powell’s Books union campaign represents an indispensable Portland 
contribution to the reinvigorated global and national labor movement of the late 1990s. 
This new wave of union activity included unprecedented efforts to organize bookstores 
throughout the nation. Unexpectedly, employees at Borders Books, Barnes & Noble, and 
Powell’s Books initiated two dozen union drives across the country between 1996 and 
2004. At times, the bookstore campaigns seemed like breakthrough moments for a labor 
movement that struggled to organize the retail sector. In fact, many of the most notable 
campaigns were initiated not by union staff organizers but by rank-and-file bookstore 
clerks, who used the internet to share information, coordinate actions, and create informal 
national bookstore unions. Yet the only bookstore union that organized during this era 
and remains today is ILWU Local 5 at the Powell’s Books chain. This campaign 
succeeded where other bookstore campaigns failed because the ILWU and the Portland 
labor community 1) prioritized the development of the workers’ organizing skills and 
confidence during the election campaign and 2) collaborated to create a social movement 
that put sufficient economic and social pressure on the bookstore’s local ownership. 
Ultimately, while a collision of factors within the bookselling sector of the economy and 
the labor movement produced the Powell’s union recognition campaign, a confluence of 
action, purpose, and unity by social justice organizations spelled success for Local 5 
during contract bargaining.  
Although Mary Winzig described the Powell’s campaign as unique, she clarified 
her assessment by noting that “every organizing drive is unique, but every organizing 
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drive is the same.”1 This circular assessment became a driving point of inquiry for this 
thesis. However, the fact that the labor movement had never seen a campaign like the 
struggle conducted by Local 5 meant that while many facets of the union drive served as 
exemplar lessons for organized labor to heed, the context of the struggle prevented it 
from representing a road map to unionization for other workers or for the revitalization of 
the labor movement more broadly.  
Michael Powell’s accelerated corporatization initiatives for his regional bookstore 
chain in the 1990s were a response to the rapid and intense economic conglomeration of 
bookselling advanced by the Borders Group, Barnes & Noble, and Amazon. Furthermore, 
Powell’s countered advances by his competitors in computer technology with a corporate 
realignment of his chain’s labor process in the 1990s. Rather than get left behind, Powell 
embraced computerization of his vast inventory, online bookselling, and increased 
corporate control as well as the rationalization of the labor process inside his stores. 
Nevertheless, these changes compelled resistance from employees, culminating in a 
union campaign led by his booksellers. The labor dispute became the store’s central issue 
for nearly two years, raising questions about the long-term viability of the Portland 
cultural institution. 
The union aspirations of Powell’s employees were not an aberration in 
bookselling, but emblematic of a national trend among booksellers in this era. These 
booksellers considered unionization indispensable to them as workers and to their 
position within the transmission of literary culture during a tumultuous era of 
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bookselling. In response to the conglomeration of the industry, the occupational identity 
of booksellers in the late 1990s and early 2000s embraced a certain air of resistance to 
corporatization and globalization. Such developments led to the remarkable rise in the 
number of attempts to unionize around the occupation of bookselling. Segments of the 
Borders and Barnes & Noble workforce found commonality of cause and experience, 
organizing informal national booksellers’ unions through the internet. These organizing 
initiatives, in particular the campaign at Powell’s, responded to businesses’ attempts to 
incorporate booksellers’ knowledge and expertise into computer systems and centralize 
the labor process under management’s direction. When these conditions, which allowed 
employers to transform the duties of retail workers duties into something akin to factory 
work (forecasted by political economist Harry Braverman’s in the 1970s) arrived to the 
bookselling sector in the 1990s, booksellers across the country including hundreds in 
Portland enlisted in the labor movement.2 
Workers and disaffected union militants, either on the margins of organized labor 
or wholly excluded, initiated the revitalization of the labor movement in the 1990s. 
Workers centers, living wage coalitions, and organizations such as Jobs with Justice and 
the reinvigorated Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), provided unorganized 
employees and those union-activists demoralized by the AFL-CIO’s seemingly out of 
touch relationship with the American working-class the means to challenge an 
increasingly globalized corporate business community on the grassroots level. The AFL-
CIO’s New Voice slate unseated the union’s entrenched leadership in 1995 and carried 
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out a series of reforms over the next three years that prioritized more funding and 
recruitment for new organizing campaigns. By the time the Powell’s booksellers sought 
union representation in 1998, these national and local developments had staged resources 
and networks of support for new campaigns like the one that emerged at Powell's Books.  
The ILWU, UFCW, and Teamsters all contributed to this era of new organizing, 
including in the bookselling sector. However, only the ILWU achieved anything but 
fleeting results in the labor movement’s attempts to unionize the nation’s bookstores. The 
West Coast longshore union’s organizing success was primarily the product of the 
union’s Organizing Department under President Brian McWilliams between 1994 and 
2000. Under the direction of McWilliams, the ILWU outreached to unorganized workers 
with the goal of pulling up into its ranks as many workers as possible. The union 
contributed a third of the international’s budget to organizing and provided unwavering 
support to new organizing projects such as the Powell’s Book campaign.  
Powell’s efforts to thwart the ILWU after the union’s narrow election victory 
proved a decisive failure and, on the contrary, the company’s actions polarized a super 
majority of the workforce behind Local 5. Although a surface reading of the April 1999 
union election results suggested Powell’s employees were evenly divided between the 
company and the union, the truth of the matter was that a significant number of “No” 
votes remained on the fence and open to persuasion. Indeed, management miscalculated 
its support among employees and further degraded bookseller loyalty to the company 
through its dismissive and retaliatory actions during the contract campaign, such as the 
termination of union leader Marty Kruse in October 1999. Case in point, booksellers 
regularly credited Powell’s attorney Larry Amburgey's caustic conduct at bargaining 
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sessions as a prime motivator for siding with the union. The combined impact of 
management’s missteps in the contract bargaining era unified booksellers around Local 5 
and almost guaranteed the union’s victory if the Local could maintain its organizing pace. 
 The Local 5 union campaign forced Portland’s self-identified liberals and 
progressives, some of whom had only a superficial appreciation for unions, to confront 
the issue of economic class publicly in their city’s “living room.” Do workers who labor 
for benevolent liberal business owners deserve the same solidarity from liberals and 
progressives given to other more precarious or disadvantaged employees? This dilemma 
played out in the editorials and published letters to local newspapers, as well as among 
politicians and civic leaders. However, no other Portland liberal felt the blunt edge of this 
quandary more than Michael Powell, who had regularly recognized the role of unions in 
his civic pursuits but expressed cynicism and bewilderment at why such measures were 
necessary at his store. “It’s ironic that I’d be attacked by labor as a capitalist running 
dog,” stated Powell.3  
Although Powell did respond to the union challenge with several textbook union 
avoidance strategies, the civil liberties advocate was unwilling to completely sacrifice his 
liberal reputation and public identity for the cause of defeating the union. In fact, this 
provided Local 5 an advantage throughout the labor dispute. Whereas most employers 
confronted with a union election take an aggressive position at the outset of a union threat 
before the labor organization takes advantage of an opportunity to position itself as a 
legitimate power in the workplace, Powell attempted to appeal to the workers on a 
personal and intellectual level during the election campaign only to lose by a few votes. 
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In comparison, Powell distanced himself from the subsequent contract bargaining dispute 
and relied on intermediaries, surrogates, and allies within the community to discredit the 
union. Yet, the company’s aggressive actions, including policy changes and the firing of 
Marty Kruse, had the opposite of the intended effect during the contract struggle. Rather 
than invalidate the Local 5, these actions reinforced in the minds of a growing number of 
booksellers the practical necessity of the union. While Powell’s strategy failed to prevent 
the union from acquiring a contract, it did allow the bookstore owner to preserve his 
liberal reputation within the community.  
The wellsprings from which the Powell’s booksellers derived their organizing 
success were their initiative, self-organization, and unrelenting creativity in planning 
collective actions. Particularly during the period of contract negotiations with 
management, Local 5’s ability to organize creative actions with varying levels of 
intensity and militancy allowed workers to act accordingly to their comfort level. 
Beginning with a ten-minute break-out or a read-in, then escalating to a walk-out to 
attend a bargaining session, and then finally taking part in street theater or ULP strikes to 
disrupt business, Local 5 introduced unionism to booksellers through imaginative and 
empowering collective actions that aligned with the culture of the store and its 
employees. While the union-activists wrote prolifically about the organizing campaign 
and contract negotiations, workers’ consciousness about the amount of power they could 
wield if they acted in concert with each other, other unions, and the broader community 
accelerated through direct action. In the fullest sense of historian Alan Trachtenberg’s 
descriptive explanation of a workers’ strike, Local 5’s work stoppages represented a 
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“rupture” of the prevailing obedience to authority in public life and generated “a sense of 
positive freedom” for the union’s working-class participants.4 
The Powell’s booksellers’ selection of the ILWU as their affiliate union allowed 
for the workers’ initiative and creativity to translate into a sense of belonging and place 
within the labor movement as Local 5. Despite the administrative challenges that awaited 
the union after they signed their first contract, the autonomy of chartering their own local 
allowed booksellers to enter into a new world of organized labor on their own terms and 
conditions. Rather, than restraining either the culture or creativity of the booksellers, the 
ILWU fostered its development while providing its knowledge on how to effectively take 
actions to win concessions at the bargaining table. The booksellers’ initiation into the 
broader labor movement came in a series of strikes in the spring of 2000, when organized 
labor joined their business halting pickets. The most powerful message of solidarity came 
when union workers in the transportation sector refused to cross the booksellers’ picket 
lines, temporarily shutting down crucial supply and delivery channels for the company. 
Paramount to Local 5’s success and ability to change the economic possibilities 
for future Powell’s employees was the union’s partnership with Portland’s social justice 
community that induced a social movement around Powell’s Books and its workers. 
Local 5’s collaboration with Jobs with Justice and the Art & Revolution Collective 
proved integral in catapulting the campaign from an isolated workplace struggle into a 
cause célèbre for the city’s progressive, anti-globalization movement. From the outset, 
Powell’s employees possessed the wherewithal to link their union effort’s success to the 
                                                          
4 Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1982), 89. 
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support of the local community. The booksellers’ first call after deciding to organize was 
not to a union but to Portland’s branch of Jobs with Justice, an organization that 
represented labor’s leadership in rank-and-file cross community alliances. Activist artists 
from Portland’s Art & Revolution Collective produced unforgettable imagery and 
choreography that communicated the union’s goals to an attentive city populace. These 
and other partnerships resulted in a network of sympathetic customers willing to disrupt 
business and even boycott the store if necessary. 
In trying to account for why contract negotiations took so long, critics may 
contend that the direct-action tactics of union and its allies stiffened the resistance of 
Powell’s management and delayed resolution. In part, this explanation assumes that both 
sides possessed an equal share of the power engendered in time. On the contrary, until 
both sides reached an agreement, the union’s power remained tenuous and, thus, 
management possessed an overwhelmingly advantage regarding time. Therefore, the 
company held a definite interest in prolonging contract negotiations for as long as 
possible in hopes that the union would either lose momentum and sign a weak contract or 
fall victim to a decertification campaign, as other bookstore unions in this era 
experienced.  
Instead, Local 5 used public demonstrations to assert immediate pressure on 
Michael Powell and allies in the wake of such actions to spur collateral pressure from the 
community. Whereas Michael Powell and his store’s management were the public 
targets, the audiences for these actions were as equally influential and included both 
employees and the general community. Between October 1999 and May 2000, bookseller 
participation in the union’s actions steadily increased which generated a sense of unity 
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among workers. Furthermore, the pickets and strikes lead by the labor community and 
street theater conducted by Art & Revolution defused the in-store tension between the 
union and Michael Powell through the broader Portland community. This approach 
provided liberal community leaders the preconditions to intervene publicly, particularly 
through Jobs with Justice’s Workers’ Rights Board hearing, and call upon Michael 
Powell to end the contract dispute by compromising with the union. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle in 1999 and Portland’s 
revival of May Day in 2000 also forged the bonds of solidarity and mutual aid between 
Local 5 and its community allies. Few other events of the 1990s inspired as much 
imagination or righteousness within the anti-globalization movement as the WTO 
protests. The choreography and effectiveness of the protests, plus the incidents of 
property destruction and police violence captured on television, raised the nation’s 
awareness of the activities of the WTO and globalization. Yet, these same factors 
contributed to the growing militarization of local police forces in the early 2000s and 
changed how cities and law enforcement agencies planned for and policed political 
demonstrations. Case in point, the City of Portland and its police department were 
influenced by and used the property destruction that occurred during the WTO protests as 
justification for their preparations and response to May Day 2000. Despite these efforts, 
and possibly a byproduct, Portland’s May Day became etched into the historical memory 
of the city’s progressive and radical communities. Thereafter, the holiday has grown in 
numbers in Portland and continues to provide anti-capitalists, immigrant rights activists, 
and unionists an annual day of celebration, protest, and confrontation with the police.  
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Local 5’s strategic use of Unfair Labor Practices (ULP) provided the union with 
the justification and security to take progressively bolder economic actions that 
ultimately were responsible for the union’s headway at the bargaining table. In this 
regard, the ILWU took advantage of management’s inexperience in the field of labor 
relations and trained booksellers to recognize and respond to the company’s ULPs. 
Conversely, the booksellers distinguished themselves as quick studies of labor law, filing 
ten ULPs within the eight months between October 1999 and May 2000. These 
allegations became the justification for eleven union work stoppages during the same 
time period, beginning with a modest ten-minute “break-out” in protest of Marty Kruse’s 
firing. Subsequent work stoppages involved greater intensity and escalated the economic 
and social pressure upon Michael Powell to sign a contract with the booksellers. Local 5 
demonstrated that the strike, the collective withholding of labor power for even the 
briefest of moments, remained workers’ most valuable tool to wrench improved 
conditions from an employer.  
Through their actions on the picket line and contributions at the bargaining table, 
women booksellers and staff organizers demonstrated that their leadership drove the 
union campaign’s success. When the ILWU’s Marcy Rein was in Portland for the 
campaign, she recalled thinking of her fellow organizers as the “fabulous all-girl 
organizing team” because by the end of the contract campaign most of the organizing 
team members were women.5 Rein described the collaborative efforts of the skilled 
ILWU staffers Anissa Couey and Patricia Schultz; Jobs with Justice organizer Margaret 
                                                          
5 Marcy Rein, interviewed by Harvey Schwartz, Local 5 Oral History Project, Anne Rand Library, 
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, San Francisco Calif., June 14, 2002, 13. 
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Butler; and the numerous women booksellers and union activists as “refreshing.”6 Union 
women, in particular, turned out in numbers to solidarity actions for the Local 5 
booksellers, including a picket in July by 150 women in town attending the AFL-CIO’s 
Western Regional Summer Institute for Union Women.7  
An analysis of Local 5’s document archive combined with the union activists’ 
oral narratives illustrates the formation of a distinct working-class culture and 
consciousness among Powell’s booksellers. In fact, the rhetoric utilized by the union, 
company, media, and public revealed that all parties involved conceived of the labor 
dispute as a cultural content. The values and perspectives communicated through 
workers’ essays, artwork, strikes, and solidarity actions with the social justice community 
demonstrate a collective occupational identity and resistance to corporatization. On its 
part, Powell’s management dismissed the workers’ vision as incompatible with 
uncompromising retail market forces and the store’s collegiate work environment. The 
company’s growth and continued leadership in the retail book sector amidst the union’s 
continued presence within the workplace suggests that the contest did not adversely affect 
the store or the public’s loyalty to the business. Historians in the future may well 
determine that the unionization and subsequent compromises contributed to the store’s 
financial successes during the years that followed. Nevertheless, the coexisting cultures 
proceed accordingly to their respective contractual powers in the workplace, colliding 
every so often into a labor dispute.  
                                                          
6 Rein, Local 5 Oral History Project, 13. 
7 Mary Winzig and Marcy Rein, “Labor Board Cites Powell’s Management for Discrimination,” Press 
Release, ILWU Library, ILWU Local 5 Document Archive, July 11, 2000. 
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The transition from the fight for the union to the administration of the union’s 
affairs proved challenging for Local 5. While this is not entirely uncommon for a new 
union, the fact that the booksellers chartered their own local made the change 
proportionally more difficult. The union activists responsible for initiating the organizing 
campaign and who successfully bargained the contract overwhelming remained involved 
within the local as officers and stewards, providing much needed continuity for the union. 
Disagreements over contract interpretation provided fodder for the local to mobilize the 
membership into union activity and continued to provide opportunities for the more 
militant-activists members to take actions. However, the unexpected addition of two new 
bargaining units, hundreds of miles away in opposite directions, into Local 5 so soon 
after the Powell’s contract agreement put its new leadership in an unfamiliar terrain. The 
Powell’s workers’ transition from organizing to administration following the signing of 
their first contract raises questions for historians not addressed in this thesis. The topics 
of how the booksellers secured a second contract, handled changes in leadership, and 
attempted to achieve their aspirations for spearheading a new era of retail unionism that 
happened to coincide with foreign wars and a domestic Great Recession appear 
particularly ripe for future historical inquiry. 
*** 
 During the three years following the signing of a contract, the United States 
underwent a dramatic political and economic change. The country experienced an 
economic recession in 2001 followed by the nation’s entry into two wars linked to the 
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland. In response, the 
ILWU and Local 5 took an oppositional stance to President George W. Bush’s war in 
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Iraq. Closer to home, a majority of workers at the South Coast Hospice voted to decertify 
the ILWU as its union in August 2002, only ten months after signing their first contract. 
As the Powell’s booksellers grappled with administering the affairs of the local during a 
time of recession and war, the booksellers continued to build and organize their union in 
preparation for their second round of contract negotiations. When Powell’s management 
and Local 5 met in July 2003 to begin bargaining for a second contract, both sides 
expressed hope for a far less acrimonious experience this time around. However, 
negotiations proved as equally difficult as before, stretching on until March 2004 before 
both sides reached an agreement. Wages and health care again became sticking points. 
Consequently, the union returned to the picket line and conducted two ULP strikes in 
November that brought the labor dispute back into the local spotlight.  
As historians begin to evaluate the labor movement in the 1990s, the national 
wave of bookstore union campaigns that occurred at the decade's close merits concerted 
inquiry. Despite the many defeats, these bookstore organizing campaigns remain 
significant because of the booksellers’ creative and trailblazing use of the internet as an 
organizing tool. Furthermore, Local 5’s successful union drive at Powell’s Books stands 
out as a point of light against a dark backdrop of failed retail organizing campaigns 
across the nation. With over three hundred workers, the Powell’s bargaining unit was 
larger than any other bookstore campaign of its time. Moreover, Local 5 is the only union 
from this era of bookstore organizing to still exist today. Indeed, the UFCW’s strategy of 
targeting a corporation’s public image and pressuring a company into a neutrality 
agreement to facilitate worker organizing has proved effective for certain union drives. 
Nevertheless, ILWU Local 5’s experience illustrated the value of a worker-centered 
200 
strategy that takes direct action alongside community partners. The retail sector is 
currently the largest employer in the U.S. and has a miniscule union density rate of 5 
percent.8 If organized labor hopes to regain its influence within the retail sector, society, 
and among the unorganized working-class, greater analysis of the national bookstore 
union wave of the 1990s and the Powell’s Books campaign can help illuminate a path 
forward for the labor movement.
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